The Deserving Patient: Blame, Dependency, and Impairment in Discourses of Chronic Pain and Opioid Use by Nickerson, Maureen
Antioch University
AURA - Antioch University Repository and Archive
Dissertations & Theses Student & Alumni Scholarship, includingDissertations & Theses
2016
The Deserving Patient: Blame, Dependency, and
Impairment in Discourses of Chronic Pain and
Opioid Use
Maureen Nickerson
Antioch University Seattle
Follow this and additional works at: http://aura.antioch.edu/etds
Part of the Anthropological Linguistics and Sociolinguistics Commons, Discourse and Text
Linguistics Commons, and the Public Health Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student & Alumni Scholarship, including Dissertations & Theses at AURA - Antioch
University Repository and Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations & Theses by an authorized administrator of AURA - Antioch
University Repository and Archive. For more information, please contact dpenrose@antioch.edu, wmcgrath@antioch.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nickerson, Maureen, "The Deserving Patient: Blame, Dependency, and Impairment in Discourses of Chronic Pain and Opioid Use"
(2016). Dissertations & Theses. 309.
http://aura.antioch.edu/etds/309
  
THE DESERVING PATIENT: BLAME, DEPENDENCY, AND IMPAIRMENT IN 
DISCOURSES OF CHRONIC PAIN AND OPIOID USE 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty of  
Antioch University Seattle  
Seattle, WA 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements of the Degree 
Doctor of Psychology 
 
 
 
By 
Maureen Nickerson 
July 2016 
 
 
ii 
  THE DESERVING PATIENT: BLAME, DEPENDENCY, AND IMPAIRMENT 
IN DISCOURSES OF CHRONIC PAIN AND OPIOID USE 
 
This dissertation, by Maureen Nickerson, has  
been approved by the committee members signed below  
who recommend that it be accepted by the faculty of the 
Antioch University Seattle at Seattle, WA in partial fulfillment  
of requirements for the degree of 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
 
 
_____________________ 
Mary Wieneke, Ph.D. 
Chairperson 
 
 
 
_____________________ 
Phil Cushman, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
______________________ 
Elin Bjorling, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
______________________ 
Date 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by Maureen Nickerson, 2016 
All Rights Reserved
1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
THE DESERVING PATIENT: BLAME, DEPENDENCY, AND IMPAIRMENT IN 
DISCOURSES OF CHRONIC PAIN AND OPIOID USE 
Maureen Nickerson 
Antioch University Seattle 
Seattle, WA 
 
Negative stereotypes about people with chronic pain pose a barrier in the delivery of 
care; contribute to worsening symptoms of physical and psychological distress; and play 
a role in policy decisions that adversely affect patients and providers. Pain-care seekers 
may be accused of malingering, laziness, mental aberration, attention seeking, and drug 
seeking. The propagation of stigmatizing attitudes was explored in this Critical 
Discourse Analysis of online-reader-comments responding to a series of pain-care policy 
articles published by a large metropolitan newspaper. Results suggest that framing pain 
patients as legitimate and deserving can inadvertently reproduce the inequities advocates 
seek to redress. Ascriptions of deservingness were associated with the locus of choice 
and agency. Assignments of blameworthiness were used to distinguish the legitimate 
pain patient from the illegitimate care seeker. Motivation for seeking pain care, as much 
as the effects of opioids, provided crucial determinants in evaluating legitimacy claims 
and blame ascriptions. Evaluations of deservingness were predicated on the valence of 
social regard. Compassion, empathy, respect and believability were rewards of positive 
social regard. The subjects of addiction and drug abuse were maligned to the detriment 
of people with pain and people with opioid addiction alike. The disease-entity model of 
2 
 
 
chronic pain was associated with psychiatric discourses of mental illness through a 
narratives inaccurate reality perception. Loss of independence, rationality, and 
respectability were semantically linked to negative stereotypes of pain patients, drug 
addicts, and mentally ill groups. Medical discourses drawing on empirical materialist 
traditions assert taken-for-granted population categories (e.g. chronic noncancer pain 
patient) with little acknowledgment of confounding variables, lack of evidence, or their 
social impact. For the benefit of people seeking care, there is a critical need for moral, 
logical, and empirical analyses of predicating factors in education and care giving 
decision-making. The electronic version of this dissertation is at AURA: Antioch 
University Repository and Archive, http://aura.antioch.edu/ and OhioLINK ETD 
Center, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/etd 
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 An acquaintance who works in office administration for a large urban clinic 
inquired as to the topic of my research. I replied, “stigma and chronic pain patients.” 
Her immediate response was to interrupt further explanation to recount stories she had 
heard from the clinicians with whom she worked. Stories of their difficulties in handling 
drugs seekers and malingering patients. She concluded her tale by confirming the 
difficulty providers have in determining who amongst their patients is “just trying to get 
drugs” and who is in “real need” of pain relief. Another colleague, a practicing 
psychologist, informed me that the patients of pain clinics were not actually people with 
physical pain conditions, just personality disorders.  
  These are only two examples of a recurring experience in discussions about this 
research project. These reflexive and simplistic responses are demonstrations of the 
problem at the heart of this paper: The automaticity of the association between the label, 
chronic pain patient, and socially undesirable behaviors (e.g., manipulation), motivations 
(e.g., attention/drug-seeking), and identities (e.g., addict, or mentally ill).  
Introducing the Problem 
 “Relations between pain patients and health care deliverers are considered the 
worst in medicine” (Jackson, 2005, p. 338). 
The Patient Experience 
  There is a body of research covering several decades in Western countries 
attesting to patients’ experience of being shamed, humiliated, invalidated, rejected, and 
discounted when seeking medical care for chronic pain (e.g., Hakanson, Sahlberg-Blom, 
& Ternestedt, 2010; Holloway, Sofaer-Bennett, & Walker, 2007; Lillrank, 2003; 
Marbach, Lennon, Link, & Dohrenwend, 1990; Nettleton, O’Malley, Watt, & Duffy, 
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2004; Slade, Molloy, & Keating, 2009; Walker, Holloway, & Sofaer, 1999; Werner, 
Isakesen, & Malterude, 2004; Young, Park, Tian, & Kempner, 2013). The people in these 
studies hale from different countries associated with Western cultures, yet the findings 
were strikingly similar across studies.  
  Participants reported a history of contentious and distressing interactions with 
various members of the medical establishment. They indicated frequently feeling as 
though they were not taken seriously; that their symptom reports were received with 
overt skepticisms, derision, or accusations of malingering; that they were viewed as 
disinterested in improvements; or that they were only seeking drugs, attention, or 
financial compensation. Some reported that they were ridiculed by health care 
professionals in the presence of others, and/or treated with disdain and callous disregard 
in private consultation. Patients described feelings of fear, mistrust, anger, resentment, 
shame, disillusionment, and a sense of wounded pride arising from their reception in 
medical and social circles. 
  The questions posed to participants in the studies cited above were not designed 
to elicit stories of discrimination, per se. Lillrank’s (2003) Finnish participants, for 
example, were asked only to recount “past and present experiences of back pain and how 
it affects their lives” (p. 1046). Neither did researchers always set out to study the 
experience of stigma. Regarding their English participants, Walker et al. (1999) 
expressed their “shock” at finding such a high prevalence of negative experiences with 
medical providers amongst people who “shared nothing more in common than seeking 
help” (p. 627).  
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  With so many similar stories across studies conducted in different cultural 
settings, it does beg the question: What is happening on a social level to make these 
narratives so common? While this study cannot hope to provide a definitive answer to 
this question, it is intended to contribute to the dialogue already under way.  
The Professional Role 
  It has been observed that pain patients can engender strong feelings of hostility in 
caregivers (Jackson, 2005). There is as yet little research exploring the experiences and 
feelings of health care professionals (HCP, as an aggregate reference to the professional 
community in its broadest sense, including clinical workers, insurance workers, health 
policy-makers, program directors, etc.). One exception found in the literature affirmed 
the patient perceptions reported in the previous section, from the providers’ perspective. 
The providers described feeling pressured to prescribe opioid medications; wonderment 
about the veracity of patient reports; worry about secondary gain, and concern abuse of 
medications (Matthias et al., 2010). These North American providers expressed feelings 
of frustration and guilt, as well as finding their work with chronic pain patients to be 
generally ungratifying.  
  HCPs occupy social roles in which they are tasked with performing gate-keeping 
functions for patient access to treatment providers, technologies, and products. As gate-
keepers, professionals are asked to fill difficult, ambiguous, and conflicting 
responsibilities. To different degrees, professionals occupying different roles within the 
health care community are asked to determine patient veracity; assess the safety and 
efficacy of treatment modalities; uphold the war on drugs; protect the economic interests 
of their employers; and base treatment decisions on patient economic resources over and 
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above medical indication, all while maintaining an ethical focus on patient care (Sullivan 
& Main, 2007; M. Taylor, 2011; Turk, 2002). 
  For providers working with patients being prescribed opioid medications, 
concerns about over-dose and addiction, and fear of criminal allegations resulting in 
encumbered licenses or even prison sentences compound the already difficult situation of 
treating patients who may be desperate for pain relief but for whom no cures exist 
(Højsted & Sjøgren, 2007; Richard & Reidenberg, 2005). What is more, general medical 
education programs have been criticized for lack of attention to pain and pain treatments 
in their core curriculum, leaving many providers unprepared to address the complexities 
involved (Mezei, Murinson, & Johns Hopkins Pain Curriculum Development Team, 
2011; Watt-Watson et al., 2009).    
  While these can certainly be stressful conditions for professionals to work under, 
is this situation really so different from other complex health concerns facing the medical 
industry? Is there something about the intractability of chronic pain, or the ambiguity of 
its etiology that leads to negative attitudes toward those who complain of it? Are pain 
patients the real problem? Or is it the meaning of pain in the grand narratives of our 
societies that underlie the negativity with which these patients are frequently regarded? 
The Partial Solution—A Critique 
   In an effort to promote a solution to the problems facing patients and providers, 
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) has called for increased education for patients, providers, 
and the public that “promote a transformation in their expectations, beliefs, and 
understandings about pain, its consequences, its management and its prevention” 
(Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2011, p. 209). What they fail to mention is the need for 
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increased research into the prevailing “ill-informed attitudes” that have been identified as 
contributing factors in the under-treatment of both chronic and acute pain (IOM, 2011, 
p. 9). Such an endeavor is necessary in order to address the concern that abiding negative 
stereotypes will undermine the goals of improved patient care. It is hoped that this study 
will go some way toward filling this gap. 
  The implication in the IOM (2011) report is that additional education about pain 
and related factors will largely address the impact of stigma on health care practices. At 
first glance, such a position appears almost a truism: Unwarranted negative assumptions 
can be replaced with objective knowledge; unwanted negative associations can be 
neutralized by substituting a palatable descriptor for one that has become provocative. 
Research into the stigma of mental illness (Mann & Himelein, 2008; Pescosolido et al., 
2010), intellectual disability (Danforth, 2002; Jordan, 2005), and HIV/AIDS (Finn & 
Sarangi, 2009) suggests that this process is far from straight forward. 
  Facts do not “float free;” they are attached to beliefs and values, and are applied 
on the basis of individual judgment (Cassell, 1991, p. 24). Advocates may attempt to 
invoke a particular frame in the belief that it will reduce widespread negative attitudes 
only to find through empirical research that it does no such thing, and may actually 
reinforce negative social attitudes (e.g., Danforth, 2002; Finn & Sarangi, 2009; Jordan, 
2005; Mann & Himelein, 2008; Pescosolido et al., 2010). Stigma is sustained in complex 
and non-obvious ways that can defy well-intentioned efforts by anti-stigma campaigners 
to re-label and (re)frame the issues, relationships or identities involved (Pescosolido et 
al., 2010).   
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  Not only does it matter what is taught, it also matters how it is framed, and these 
are far from intuitive (Parker, 1992). On the first point, as it relates to pain management, 
the what is an unknown quantity. There is no existing consensus regarding the definition 
of pain or the line demarcating acute from chronic; or as to what constitutes best practices 
in pain management; or the safety and efficacy of opioid medications in chronic pain 
management (Jackson, 2005). Nor is there consensus with regard to what constitutes a 
real diagnosis (e.g., Erlich, 2003).   
  This is not to suggest that consensus should be a goal of science or clinical 
practice, because that would be anathema to the scientific paradigm of progress (Holmes, 
Murray, Perron, & Rail, 2006). It does mean, however, that there are many overlapping 
and conflicting pools of information from which pain educators could draw, and which 
may or may not achieve the stated ends. It also means that the field could benefit from 
additional research critiquing, synthesizing and clarifying existing knowledge claims 
informing the development of large scale public educational interventions.   
  Knowing what frames to use in presenting pain in educational materials is equally 
problematic. As a review of the literature will show, the existing frames in dominant 
medical discourses are quite varied and sometimes contradictory. Pain is a debated 
construct within medicine and the larger societies in which we live. It is conceived as, 
among other things, a disease; a symptom; a function; an effect; an emotion; a 
biopsychosocial phenomenon; something deserved; something random; a thing to endure; 
or a thing to control. Medicine is thought to serve a palliative role in care of the suffering, 
or not so much. Opioid medications are thought to be a boon to chronic pain 
management, or they are seen as more dangerous than useful, especially in cases of long-
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term use. All of these positions have some support in the literature and could therefore be 
used to fill the IOM mandate of increased education, but to what end?     
  Rather than believe there are definitive answers to these questions, this study 
highlights the importance of attending to the intersection of medical/scientific and lay 
discourses pertaining to chronic pain if we are to understand, or affect, the negative 
attitudes toward chronic pain sufferers. 
Study Aims 
  The purpose of this project was to explore the intersecting medical/scientific and 
lay discourses as well as their implications for the treatment of chronic pain patients in 
practice and policy. The data for this analysis was obtained in the context of a public 
debate about evolving state policies on opioid medications in the management of chronic 
pain. The research is undertaken for the purpose of informing efforts by patient advocates 
to increase access to respectful, client-centered, effective and affordable care for patients 
who live with chronic pain.  
Organization of This Dissertation 
  The dissertation begins with an overview of chronic pain, patients frames, and 
treatment issues found in the literature. It will then proceed to a discussion of stigma in 
chronic pain and the centrality of discourse in the organization of social and material 
reality. The third chapter will present an overview of critical realism, the philosophy of 
science upon which the study is predicated, as well as the methodology of critical 
discourse studies. This third chapter will also address researcher subjectivity. The final 
two chapters will present the results and discussion of the analysis of pain-related 
discourse as it appeared in the online responses to the Seattle Times investigative Politics 
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of Pain article series. Clarification of intended use of common terms are interspersed with 
the results and discussion sections.  
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Background and Context: Pain, Stigma, and Discourse 
Pain 
  Persistent or recurring pain is a reality for millions of people around the globe. In 
a 2004 press release, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported statistics released 
by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) suggesting that one in five 
people worldwide suffer from moderate to severe chronic pain (World Health 
Organization [WHO], 2004). The IOM, a congressionally appointed think tank, has 
estimated that one in three adults in the United States are affected by chronic pain (2011). 
According to the same report, the national cost of chronic pain is estimated between 
$560–$635 billion annually. This figure includes both treatment costs and work-place 
productivity lost to sick days and disability. Qualitative research attests to the profound 
impact of chronic pain on the lives of those who experience it (Ojala et al., 2014; 
Thomas, 2000). 
  The problems associated with inadequate pain management in the United States 
were considered to be of such magnitude that advocates successfully prevailed upon 
Congress to take action. In the year 2000, the United States Congress declared a Decade 
of Pain Control and Research, an act signed into law by then President Clinton (Lippe, 
2000). Ten years later, in 2010, Congress directed the department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and the IOM to examine pain as a public health problem (IOM, 2011). 
The hope of both undertakings was that increased attention and elucidation of the 
problem would lead to increased efforts in research and medical education for advancing 
pain care, prevention, and palliation.  
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  From these sources, it is made clear that chronic pain is a problem of staggering 
proportions with a considerable economic burden for patients and society. What is less 
clear is who and what are being referenced with the use of these terms. 
  Pain conditions and pain patients. The health conditions that can lead to a life 
of chronic pain are myriad (Banning, Sjøgren, & Henriksen, 1991; Breivik, Collett, 
Ventafridda, Cohen, & Gallacher, 2006; Tsang et al., 2008). Chronic Pain Conditions 
(CPC) can arise from developmental conditions (e.g., Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome), injury 
(e.g., spinal fracture), disease (e.g., multiple sclerosis), infection (e.g., HIV/AIDS), 
metabolic disorders (e.g., diabetes), and treatment after-effects (e.g., neuropathy 
subsequent to chemo-therapy). Chronic pain is also common sequelae for torture 
survivors (Thomsen, Eriksen, & Smidt-Nielsen, 2000). (See Table 1 for a partial listing 
of medical diagnoses associated with chronic pain.) 
  The source of patient’s chronic pain may remain enigmatic to medical science 
(e.g., phantom limb syndrome or chronic muscular pain). CPCs may be characterized by 
episodic pain (e.g., recurring migraine headaches), or the pain may be experienced as a 
constant companion (see Thomas, 2000). Some CPCs produce observable physical signs; 
the severe spinal curvature resulting from advanced ankylosing spondylitis, for example. 
Often, however, CPCs have no outwardly observable manifestation; we may only know if 
someone has Crohn’s disease or osteoarthritis if we are given that information. 
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Table 1 
Partial List of Diagnoses Associated With Persistent or Recurring Pain 
Ankylosing spondylitis Irritable Bowel Syndrome 
Arachnoiditis Multiple Sclerosis 
Arthritis (rheumatoid, psoriatic, osteo) Muscular scar tissue 
Behcet’s disease Myofascial Pain 
Bursitis Oncological Complication 
Cancer Pelvic Inflammatory Disease 
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Post-Herpetic Neuralgia 
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome Sacroiiac joint dysfunction 
Complex Regional Pain Syndrome/ 
aka Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy 
Sciatica 
Diabetic Neuropathy Scleroderma/systemic sclerosis 
Disc degeneration Sickle Cell Disease 
Ehlers-Danlos syndrome Sjøgren’s syndrome 
Endometriosis Spinal fracture 
Fibromyalgia Spinal Stenosis 
Frozen Shoulder (joint capsule) Spondiliosis 
Glaucoma Spondylolisthesis 
Gout Stroke induced neuropathy 
Guillain-Barre syndrome Systemic Lupus Erythematosus 
Hemophilia Temporomandibular joint dysfunction 
Headache disorders Tendinitis 
HIV/AIDS Trigeminal Neuralgia 
Inflammatory Bowel Disease Vulvodynia 
Injury to PNS or CNS Whiplash 
Interstitial Cystitis  
 
  Given the multitude of health conditions, psycho-social factors, and wide 
variation in the availability of effective treatments, it should come as no surprise that the 
life circumstances of people who develop CPCs are equally diverse. People with CPCs 
may be adults, senior citizens, or children and adolescents (Ramage-Morin, 2008; 
Ramage-Morin & Gilmour, 2010). They may be employed or unemployed, financially 
independent or recipients of public benefit programs (see Marbach et al., 1990).  
  People with chronic pain may or may not be receiving or pursuing pain care (see 
Slade et al., 2009). They may describe treatment as efficacious or report that nothing has 
yet led to desired improvements. Some disorders and injuries are more frequently 
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diagnosed in particular subpopulations. For example, epidemiological research has found 
that women are approximately twice as likely to be diagnosed with fibromyalgia then are 
men (Weir et al., 2006).   
  Some people with CPCs experience debilitation from their pain while others do 
not. Variations in individual reports of pain severity, longevity, and impact on 
functioning have been noted between and across diagnostic categories (McCracken, 
Matthews, Tang, & Cuba, 2001). Genetic (Williams et al., 2012), hormonal (Wiesenfeld-
Hallin, 2005), social (Andersson, 2004), ethnocultural (Bates, Edwards, & Anderson, 
1993) and psychological (Pincus, Burton, Vogel, & Field, 2002) factors have all been 
offered by way of explaining the distinctive manifestations of pain in individual patients.  
  Little in the way of cross disciplinary scholarship examines whether or how these 
explanatory hypotheses may be resolved into an integrated phenomenology of pain. 
Rather, the inherent variance of subjective experience is seen to present a problem of 
categorization: To what sphere does the report pertain, the physical or the mental, the 
objective or subjective? Is the complainant in need of physical interventions to redress 
pathological processes, or does their situation require a different response? These 
questions are hardly academic. How they are answered carries profound implications for 
how people with CPCs are received and responded to, particularly when treatments are 
not as successful as providers or patients would hope.     
  Definitions and taxonomies of pain. Pain is often given as the primary reason 
that people consult health care providers (IOM, 2011). Nevertheless, operational and 
conceptual definitions of pain are in a surprising state of disarray. Lay dictionaries 
provide biomechanical and metaphorical definitions of pain (see Miriam-Webster 
13 
 
 
 
dictionary online). Meanwhile, scientists and practitioners debate the properties by which 
pain can be subdivided into categories of prognostic value; the extent to which pain 
correlates with structure; and whether it is, at its base, a purely psychological state (see 
International Association for the Study of Pain [IASP], 2012).  
  There is even an argument being made that, as neurological phenomena, 
emotional and physical pain are “ontologically identical” (Fields, 2007, p. 43). The idea 
that physical and emotional pain are experienced synonymously has also been the subject 
of psychology research and theorizing (G. MacDonald & Leary, 2005). The idea is 
supported with some experimental data from animal studies in which affiliative 
neurochemicals (e.g., oxytocin) administered to rats was shown to reduce sensitivity to 
physical pain (Uvnäs-Moberg as discussed in G. MacDonald & Leary, 2005).      
  Pain in a clinical context may be considered acute, chronic, chronic 
cancer/malignant, chronic non-cancer/malignant, neuropathic, inflammatory, and/or 
psychogenic (arising in the psyche). Pain is sometimes considered to be a symptom of 
some underlying pathology; at other times it is conceived as a disease entity in its own 
right (Siddall & Cousins, 2004; Tracey & Bushnell, 2009). Pain is also described in the 
professional literature as a biopsychosocial phenomenon (Roy, 2001).  
  The biopsychosocial conceptualization has been criticized for lack scientific 
validity, and for ostensibly ignoring the biological components of chronic pain 
(Manchikanti, Boswell, et al., 2009). The literature using the biopsychosocial language 
has been criticized for ignoring the social-environmental factors associated with pain 
reports (Blyth, Macfarlane, & Nicholas, 2007). It would seem that psychological factors 
are receiving greater focus in medical explanations of chronic pain. The fact that patients 
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may hold a primarily biomedical view of their pain experiences, in contrast to the 
profession’s focus on psychological factors, has been cited as a source of contention in 
medical encounters (Roy, 2001).  
  Medical taxonomies of pain usually begin with two super ordinate classifications: 
chronic or acute (Ferrell, 2003). Chronic pain is further divided into categories of cancer 
and non-cancer pain (IASP, 2012). The way in which pain is assigned to these different 
categories is not without problems. While these terms convey a temporal relationship, 
and are vaguely suggestive of etiology, the situation is considerably more nuanced. 
  Acute pain—nature’s alarm system. Acute pain is frequently identified as having 
a “distinct onset, obvious cause, and short duration” (Ferrell, 2003, p. 323). It is this type 
of pain that is associated with sudden and/or damaging changes in physical structures. A 
minority of individuals are, through congenital factors, disease, or injury, unable to 
perceive pain and may live forshortened lives as a result (Nagasako, Oaklander, & 
Dworkin, 2003). This has contributed to a conceptualization of pain as having an 
evolutionary advantage: Pain alerts us to the presence of potentially life threatening 
conditions and motivates behavioral responses designed to preserve our physical integrity 
(Woolf & Ma, 2007). Such a function must, logically, follow form. 
  Nociceptive fibers in the peripheral nervous system are attributed with being the 
structure through which the alarm system functions. These stratified nerve cells transmit 
signals to the central nervous system in response to mechanical (e.g., inflammation), 
chemical (e.g., capsaicin), or thermal irritation (Woolf & Ma, 2007). The activation of 
these fibers creates a neuronal chain reaction that includes interpretation of the stimulus 
as painful, assessment of degrees, and initiation of response—not necessarily in that order 
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(Fein, 2012). As with any structure, damages and glitches in the system are potential 
sources of disrupted function.  
  Chronic pain—the convoluted designation. Definitions of chronic pain are rather 
more convoluted; and inconsistent in the literature. It begins with the distinction between 
cancer and chronic non-cancer pain (CNCP). In the first case, it is simply unrelenting 
pain in the context of malignancy. In the second, persisting pain is not associated with an 
active cancer diagnosis. The distinction is not academic—it is translated into policies and 
treatment guidelines that directly impact the types of pain care a patient may receive 
(Jovey et al., 2003).    
  The utility of sorting CPCs into broad categories of malignant and nonmalignant 
is rarely addressed in the context of its use. It appears to be deployed primarily in 
discussions of opioid therapies for long term pain management (e.g., Kalso, Edwards, 
Moore, & McQuay, 2004). This is the question that does not seem to have been asked by 
researchers: Does the etiological diversity of CPCs confound empirical research into 
opioid responsiveness in an undifferentiated sample of CNCP patients? 
  People with CPCs represent a heterogeneous group of people that defies 
reductionist classifications and stereotypes. Yet such pathological diversity in the sources 
of persistent or recurring pain, as well as the divergent manifestations of pain 
experiences, is erased with the reductionist terminology that is used to denote and delimit 
pain related-constructs. As a taxonomical label from the treatment literature that is used 
in policy-making discourse, CNCP suggests a population homogeneity that simply does 
not exist. 
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  Chronic non-cancer pain is . . . everything else? A widely accepted definition of 
Chronic non-cancer pain (CNCP) is that which persists past a time of expected healing, 
or as “pain that continues when it should not” (IOM, 2011, p. 278). The delimitation of 
expected healing time, however, is rather difficult to determine, given the wide variance 
in clinical presentations (Apkarian, Baliki, & Geha, 2009). As these authors point out, 
different injuries or illnesses have different expected healing times. This is something 
that is not always acknowledged in discussions of patient presentation, pain research, or 
treatment guidelines and decisions.   
  The International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP), Task Force on 
Taxomony (1994), frequently cited as the authoritative definition in the literature, states 
that including the specifier of healing time in the definition of chronic pain is traditional 
(citing a 1953 article by Bonica). They acknowledge that healing periods vary as a 
function of injury and context and suggest it would be simpler to conceptualize chronic 
pain as that which “persists for a given length of time” (p. xi). Therefore, three months is 
offered as “the most convenient point of division” but they suggest a preference for six 
months in the context of research (p. xi). This trifurcated, and seemingly arbitrary, 
definition is inconsistently translated into the professional literature.    
  Citing the IASP’s 1994 taxonomy, Apkarian et al. (2009) use a definition in 
which chronic pain is understood simply to be “pain that persists past the healing phase 
following an injury” (p. 82). A 1986 definition from the IASP is quoted by Denisco, 
Chandler, and Compton (2008) as “pain persisting more than 90 days beyond the period 
of injury” (p. 7). They do not mention healing time.  
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  Ferrell (2003) cites the IASP definition simply as a duration of three months, with 
no mention of initiating injury.  Researchers in a study of CPC prevalence in Australia 
specified only that the pain must occur “every day [emphasis added] for three months” 
(Blyth et al., 2001, p. 128). Breivik et al. (2006) cite a definition credited to the IASP as 
pain “without apparent biological value that has persisted beyond the normal tissue 
healing time, usually taken to be 3 months” (p. 309).  
  The IASP (1994) has suggested that chronicity may be established earlier for 
cancer pain then for CNCP. They state that in the case of cancer pain, “three months is 
sometimes too long to wait before regarding [it] as chronic” (p. xi).  It is tempting to 
suppose this delineation arises from the presence of an observable nociceptive source of 
sensation. Yet this distinction ignores the existence of CPCs attended by nocioception, 
effectively collapsing such apparently distinct disorders as rheumatoid arthritis, post-
herpetic neuralgia, and musculoskeletal pain. 
  Categorizing chronic pain. Confounding efforts to deploy pain terms with any 
specificity, various CPC diagnoses can fall into different categories depending upon 
which proposed taxonomies are in use. Costigan, Scholz, and Woolf (2009), for example 
separate nocioception from chronic pain, even for conditions associated with 
inflammation. Ferrell (2003), on the other hand, subsumes the latter into the former in 
delineating nociceptive from neuropathic chronic pain. Other authors have distinguished 
between functional somatic syndromes, characterized by “medically unexplained 
symptoms” (e.g., Irritable Bowel Syndrome), and CPC diagnoses of “a clear medical 
origin” (e.g., Inflammatory Bowel Disease) (Looper & Kirmayer, 2004, pp. 373, 374).  
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  Some chronic health conditions which can lead to persistent or recurring pain may 
not be included under the rubric of chronic pain at all. Sickle Cell Disease and 
hemophilia provide two examples which did not appear in literature searches using key 
words of chronic pain. Yet it would appear that patients with these chronic and 
potentially painful conditions are also vulnerable to under-treatment of pain arising from 
misunderstandings and negative attitudes about pain and palliative care (Labbe, Herbert, 
& Haynes, 2005; Witkop et al., 2012). 
  Pain—the disease. Historically, medical science has conceived of pain as a 
symptom of underlying disease/injury processes (Siddall & Cousins, 2004). The goal of 
physicians, according to this view, is to rectify the underlying cause, thereby alleviating 
the pain. When the underlying cause cannot be remedied, or when it is unknown, pain 
becomes the primary focus of medical attention and symptom management interventions. 
Perhaps this is one reason that the conceptualization of chronic pain as a diagnostic entity 
in its own right—a disease of the central nervous system rather than a symptom of other 
distinguishable pathologies—is gaining ground (Tracey & Bushnell, 2009).  
  The central thesis of this disease model of chronic pain holds that the experience of 
chronic pain is due to identifiable changes in neural structures and their function (Tracey 
& Bushnell, 2009). These authors report, support for this hypothesis is based on 
neuroimaging research demonstrating hyperactivity in brain regions associated with 
processing strong emotion and physical pain. The idea arises from an understanding of 
pain as nature’s alarm, which in the case of chronic pain has sorely malfunctioned. The 
problem left unstated, of course, is the confounding variance of CPCs. Can osteoarthritis 
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and fibromyalgia, to name a mere two, be reduced to the same underlying 
condition—malfunctioning neuronal activity in the brain?   
  Chronic pain, in a temporal sense, may have an obvious biological cause, and, 
when arising in the context of chronic disease processes, e.g., multiple sclerosis, may not 
have a healing time at all. For this reason, some researchers have noted a need for more 
precise nomenclature. Giordano (2011) takes up the relatively uncommon but seemingly 
useful term, maldynia to denote a “wild-type chronic pain” that is characterized by its 
“nonpurposivenss” and escalating severity (p. 1). It is this wild-type of pain that some 
now consider to be its own disease entity. 
  Similarly, Manchikanti, Singh, Datta, Cohen, and Hirsch (2009) explicitly 
distinguished “chronic pain syndrome” from other forms of chronic pain in the definition 
used in their research: “Pain that persists 6 months after an injury and [emphasis added] 
beyond the usual course of an acute disease or a reasonable time for a comparable injury 
to heal . . . that may continue in the presence or absence of demonstrable pathologies” 
(p. E35). They contrast chronic pain syndrome as “a complex condition with physical, 
psychological, emotional, and social components” (p. E35). How these definitions are 
understood as distinctive and contrasting is not clearly articulated.   
  Some writers specify neuropathic disorders as the intended referent of the disease 
model of chronic pain (Costigan et al., 2009). Others, such as Siddall and Cousins (2004), 
argue in favor of the disease conception of chronic pain even in conditions of chronic or 
recurrent nociceptive pain. These authors explain that “continuing nociceptive inputs” 
lead to pathological changes in nerve function as well as disruptions in mood, cognition, 
and social domains (Siddall & Cousins, 2004, p. 510).  
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  In less technical works these ideas are interpreted for popular consumption in the 
metaphor of a malfunctioning alarm system (Thernstrom, 2010). The common thread 
amongst all is the tendency to perpetuate the trend of collapsing CPCs into a single 
category of “chronic pain.” The question unasked is whether or how treatment decisions 
are compromised through ignoring the existence of etiological, mechanistic, or other 
distinctions. 
  It is unclear how definitions of acute, chronic cancer and CNCP in professional 
circulation can account for the diversity of patient presentations, prognoses, and 
treatment options.  What is clear, however, is that these classifications do not provide a 
consistent signifier that can aptly signify the spectrum of painful chronic conditions for 
which people may seek medical management of pain. And while it is acknowledged that 
no consensus understanding exists, the definitions and taxonomies themselves do not 
appear to be the focus of controversy or debate within the literature. Existing 
controversies relate to other pain-related topics. 
  Pain controversies: Ambiguity, opioids, and socioeconomics. Scientific 
disagreements about pain categorization, the validity of particular diagnoses or the 
legitimacy of patient reports of pain intensity are another source of complexity (Lillrank, 
2003; Looper & Kirmayer, 2004; Walker et al., 1999). In some cases (e.g., fibromyalgia 
syndrome), the medical community has not arrived at a consensus regarding the 
ontological status of the diagnostic label (Ehrlich, 2003). Other objectively diagnosable 
conditions, such as degenerating vertebral discs, are controversial in another way. Some 
in the medical community are dubious of the view that compressed or disintegrated discs 
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are the source of patients’ subjective reports of pain, largely because not all individuals 
with visible degeneration provide corresponding reports of pain (Negrini & Zaina, 2013).  
  It is probably unsurprising that these controversies impact provider’s attitudes and 
treatments regarding patients with debated diagnoses (Asbring & Narvanen, 2003). These 
epistemological and ontological debates within the health science community, however, 
also have an impact on the way people with CPCs are viewed in non-medical settings. 
For example, in a qualitative study, Nettleton et al. (2004) reported that psychological 
explanations of pain were associated with a lack of family support for the person with 
chronic pain. Moreover, the atmosphere of disbelief that can result contributes to 
patients’ psychological distress; dissatisfaction with the health care community; and self-
doubt (Nettleton et al., 2004; Roy, 2001).  
  The opioid debate. On-going controversies about the safety and efficacy of 
continuous opioid therapy (COT) are factors in both treatment practices and policy 
decisions (e.g., Breivik, 2005; Rosenblum, Marsch, Joseph, & Portenoy, 2008). Public 
health concerns related to the risk of addiction and overdose, and high black market 
demand have led to regulatory practices that can appreciably obstruct patient access to 
these medications (Gilson, Maurer, & Joranson, 2005). The situation is made more 
complicated by the wide variation in reports of opioid efficacy for CPCs.   
  Different authors make conflicting claims about the efficacy of opioid 
medications in treating CNCP. Compare the following assertions from two published 
research reports. “Opioid medications alleviate nociceptive and neuropathic pain but 
trials reported large individual variation” (Kalso et al., 2004, p. 378). Alternatively, 
“Neuropathic pain is an anomaly because it is insensitive to morphine as well as other 
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opioid drugs” (Stucky, Gold, & Zhang, 2001, p. 11846). HCP consumers of this research 
are left to decide for themselves which of these mutually exclusive truth claims is more 
true.   
  In clinical practice, concerns of addiction and drug tolerance may deter the use of 
these substances for pain, whether from acute, chronic, or cancerous conditions (Albrecht 
et al., 2013; Labbe et al., 2005). Literature reviews of addiction research with pain 
patients found wide variation in the incidence of addiction following COT (see Fishbain, 
Cole, Lewis, Rosomoff, & Rosomoff, 2008; Højsted & Sjøgren, 2007). Højsted and 
Sjøgren (2007) included patients with both CNCP and cancer pain in their review. 
Fishbain and colleagues (2008) focused specifically on people with CNCP in a study of 
incidence of abuse and addiction in patient populations. 
  Local clinics have sometimes made blanket policies proscribing opioid 
medications for chronic pain management (see American Pain Foundation [APF], 2011). 
Some pharmacists have admittedly refused to stock opioid medications, citing fears of 
robbery as well as patient safety (Greenwald & Narcessian, 1999; Morrison, Wallenstein, 
Natale, Senzel, & Huang, 2000). Pharmacy and clinical policies of this nature are 
especially problematic for low income patients who are presented with limited options for 
accessing needed clinical services and pharmaceutical products (Morrison et al., 2000).  
  Reluctance to prescribe opioid medications has also been credited to a fear of 
regulatory scrutiny and the possibility of legal sanctions. To assess the statistical risk of 
this outcome, Jung and Reidenberg (2006) examined legal records of providers who were 
subjected to DEA investigations related to opioid prescribing. They found that when 
medical documentation was adequate, legal actions subsequent to an investigation were 
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infrequent. This may not alleviate concerns for providers who doubt the consistency with 
which “adequacy” is defined by oversight committees.  
  Disparate treatment of pain patients. Available treatments for chronic pain differ 
significantly, as do individual responses within and across diagnostic categories (Cipher 
& Clifford, 2003; Světlík, Hronová, Bakhouche, Matoušková, & Slanař, 2013). Some 
treatments aim to alter the structural or functional sources of pain: knee, back, and hip 
surgeries, for example. In many cases, however, medical, psychological and self-
management strategies for treating CPCs serve a wholly palliative function, to ease the 
suffering of those who may one-day return to health (e.g., cancer patients), or whose 
ailments are presently incurable, e.g., multiple sclerosis (Brennan, Carr, & Cousins, 2007; 
Roy, 2001). Existing treatments differ according to costs, risks, effectiveness ratings, and 
their reimbursement status within the economy of medical benefits. For these reasons and 
more, the full range of treatment options are not routinely available to everyone. 
  Many writers, providers, researchers, ethicists, patients, family members, as well 
as agencies such as the IOM have decried the widespread under-treatment of acute, 
chronic, and malignant pain in medical practice (Albrecht et al., 2013; IOM, 2011). Yet 
this is not a claim that goes unchallenged within the field. Deyo, Mirza, Turner, and 
Martin (2009) argue that chronic back pain is over treated and under studied. This raises 
questions about the medicalization of back pain without attending to sociological factors 
that may contribute to the experience of pain. 
  Ethical dilemma of under-treatment. Notwithstanding the objections to the 
claims of under-treatment, noted above, it is widely accepted that pain, in all its variation, 
is woefully undertreated the world over (IOM, 2011; Lohman, Schleifer, & Amon, 2010; 
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Ward et al., 2004). The term conjures an image of an identifiable bar demarcating 
appropriate from deficient and excessive care, but this not an operational construct.  
  Under-treatment, as it is used in the literature cited throughout this section, is a 
general term referencing a set of problems affecting the delivery of care and resulting in 
absent or ineffective attempts to alleviate pain. These include inconsistent assessment of 
pain; withholding of interventions for any number of reasons; ignorance of available 
treatment options; and lack of available resources. This among other social factors related 
to physical and financial access to clinical care, such as geographical availability and/or 
poverty (see IOM, 2011). Yet even if everyone had physical and financial access to 
medical care, vast differences would still exist in HCP understandings of what constitutes 
adequate pain care. Pain care is not merely a scientific question for medical practitioners; 
it is also an ethical dilemma for people in the health care profession.  
  Socio-demographic factors. Several writers have reported disparities in treatment 
for pain-related conditions based upon demographic variables such as race and gender 
(e.g., Balsa & McGuire, 2003; Green, Anderson, et al., 2003; Sabin & Greenwald, 2012). 
This too has been challenged. At least one study reported that patient gender and race 
were not significant factors in clinical treatment decisions (Weisse, Sorum, & 
Dominguez, 2003). It is interesting to note that, while these authors interpret these results 
as a challenge to the disparity hypothesis, their findings are considerably more complex. 
The gender and race of their physician-participants was found to be an influential factor 
in treatment decisions. In the final analysis, demographic variables were still significant 
albeit in unexpected ways.      
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  The multiple identified reasons people are living with pain that is not well-
controlled are socially complex and ethically loaded (Rich, 2000). There is a well-
documented disparity in access to medical care for many, including people of color, 
immigrants, and those of low SES (Anderson, Green, & Payne, 2009; Balsa & McGuire, 
2003; Mor, Zinn, Angelelli, Teno, & Miller, 2004). Considered research about the course 
and prognosis of specific pain conditions may not be available to guide diagnostic and 
treatment decisions (Deyo et al., 2009). 
  Treatment decisions can be influenced by demographic stereotypes (Burgess, van 
Ryn, Crowley-Matoka, & Malat, 2006; Green, Wheeler, & LaPorte, 2003; Sabin & 
Greenwald, 2012), as well as attitudes toward pain and diagnostic labels (Ansted, 2009; 
Asbring & Narvanen, 2003). Available options are likewise limited by financial 
considerations at the point of delivery (Balsa & McGuire, 2003). Beliefs, access, and 
policies about opioid medications also play a role (Cherny, Baselga, de Conno, & 
Radbruch, 2009; Labbe et al., 2005). 
  Institutional practices. General practitioner education programs do not always 
provide courses in assessment or management of pain of any type (Mezei et al., 2011). It 
has been observed that the curriculum for veterinarians contains five times the number of 
hours devoted to pain care in some university training programs (Watt-Watson et al., 
2009). Reimbursement policies encourage clinical practices that limit the time 
professionals can or will devote to understanding and meeting the needs of individual 
patients (IOM, 2011). In addition, there are politics of government, including cost-saving 
priorities and drug related concerns, which affect current clinical practice and research 
priorities (Gilson, 2010; Gilson et al., 2005; Turk, 2002).  
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  Competing masters. Existing treatments for CPCs vary according to posed risk, 
cost, and effectiveness (Turk, 2002). Compounding this fact is the subjective nature of 
the pain experience and its ambiguous relationship with visible markers of 
pathophysiology. Together, these realities have created complex medical, economic, and 
regulatory pressures on clinical understanding and decision-making in the treatment of 
CPCs (M. J. L. Sullivan & Main, 2007).  
  The oft-times competing social agendas of diverse stakeholders can hamper the 
scientific and social understanding of CPCs, effectively creating barriers to the 
development, production, and distribution of treatment technologies (IOM, 2011). The 
barriers listed above are presumably augmented by the impact of stereotypes and implicit 
biases on individual decisions and social arrangements (Burgess et al., 2006; Meghani et 
al., 2012) 
Stigma 
  Stigma theory has been criticized for its focus on the individual being 
discriminated against rather than those engaging in the discrimination (Sayce, 1998). 
While such a myopic view of stigma is admittedly problematic, it is not a necessary 
component of the construct. Stigma can also be understood as a social process, unfolding 
in ways that are highly context dependent, that normalizes discrimination (including self-
directed negativity), and naturalizes the social order (Blommaert, 2005; Goffman, 1963; 
Scambler, 2009). The problem that Sayce (1998), and others, have identified may reside 
in the lack of attention being paid to the social contexts and normalizing discourses 
whereby stigma receives its meaning and its sustenance (Goffman, 1963).   
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  Stigma is inextricably linked to perceptions of social norms, including those 
associated with the socially acceptable responses to people who fall outside those norms 
(Norman, Sorrentino, Windell, & Manchanda, 2008). Moral judgments and blame 
allocation can be part and parcel of stigma, which is ultimately attached to normative 
expectations of what it means to be a good and desirable human being in one’s social 
context (Goffman, 1963; Yang et al., 2007).  
  Stigma can also be attached to a perceived inferiority or imperfection without an 
attendant sense of blame directed toward the stigmatized (Scambler, 2004). In either case, 
political domination of stigmatized groups is justified through widespread endorsement 
of negative stereotypes which allows for the exercise of power in excluding those of 
lesser social status (Goffman, 1963; Link & Phelan, 2001). All of these elements feature 
in the discourse of chronic pain.    
  Chronic pain as stigma. Stigma is a recurrent theme in the discourses 
surrounding pain. As a reference to a particular set of discourses regarding the enactment 
of social power relationships, it deserves to be held to the same degree of scrutiny as any 
other invocation in the discourse. This is beyond the scope of this study, however; an 
existing body of literature has aligned with this construct which this project is intended to 
connect with and build upon.  
  The existence of noxious views about people with CPCs is incontrovertible, as is 
the distress these views engender, and their political consequences. Stigma is one 
possible conceptual matrix for making sense of these social phenomena. The researchers 
in the qualitative studies of patient experiences cited in the introduction invoke the 
concept of stigma as their explanatory model for the existence, enactment, and impact of 
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negative stereotypes in the narratives provided by participants (Hakanson et al., 2010; 
Holloway et al., 2007; Lillrank, 2003; Marbach et al., 1990; Nettleton et al., 2004; Slade 
et al., 2009; Walker et al., 1999; Werner et al., 2004; Young et al., 2013). 
  Pervasive negative expectations and stereotypes regarding pain patients represent 
the quintessence of social stigma: To have a chronic pain condition (CPC) is to have a 
deeply discrediting attribute that has led to a widespread view that those who suffer from 
or complain about chronic pain may be discountable, illegitimate, tainted members of 
society (applying the definition of stigma provided by Goffman, 1963).  
  Stigma, as a mark of shameful or blameworthy deviance, (Scambler, 2009) can 
create an atmosphere in which disrespect, disregard, and disenfranchisement may be 
viewed (by those with and without CPCs) as socially expected and acceptable responses 
toward people with CPCs (drawing from Norman et al., 2008). The intersection of 
multiple stigmatized identities (e.g., female, person of color, disability status, etc.) are 
identified as contributing factors in disparate reports of pain severity and pain care 
practices (Burgess et al., 2006; Green, Anderson, et al., 2003).  
  On a personal level, repeated exposure to negative stereotypes and stigmatizing 
interactions can have deleterious effects on people’s social relationships, mental and 
physical health, and their general sense of wellbeing and quality of life (Allison, 1998; 
Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009). Enacted in the context of unequal social power (such as those 
involving patients and the gate keepers of medical care—health professionals, payors, 
and policy-makers), stigma involves acts of individual and institutional discrimination 
that can effectively limit life options and access to resources (Link & Phelan, 2001). 
Stigmatizing attitudes influence social relationships, roles and expectations; and directly 
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impact distribution of resources through clinical, policy, and regulatory decision-making 
(IOM, 2011). 
  Felt stigma. Felt stigma refers to stereotype awareness and incorporates both a 
sense of shame for being one of the tainted, as well as the “fear of encountering enacted 
stigma” (Scambler, 2004, p. 33). Participants in qualitative studies indicate that 
perceptions of stigmatization contributed to reduced compliance with treatment 
recommendations. A Hong Kong study of patients with diabetes found that stigma was a 
barrier to implementing symptom management strategies (Tak-Ying, Kwan, & Wong, 
2003).  
  The unpleasant experiences of stigmatization have reportedly led some 
individuals to avoid seeking medical care for their CPC or even other health conditions 
that may have arisen (Slade et al., 2009). Pain-related stigma may also disrupt 
relationships with family, co-workers, employers, and others within patients’ social 
networks (Roy, 2001). This has reportedly led some people to conceal their health 
conditions for fear of the consequences to their social standing (Slade et al., 2009).  
  These effects, including delayed help-seeking, have been described in research 
with patients who experience stigmatization for attributes other than those explicitly 
associated with chronic pain. Similar health impacts were identified in patients who 
present with obesity (Rogge, Greenwald, & Golden, 2004), lung cancer (Chapple, 
Ziebland, & McPherson, 2004), and mental illness (Corrigan, Larson, & Rusch, 2009). 
Stigma associated with potentially painful conditions, such as HIV/AIDS and multiple 
sclerosis, has posed similar problems for these patients in contexts other than pain care 
(Grytten & Maseid, 2005; Vanable, Carey, Blair, & Littlewood, 2006). This research 
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suggests that the experience or expectation of stigma, and not solely issues related to pain 
conditions, play a significant role in patients’ dissatisfaction with the health care 
community. 
  Patient perceptions of stigma have also been assessed in quantitative survey 
analyses using scales for assessing stigma in chronic illness (see Rao et al., 2009). It has 
been suggested that some pain patients may experience greater stigma then do people 
with other stigmatized health conditions, such as epilepsy (Young et al., 2013). The 
migraine sufferers in this study were also grouped according to whether their migraines 
were chronic or episodic in nature; the analysis suggested that chronicity was a factor in 
the experience of felt stigma. Looper and Kirmayer’s (2004) study suggested that felt 
stigma may vary as a function of diagnostic controversy.  
  Enacted stigma. Enacted stigma refers to “episodes of discrimination… on the 
grounds of their social and cultural unacceptability” (Scambler, 2004, p. 33). Previous 
research has documented negative attitudes and beliefs of health care professionals 
toward chronic pain patients (Asbring & Narvanen, 2003; Dobscha, Corson, Flores, 
Tansill, & Gerrity, 2008; Matthias et al., 2010; Phelan, Van Ryn, Wall, & Burgess, 
2009). A smaller body of research has examined the influence of HCP attitudinal 
variables on pain management decisions, usually through vignette studies or surveys 
(Byrne, Morton, & Salmon, 2001; Green, Wheeler, et al., 2003; Labbe et al., 2005; 
McCaffery, Ferrell, & Pasero, 2000; Sabin & Greenwald, 2012).  
  Given the plethora of studies finding felt stigma amongst chronic pain patients 
reviewed in previous sections, it may be tempting to conclude that stigma’s influence on 
pain treatment is a problem relegated to the world of chronic pain. With the exception of 
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Labbe and company, however, most of the studies cited in this section were exploring the 
under-treatment of acute pain. At least one article has explored oppressive dynamics in 
medical encounters with general patient populations, and that from the HCP’s perspective 
(Malterud & Thesen, 2008), but most studies were associated with opioid treatment 
options. Opioids are socially controversial and medically complicated, whether 
discussing chronic or acute pain conditions. 
  Stigma and opioid medications. While debates rage in the literature about the 
efficacy of COT (see Ross, Jamison, & Edwards, 2011), the point has been made that 
constrictive opioid regulatory and hesitant prescribing practices are more a product of 
“opiodophobia and opioignorance” than scientific knowledge (Brennan et al., 2007, 
p. 209). These are terms frequently deployed by those who are sympathetic to the use of 
opioid medications in pain management, tied to a psychological discourse of undesirable 
mind-states.  
  Many writers from this perspective have expressed concern that a significant 
factor in the general problem of under-treatment is the negative attitudes about opioid 
substances endorsed by both patients and providers, even for pain control in end of life 
care (see Rukhadze & Kordzaia, 2011). These authors characterized palliative care in 
their native Georgia as one based on “overwhelming opioidophobia” (Ruhkadze & 
Kordzaia, 2011, p. S159). Others caution authors to avoid hyperbolic debate tactics to 
avoid a “return to opioidophobia,” implying that current reasoning is now past the fear of 
opioid medications, at least in North America (e.g., Ross et al., 2011, p. 508). Yet the 
discourse of Eastern European and North American pain care does not seem so different. 
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  In an apparent attempt to insulate discussions of patient care from the highly 
contentious debates about the use of opioid therapies and the motivations of 
pharmaceutical companies, Goldberg (2010) advocates treating the question of stigma 
toward pain patients and negative evaluations of opioid use as separable phenomena. 
Others have framed antipathy toward opioid medications as subordinate to the general 
problem of misinformation and deficiencies in pain care education within medical 
training programs (e.g., Rich, 2000). It may be, however, that patient interests will not be 
served without attending to the association between perceptions of opioid analgesics and 
attitudes toward pain in the social discourse (Notcutt & Gibbs, 2010).  
Discourse 
  Discourse, language, text, and talk are employed and understood in different ways 
at different times by different people (Potter, Wetherell, Gill, & Edwards, 1990). In 
conversational use, they can be treated as (nearly) interchangeable terms, while in 
academic settings they are delimited on theoretical grounds. Different disciplines within 
social science have developed professional discourses characterized by subtle semantic 
variations in the use of designating terms as well as differing conceptualizations of 
relational significance (Entman, 1993).  
  To add a layer of complication to the picture, differing philosophies of science are 
taken up by different scholars within and across fields (e.g., social constructionist and 
positivist paradigms) which leads to divergent understandings of posited objects (Hardin, 
2000). The practical result is that scholars who are operating within different theoretical 
paradigms can derive competing understandings of what and how to group phenomena 
under designations such as discourse, language, text, and talk (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). 
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  For the purposes of this study, discourses are understood according to 
Fairclough’s (2009) proposition: “Discourses are semiotic ways of construing aspects of 
the world (physical, social or mental) which can generally be identified with different 
positions or perspectives of different groups of social actors” (Fairclough, 2009, p. 164). 
They are meta-narratives that contain and communicate cultural understandings of any 
given subject. 
  Power and sense-making. Discourse theory would suggest that our individual 
and collective attitudes, including stigma and discrimination, are underlain by historically 
specific, interconnected systems of meaning (Karlberg, 2012). These discourses are 
culturally coherent, and reflective of shared normative understandings of the physical, 
social, and moral world. Yet when critically examined, even the most hegemonic 
discourses appear dynamic, splintered, and contended (Parker, 2002).  
  All social practices have semiotic elements (i.e., conceptual communications) to 
which they are dialectically related: Discursive formulations of individuals, roles, and 
issues informs behavior and social structures which are in turn influenced by how we 
think and talk about them (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Discourses shape meanings as they 
are ascribed to and attended by cognitions, motivations, emotions, and behavior of groups 
and individuals (Karlberg, 2012). Cultural and social norms are enacted in and through 
the patterned use of language (Blommaert, 2005). 
  The way in which we as a society talk about issues, the way in which concepts are 
positioned relative to one another in discourse, can facilitate or resist available 
formulations and enactments of social identities and expectations (Parker, 1992). These 
formulations are informed by moral understandings of the good that influence social 
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practices, power relationships, resource allocation, and individual behavior through 
processes of normalization (Blommaert, 2005; Hall, 2001; Parker, 1992).  
  Dominant discourses. Discourses that dominate within particular social groups 
lead to the privileging of certain roles, identities and ideas over others to the extent that 
many voices remain unheard and wield little influence (Blommaert, 2005; Gee, 1998). 
Existing social realities, inclusive of the stratified allocation of privileges in accessing 
social and material resources, are naturalized as the right and expected order of things 
(Parker, 2002). Markers of social identity, and their attendant status, can frequently be 
observed in the way people use language (Blommaert, 2005). They can show up in 
speech dialects, turns-of-phrase, spelling accuracy, sentence construction, reactions to 
prompting events, and even in the construction of our identities (e.g., Gee, Allen, & 
Clinton, 2001).  
  It is not that we can know definitively who a person is by the way they use 
language. Rather, these indexical and contextual cues dictate expectations of production 
(what is said by the speaker/writer) and uptake (what is understood by the listener/reader) 
(Blommaert, 2005). They serve to orient discourse participants to existing understandings 
of the stratification of linguistic repertoires, on the basis of which assumptions of are 
made about the character and qualities of the participants. Poor spelling, for example, 
may lead readers to deride the writer’s intelligence or educational attainment regardless 
of whether an objective correlation has been or can be established in any given case.  
  Access to the linguistic repertoires of various social groups, even within a given 
culture, is itself an object of privilege and an outgrowth of experience (Blommaert, 2005; 
Gee, 1998). English speakers in the United States, for example, do not all speak the same 
35 
 
 
 
language. Even the knowledge of conventions guiding language use in specific settings is 
differentially distributed among speakers of the same mother-tongue (Blommaert, 2005; 
Gee, 1999).  The variance in language production (e.g., accents, jargon, etc.) is matched 
by the variance in its reception (e.g., meanings taken, stereotypes activated, etc.). 
  An Italian study comparing the descriptive language of doctors and nurses found 
that linguistic representations of the clinical significance of pain differed according to 
professional training and norms (Montali, Monica, Riva, & Cipriani, 2011). Patients with 
different language use practices (e.g., men and women) may take very different 
approaches to expressing their symptoms (Strong et al., 2009). People with chronic pain 
who are not members of the medical/psychological/academic communities may not 
encounter the signifiers or the concepts associated with pain patients in these discourses. 
In other words, patients and providers may have very different understandings of 
concepts, phenomenon, and language in how they articulate pain experiences (Kenny, 
2004).  
  These unclarified interpretative confusions can compromise mutual understanding 
in medical encounters. The differential use of language in expressing, positioning, and 
understanding one’s self and others in the world is an under-appreciated, and 
confounding, factor in efforts to understand the meanings and implications of discursive 
practices (see Gee et al., 2001).  
  The embedded subject. Because discourse precedes and forms our participation in 
it, most of our talk and actions are enacted outside of conscious awareness and control 
(Kogler, 1992/1996). In effect, we do not always know why we think or act as we do and 
neither do we fully apprehend the implications of what we say or how it is said.  An 
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ontological hermeneutic understanding of discourse (e.g., Gadamer, 1966/1976; 
Richardson, Flowers, & Guignon, 1999) would suggest that individuals exist within pre-
existing interpretative frameworks for understanding the world. We make sense of the 
conceptual and phenomenological world by drawing on this “implicit stock of unthematic 
background assumptions” (Kogler, 1992/1996, p. 198). The accepted utility of broad 
distinctions between CNCP and chronic cancer pain, for example, operates as 
unthematized background assumptions in discussions of COT.  
  In the normal course of our days, we do not usually pause to consider our current 
historical context or the semantic relationships with which we express our understandings 
(Gadamer, 1966/1976; Parker, 1992). In day to day interactions between people with 
even loosely shared socio-cultural references, such intense reflection on the interpretative 
possibilities within our discourse is not necessary for mutual comprehension (Gadamer, 
1966/1976). This is because understanding is often presumed when speakers deploy 
familiar terms. Whether or not participants hold shared meanings is rarely explored. This 
assumption of familiarity, while necessary for efficient communication, can and does 
contribute to misunderstandings of meaning and significance (Gadamer 1966/1976).    
  The stock of implicit moral, political, and ontological assumptions (or pre-
understandings) which make discourses comprehensible arise from cultural practices 
(including language practices) that precede our existence as individuals (Gadamer, 
1966/1976). As such, discourses transcend the consciousness of the individual interpreter 
who is always embedded in specific socio-historical contexts with access to a repertoire 
of discourses delimited by social status and personal experience (Blommaert, 2005; Gee, 
1999). When we forget this, meanings become more easily misconstrued. It is only when 
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we acknowledge the interpretative nature of our social situation that we think to verify 
whether our understandings are shared with others in the encounter.      
  This does not preclude the possibility of change within social discourses, or the 
possibility of acquiring new understandings and access to new repertoires. It means we 
are generally unaware that our understandings are situated understandings until our 
situation is changed through encounters with different others (Gadamer, 1966/1976). As 
we enter into new situations and adopt new understandings, we come to inhabit a new 
discourse, complete with new subject positions and interpretative frameworks (Gee, 
1998). Through mutual encounters, assumptions (on opioid use, for example) can be 
challenged and changed only if participants are open to the existence and credibility of 
other perspectives (the voice of providers, regulators, and patients).   
  Changes in understanding and discursive participation happens at an individual 
level, as when one is inducted into a professional discourse foreign to one’s previous 
experience. The assumptions which are not activated or challenged during these kinds of 
encounters do not become open for dialogue or influence (Gadamer, 1966/1976). These 
processes, of encountering and adapting to different ideas and perspectives, are also 
occurring at a macro level. Social understandings are transformed through the dynamic 
nature of discursive exchanges between those operating within different situations, from 
different backgrounds, and with differing ideological frames (van Dijk, 2011).  
  Contending discourses and changing frameworks. As social understandings 
change so do the interpretative frameworks (moral, political, and ontological) through 
which facts are made meaningful (Cassell, 1991). By way of example, pain can be (and 
has been) viewed as a sign of divine disapproval; an expected or deserved fate that one 
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must simply bear; a pathway to salvation and clarity; an emergent symptom of 
psychological distress; or a sign of structural pathology, injury or infection, among other 
things (Thernstrom, 2010; Valadas, 2011).  
  Each of these frames arises within a culture’s wider discourses about the natural 
order of things (e.g., religious, medical and psychological discourses). Each frame is 
embedded in a matrix of cultural meanings that elicits different social responses from 
different social actors (Valadas, 2011). These subjects, and social actors, inhabit different 
positions within moral hierarchies that are associated with social standing and stigma 
(Yang et al., 2007).   
  Awareness of changing representations within discourse is complicated by the 
observation that terms of reference can remain in common use while conceptualizations 
of the referent phenomenon are transformed over time and place (Blommaert, 2005). 
Schizophrenia research provides a prime example of this phenomenon. The word has 
remained a common reference in research since it entered the psychiatric vernacular in 
1908 (Fusar-Poli & Pierluigi, 2008). Operational definitions and categorical criteria, 
however, can differ to such a degree that referent populations may be incomparable 
across studies (see Overall & Hollister, 1979).  
  Thus, accepting definitions without reflection (or implicit assumptions about 
chronic pain) renders the divergent and contradictory uses of the terms invisible. Taking 
semiotic devices at face value can lead to a false sense of epistemological and/or 
ontological continuity that can negate efforts to understand, let alone alter, social reality 
(Parker, 1992). Attention to the processes by which taken-for-granted social realities are 
reproduced becomes a necessity, however, when we seek to understand, and particularly 
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when we intend to influence, the social arrangements, moral understandings, role 
expectations, power relationships, and resource allocations within our society (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2009). Critical analysis of discursive practices attempts to open this implicit 
process to explicit observation, reflection, and influence (Parker, 1992).  
  Medical discourses. Issues of pain, patient care, and policy show up in the social 
discourse in ways that are both constituted by and constitutive of social and moral 
attitudes and behaviors toward those who suffer from chronic pain (Wodak & Meyer, 
2009). It can be argued, on theoretical grounds, that professional discourses regarding the 
nature of chronic pain and the chronic pain patient are integral in the propagation of 
stigmatizing attitudes, and behaviors toward people who suffer with CPCs both within 
and without the health care field.  
  Medical and scientific discourses, as “systems of representation” imbued with the 
socially sanctioned power of authoritative knowledge, are normative in the cultures 
producing the literature reviewed above (Hall, 2001, p. 73). Truth claims referencing this 
authority are generally accepted as reflections of the world as it is, which assumption 
allows the contentious nature and the political implications of the discourse to proceed 
relatively unobserved and unchallenged (Fischer, 2003).  
  Medical discourses position people to be particular kinds of subjects (e.g., 
patients, providers, scientists, sick person, healthy person, etc.). These subjects are 
expected to have particular sorts of problems, behaviors, and responses, in order to make 
sense within the frame of discursive exchange—what Davies and Harré (1991) referred to 
as the subject positions. Would-be clinical providers are enculturated into these 
discourses through their educational and training experiences. Policy-makers rely on the 
40 
 
 
 
attestations of people with expert fluency in these discourses in making decisions that 
have a direct impact on the lives people lead (Fischer, 2003). Patient populations differ 
widely in their access to, and understandings of these discourses and their associated 
linguistic repertoires.   
  Medical, scientific, and pain-specific discussions are nested within dominant 
discourses of individuality, autonomy, responsibility, and the privileged status of the 
material sphere that pervade Western understandings of human being and health (Cassell, 
1991). These grand narratives are interwoven with local moral and political meanings, 
and valuations regarding innumerable issues of relevance to the attitudes displayed 
toward chronic pain suffer (van Dijk, 2011).  
  Ideological perspectives on gender, sex, race, disability, the physical, and the 
psychological provide interpretative frameworks through which medical/scientific 
discourses are taken up by those who encounter them (Radley & Billig, 1996). Anti-
stigma discourses that do not consider the ways in which these discursive threads interact 
can inadvertently compound or at least leave unchanged the stigmatization of their target 
population (e.g., Finn & Sarangi, 2009). For all of the above reasons, professional 
discourses about the nature of pain, and its categorization should be subjected to critical 
analysis, not simply taken to be reflections of the natural order (Blommaert, 2005; Parker, 
1992).  
  Existing critiques of chronic pain stigma. Underlying and intertwining scientific, 
commercial, and political factors are social attitudes about the moral meanings of pain, 
pain patients, pain treatments, and pharmaceuticals (Goldberg, 2010). Several writers 
have explored the moral meaning of pain through the lens of ethnography and 
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philosophical bioethics (e.g., Cassell, 1991; Goldberg, 2010; Jackson, 2005; Rich, 2000). 
These authors have explored the association between sin and suffering (e.g., Goldberg, 
2010); the affront pain poses to expectations of mind-body dualism; and lack of 
professional consensus regarding diagnosis and treatment (e.g., Jackson, 2005). Cassell 
(1991) observed the existence of a structural bias in medical science, leading some to 
discount the subjective experience of patients. The role of opioid stigma and the 
predominance of a curative (as opposed to palliative) model of medicine have also been a 
focus of analysis (e.g., Rich, 2000).  
  These writers, however, have left some of the foundational assumptions in 
professional discourses unquestioned. What was not found in this literature review was 
an exploration of how beliefs about American meritocracy and the unproblematic pursuit 
of life, liberty, and happiness impact patient stigma. Models of medicine (e.g., curative 
vs. palliative/ functional vs. structural) are subjected to insightful critique (e.g., Cassell, 
1991; Rich, 2000). Models and taxonomies of pain, however, are more often cited then 
critically examined. One glaring example, no one seems to have questioned the 
confounding effects of variance among the population of CNCP patients in empirical 
outcomes research.      
  Opioid medications are acknowledged to be contentious but their (under)use is 
assumed to represent a lack of education, fear of addiction potential, or fear of 
legal/ethical sanctions (e.g., Notcutt & Gibbs, 2010). In all the calls for increased 
provider education into pain care and opioid use, the fact that the peer reviewed literature 
asserts divergent findings regarding the safety and effectiveness of opioid medications in 
the treatment of chronic pain has not been critically addressed. The ways in which 
42 
 
 
 
medical (and lay) discourses of addiction and mental illness intersect pain care has also 
received scant attention in the literature (for exceptions, see Bell & Salmon, 2009; 
Looper & Kirmayer, 2004).  
  Anti-stigma frames in medical discourses of chronic pain. It has been suggested 
that the cultural connection between sin and suffering contribute to the stigma of chronic 
pain (Goldberg, 2010). It has also been suggested that the ambiguity of CPCs threatens 
normative assumptions of the separation of mind and body, which leads to discomfort 
and hence to stigma (Jackson, 2005). It has also been proposed that (re)conceptualizing 
chronic pain as a disease entity will lead to reduced stigma (Thernstrom, 2010). There is 
an assumption in the discourse of the “legitimate patient” that, if people seeking pain care 
are distinguished from those who have used opioid medications for nonmedical purposes, 
they will be received with increased empathy and respect. How these frames arise from, 
interact with, and influence existing beliefs, attitudes and social meanings has not been 
explored. 
  Language used in treatment approaches has also been criticized for the negative 
way they position the patient as a subject. J. MacDonald (2000) noted that psychological 
approaches to pain management frame patients in patronizing terms that reinforce 
existing stereotypes of patients, namely that they are motivated by secondary gains; are 
invested in the sick role; and require paternalistic guidance in letting go of these.  
  Kendall and Rogers (2007) criticize deployment of the self-management 
paradigm within psycho-educational programs designed for those with chronic diseases: 
Self-management and self-care education tend to ignore the social contributions to 
patients’ health, their experiences and their choices. These writers also express concern 
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that these discourses position patients as targets of blame for not taking proper action, 
according to the dominant medical discourses on what constitutes a healthy life-style.  
  Patient advocates have embarked upon efforts to counter stigma by drawing 
attention to the problems faced by patients trying to access medical care. These efforts 
emphasize the legitimacy of patient reports, and attempting to invoke alternative semantic 
networks through selective word use. Contemporary attempts include the use of such 
vernacular as “the legitimate pain patient” (see www.legitimatepainpatients.org). The use 
of the more erudite “opioid analgesics” is encouraged as a replacement for the common 
phrase “narcotic pain killers” (van Pelt, 2012, p. 16). 
  These attempts to rework semantic associational networks represent a move to 
distance the subject position of pain patient from that of drug abuser/addict. Bell and 
Salmon (2009) have noted the potential harm this strategy presents to people who been 
positioned as addicts, especially in the context of pain care for co-occurring health 
conditions. It is an open question what effect it will have on people with CPCs who are 
not (yet) identified as addicts.  
  In addition to a focus on semantic considerations, advocates have attempted to 
invoke alternative socio-political frames, e.g., pain care as a human right (Brennan et al., 
2007). Connecting the issue with an overarching moral discourse, e.g., human rights, is 
an attempt to build consensus regarding the good, and rally people to the cause (Fischer, 
2003). Such frames are intended to display the subject(s) in a more positive light in order 
to legitimize desired outcomes.  
  Work in stigma research with other populations suggests that these strategies, in 
isolation from broader engagement with social norms, are likely to meet with limited 
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success (Bell & Salmon, 2009; Danforth, 2002; Finn & Sarangi, 2009; Harper, 2005; 
Mann & Himelein, 2008; Norman et al., 2008). This because stigma, like all normative 
assumptions, does not inhere solely in our words; it lies within the interconnected 
systems of meaning that frame our understanding of, and attitudes toward, the real and 
the good (Fischer, 2003). In other words, the problem is not the signifier, but the way in 
which the signified is related to and functions in service of social norms—the taken-for-
granted realities within the discourse. 
  Without a clear appreciation for the ways in which existent discourses support 
existing arrangements, would-be educators inevitably draw from what they already know. 
That is, they draw “on the language, ideas, beliefs, ideologies, metaphors, and 
representations that are available” in cultural narratives about pain, illness and disability 
(Nettleton et al., 2004, p. 50). These cultural narratives are infused with dominant 
discourses, with their moral understandings and political implications, that facilitate 
stigmatization of people with chronic pain and illness (Radley & Billig, 1996). 
Unfortunately, these facilitating discourses have received little attention in the literature.   
  In order to avoid (re)stigmatization of people with CPCs, through well-
intentioned efforts to improve their social status, it is necessary to understand how social 
norms are invoked and deployed within discussions of pain patients, care, and policy. 
More than this, it is important to explore the moral and political implications of existing 
and proposed frames, as they are taken up and intersect other discourses and ideologies. 
This critical discourse analysis was undertaken with the intention of focusing attention on 
the normalizing factors operating within discourse. A primary aim was the elucidation of 
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interconnected ideas facilitating or resisting stigmatization, and consequent 
marginalization of people who seek pain care and/or live with chronic pain conditions.    
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Theory and Method 
Discourse Analysis and Discourse Studies 
Many books and studies have been published under the rubric of Discourse Analysis 
(DA) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). In following the example of van Dijk 
(2009) I am breaking with this tradition in favor of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS/DS). 
van Dijk proclaimed the term DS to be better able to incorporate the range of activities, 
theories, and methodologies which make up this multi-disciplinary field of study. Perhaps 
more to the point, he acknowledged the confusion which results when using a word 
generally reserved for activities related to methodology: “A widespread misconception” 
that discourse analysis is a method of analysis (van Dijk, 2009, p. 62). 
  C/DA is not a methodology with a set of prescribed techniques. Rather, as a 
transdisciplinary concept, various research approaches are associated with the umbrella 
of discourse studies (van Dijk, 2009). What is offered is a broad theoretical framework 
(as described in the previous section) for making sense of language as a social practice 
(Blommaert, 2005).  
  The study of language-in-use. All discourse studies (DS) draw from linguistic, 
semantic, and semiotic epistemologies (van Dijk, 2009). The particular properties of 
discourse that become a focus of attention for the researcher depend in large part upon 
the researcher’s field of scholarship; the stated purpose of the study; and the specific 
questions being asked (Gee, 1999; Karlberg, 2012). Ontologically, the meaning of a text, 
the understandings of the facts within it, is always co-determined by the historical 
situation of the reader/listener (Gadamer, 1960/1975, pp. 295–296). 
47 
 
 
 
  Discourses as systems of meaning emerge from the layers of signification that 
inhere in the ways that language is used: The meaning of an utterance is greater than the 
sum of the definitions of its constituent elements (Gee, 1998). It is the inter-relationships 
between these constituent elements (the linguistic, the narrative positions, and the 
preunderstandings of the authors/readers) that provide the basis for understanding 
referential meanings and significance for cultural practices (Blommaert, 2005). Analysis 
in this view involves understanding “the whole in terms of the detail and the detail in 
terms of the whole” (Gadamer, 1960/1975, p. 291). 
  van Dijk (2009) proclaimed that discourse studies need to be grounded in 
linguistic concepts for the simple fact that the fundamental unit of analysis is language-
in-use. It is beyond the scope of this project to provide an exhaustive list of linguistic 
devices that may prove meaningful in the process of analyzing a particular unit of text, 
but such a list could include semantic denotation and connotation, grammar, syntax, 
rhetorical devices, argumentations, genre, situational conventions, and contextual cues 
(aka pragmatics). Any device affecting uptake (i.e., interpretative possibilities).       
  Blommaert (2005) underscores the importance of including semiotic 
understandings of the representational aspects of communication in illuminating 
meanings, both of and for language-as-a-social practice. Semiotics refers to the study of 
meaning-making processes of communicative exchanges, of which linguistic objects are 
but one example. Said another way, semioticians seek to understand what words, 
gestures, images etc. (i.e., “signs”) are meant to signify and how meanings are understood 
by language users.    
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  DS also incorporates semantic and pragmatic analyses. There are many sub-
branches of semantic study, but a unifying theme is the focus on representing meaning 
through conceptual relationships of referent terms and their referent phenomenon/object 
(Cruse, 2006, pp. 2–3). Pragmatic branches of semantic studies emphasize the importance 
of context and embedded social cues for the apprehension of meaning amongst discourse 
participants (Cruse, 2006, pp. 3–4). Examination of sign deployment within contexts of 
use may suggest particular conceptual associations, definitions, and understandings of the 
topical content. 
  Discursive participants can employ an array of linguistic and non-linguistic 
devices to signify interpretative intent. These can include the use of gestures, vocal tone, 
grammatical moods, strategic use of type font, emoticons, pictorial material, as well as 
word selection and order. Deployment of signs is predicated on (sub)cultural conventions 
of language use, as well as constraining realities of the medium (e.g., internet) through 
which communication proceeds (Herring, 2007).  
  Successful deployment of signs/signifiers renders an utterance comprehensible to 
particular participants in particular ways. Failed deployment always results in a degree of 
confusion. Many such failures of understanding are easily remedied but at the most 
extreme end, they can result in an abrogation of influence through association with lower 
status and concomitant loss of power and privilege (Blommaert, 2005). People who do 
not make sense, or have little credibility, are not accorded a say—their Voice is 
dismissed. 
  Voice, in this context, refers to the “capacity to accomplish desired functions 
through language” and “the capacity for semiotic mobility” (Blommaert, 2005, 
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pp.  68–69). To be understood, to influence interpretation of what is said, to influence 
behavioral responses, these are the capacities of reference. Voice involves the speaker’s 
ability to choose context-appropriate cues (e.g., words, tone, dialect etc.), and to draw 
from familiar narrative themes, but it also requires that the listening party allow the 
speaker to influence their understandings. This allowance may be granted or withheld for 
any number of proffered reasons all of which are based upon assumptions about the 
speaker’s position in the social hierarchy (Blommaert, 2005). 
  Critical discourse studies. Critical approaches to discourse pay particular 
attention to power effects within discourse and generally align with an explicit agenda of 
remediating identified social problems (Blommaert, 2005). Critical theories encourage 
researchers to engage in the political meanings of knowledge and knowledge production 
as an ethical stance toward social responsibility (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Critical studies 
have their foundations in critical social theory, which has a tradition of tracing its history 
to the works of the Frankfurt School of Neo-Marxist thinkers like sociologist Max 
Horkheimer. Extolling the emancipatory aims of social science, Horkehimer (1937) 
advanced a conception of the researcher not as a neutral observe but as an agent of social 
change.  
  Critical approaches to discourse studies are grounded in the theories of Michel 
Foucault (Hall, 2001). Foucault and those who followed observed that Discourses are 
more than just talk; they are also mechanisms of social control operating through 
processes of normalization (Hall, 2001; Parker, 2002). Critical discourse studies are 
often, though not exclusively, associated with post-structuralism, a philosophical 
movement emphasizing the linguistic construction of experienced reality (Parker, 1992). 
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While the present study draws upon post-structuralist insights into the constructive nature 
of language, it is grounded in an alternative paradigm—that of critical realism. 
Critical Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions 
  Every research program is underlain by a philosophy of science that provides the 
lens through which objects of study come to be viewed as a legitimate source of inquiry. 
These theories dictate the manner in which the inquiry must proceed in order to produce 
knowledge that is viewed as trustworthy (Parker, 1992). Different philosophies of science 
may overlap in some foundational assumptions, but they often posit exclusive 
understandings of objects, subjects, practices and ethics (Hardin, 2000).  
  Assumptions regarding both ontology and epistemology are often left unstated in 
descriptions of methodology, perhaps due to a (mistaken) assumption that the 
perspectives on what constitutes the real are shared by all. Providing explicit clarification 
of the philosophy informing a particular research project can aid both the researcher and 
the reader in their evaluation of the research design and interpretation of the results. 
Clearly positioning the researcher within an intellectual tradition can also address issues 
of subjectivity by providing a context for the choices and interpretations made in the 
course of the analysis.  
  Ontological foundations. This research is informed by critical realism, a 
philosophy of science arising from the works of Roy Bhaskar and Rom Harré that posits 
a dynamic, stratified understanding of social and material phenomena (Gorski, 2013). 
Inherent in the position of critical realists is the recognition that language and culture play 
an important and foundational role in the formation of human experience and knowledge, 
yet the material basis of experience, including oppression, is an acknowledged and 
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accepted aspect of reality (Parker, 1992). In this, critical realism rejects the ontological 
and epistemological dualism at the heart of the positivist and social constructivist 
paradigms, respectively (Gorski, 2013).  
  The ontological assumptions of critical realism are fundamentally dynamic: 
Things (broadly conceived to include objects, subjects, and practices) with differing 
properties, existing at different levels of organization within specific contexts, consist of 
complex interacting subparts which lead to the emergence of other properties (Parker, 
1992). Exploring and explaining these emergent properties, and the contexts that give 
them form and meaning, is understood to be the purview of scientific inquiry in both the 
physical and social sciences (Gorski, 2013). Differences in the ontological properties of 
their objects of study necessitate different epistemological considerations in their research 
programs. 
  The properties of some things make them at least partially amenable to efforts to 
isolate variables in predictable ways, e.g., pharmocodynamic and pharmacokinetic 
properties of medicines. Patterns may be more easily identified when the properties of 
things are such that systems are closed, or at least containable, and possess limited 
variability (Parker, 1992). Even in the context of physical science, with its’ tangible 
objects and determinable variance, insights remain incomplete. In the example of 
pharmacology, complex interactions between variables can impact outcomes (emergent 
properties) for individual patients in sometimes unpredictable ways (Wilkinson, 2005).  
  Humans clearly do not exist as or in closed systems—ever (Parker, 1992). Human 
experience and behavior (inclusive of physiology), cannot be understood in isolation of 
the contexts in which they occur. This is true not only because social reality gives them 
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meaning, but also because social reality determines the accessibility of material resources 
underlying the circumstances in which the experiences occur and the behaviors are 
shaped (Gorski, 2013).   
  This is not meant to suggest that reality (or knowledge about it) is merely a social 
construction. Simply that in positing either, we are discussing mediated perceptions 
within a tangled network of meanings that are a fundamental aspect of the human being 
(Gadamer, 1960/1975, p. 250), which scientific endeavors must both account for and take 
into account (Gorski, 2013). That these meanings are not consistent across time or 
universally accepted truths world over is another fundamental aspect of human society: 
What makes sense to us here today, at this time in history, is not what has or will make 
sense in cultures across time and space (C. Taylor, 1989, p. 13). 
  Socially situated not socially determined. Meanings, i.e., theories, ideologies, 
cultural narratives, etc., contain information regarding the status of, and relationships 
between posited objects (Cassell, 1991). They frame our conceptual understanding of the 
description, the described and the describer.  These also provide the guiding normative 
assumptions by which we evaluate things like validity, morality, and desirability (Gorski, 
2013). In contrast to post-structuralist/post-modern philosophies of science, it is not 
assumed that physical realities are simply an outgrowth of interpretation (Parker, 2002). 
  Social realities may determine whether and how existent phenomena are 
perceived and responded to (see Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999), but not the 
existence of the phenomena of perception and response per se (see Kearins, 1986).  This 
should not be interpreted as suggesting that any and all concepts imbued with truth-value 
are, in the empirical sense, actual. For example, it was formerly accepted scientific truth 
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that infants did not feel pain; this does not mean it is, or ever was, the actual case (see 
Rodkey & Riddell, 2013). Infant pain perception exists or not regardless of whether or 
how it is described in language. There is a reality outside of our experience (or lack 
thereof), but “there is no one to one relationship between a description and what it 
describes” (Parker, 1992, p. 27). 
  Material and discursive objects. The material and the discursive are viewed as 
having independent but dynamically related ontological status (Sims-Schouten & Riley, 
2007). Material reality is not reducible to discourse but it is made socially meaningful 
through discourse. Indeed, it has no representation outside of discourse (Gorski, 2013). 
Concordantly, discourse is understood to have effects on material arrangements through 
its influence on other practices (Parker, 1992). It is also understood to be constrained by 
the (im)possibilities inherent in the material world (Sims-Schouten & Riley, 2007). Or, as 
Parker writes: “The real always lies on the edge of discourse, making some moves in 
language games impossible” (Parker, 1992, p. 38). 
  The boundary between the material and discursive is fuzzy, at best and a critical 
realist approach to discourse analysis has been critiqued on the grounds that there is no 
clear means of distinguishing between them (e.g., Potter et al., 1990; Speer, 2007). That 
we have difficulty distinguishing objects, however, does not mean that they are not 
distinct. It means only that our knowledge should be considered provisional and 
incomplete, rather than positive or absolute (Parker, 1992). Different theorists within this 
tradition have offered taxonomies for the purposes of distinguishing different object 
status and strata of reality (Gorski, 2013). This study was informed by the 
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conceptualization of object status proposed by the critical social psychologist, Ian Parker 
(1992).  
  The object status of pain. Parker (1992) suggested conceiving of things (i.e., 
objects, subjects, and practices) as belonging to one or more of three possible realms of 
object status: Things which exist (ontological status), things which we talk of knowing 
(epistemological status), and things which serve as organizing social structures 
(moral/political status). These are not discrete categories and many things have a place in 
one, two, or three realms.  
  In this framework, pain can be seen as a thing with ontological status, something 
that exists independent of whether or how we talk about it. An ontological property of 
pain may be that it must be inferred through correlational observations (e.g., pain 
behaviors). Pain is also a thing with epistemological status. It is a thing that has been 
delimited on theoretical grounds, and made an object of study and intervention. Pain is 
also something with a moral/political status: It is a thing that demands response from 
social actors, responses that will have material and social effects on the lives of those 
involved. 
  It would be a mistake to assume that the way in which pain is represented as 
something known is equivalent to the thing that is experienced. As an object with 
epistemological status, it is a linguistically conceptualized phenomenon laden with 
meanings that entwine our experience of it. Social discourses may shape how pain is 
manifested, perceived, responded to and expressed in different socio-cultural contexts 
(see Cardosa & Sousa, 2009; Thernstrom, 2010). But conceptions of pain and experience 
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of pain are also constrained by the organic material (aka body) through which pain is 
brought to light and with which it is intimately associated in language (IASP, 2012).  
  Summary of theoretical assumptions. Social reality has no physical form 
outside of discourse, but the physical is not simply a discursive construction.  At the same 
time, the physical is known through discursive constructions, but it should not be taken 
for granted that our language reflects the world. Discourses are performed by us, but they 
also hold power over us. Actions are predicated upon the meanings contained in 
discourses.  
  Discourses are central to the organization of materials in the social world. The 
assignment of privileges; access to social and material resources; and the status of social 
identities are demonstrated and reinforced through discursive positioning. Dominant 
discourses appear to naturalize the existing social order, but even these are dynamic and 
contended, making room for resistant formulations. Critical analysis of discursive 
practices attempts to open this implicit process to explicit observation, reflection, and 
influence. The next section will outline how these theoretical considerations were applied 
in this study. 
Data, Analysis, and Subjectivity 
  This section describes the application of the analysis of discourse to the text used 
in this study. The examination of language-in-use was intended for the purpose of 
identifying cultural meanings that emerged from readings of the text. This research was 
predicated upon the ontological assumption that these cultural meanings (theories, 
ideologies, narratives, associations, etc.) have direct bearing on the experience of 
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discrimination reported by people with chronic pain. In other words, social discourse 
impacts people in tangible ways.  
  This analysis was undertaken to increase attention given to understanding the 
ways in which dominant discourses maintain the status quo (Parker, 1992). It may be 
particularly relevant to the work of patient advocates who are attempting to (re)frame the 
subjects involved. Analytic activities focused on interpreting language use, implications 
of tone, semantic associations, and references to and use of external source material. 
  Data summarized. In this study, the text of a public exchange carried out via the 
website of a large metropolitan newspaper in the northwestern United States was 
subjected to interpretative analysis. The data was derived of 779 units of variable length, 
individually authored texts. The units of text included articles published by the Seattle 
Times (the Times) as well as online comments posted to the Times’ website by readers or 
other site visitors. The material was available to anyone with internet access. The data 
was originally published online in December 2011 and the early months of 2012. It was 
downloaded during the same time frame [See Table 2 for list of texts used as data in this 
study].  
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Table 2 
Summary of Source Data 
Abbreviated Name Author(s) Published Retrieved Number of 
Comments 
Politics of Pain Series: State 
Pushes Drug that Saves Money 
Berens & 
Armstrong 
12/10/2011 12/20/2011 185 
How We Linked Methadone 
Deaths to Poverty 
Berens & 
Armstrong 
12/10/2011 12/20/2011 7 
Politics of Pain Series: State Law 
Leaves Patients hurting 
Berens & 
Armstrong 
12/11/2011 12/22/2011 235 
Politics of Pain Series: Vancouver 
Pain Clinic 
Berens & 
Armstrong 
12/12/2011 12/22/2011 75 
WA Addressing Deaths 
(editorial) 
Franklin & 
Thompson 
12/20/2011 1/9/2012 22 
State Plans Warning for 
Methadone 
Berens & 
Armstrong 
12/21/2011 12/27/2011 45 
Rise Above Opiate Wars 
(editorial) 
Myra 
Christopher 
12/22/2011 12/27/2011 31 
Preferred pain drug now called 
last resort 
Berens & 
Armstrong 
1/27/2012 4/5/2012 71 
Times Win Prize for Series Seattle 
Times Staff 
3/3/2012 4/5/2012 3 
Methadone Series wins Pulitzer Seattle 
Times Staff 
4/16/2012 4/23/2012 74 
Letters to Editor 2 12/12/2011 4/5/2012 5 
Letters to Editor 4 12/13/2011 4/5/2012 0 
Letters to Editor 2 12/14/2011 4/5/2012 3 
Letters to Editor 3 12/16/2011 4/5/2012 0 
Letters to Editor 1 12/17/2011 4/5/2012 0 
Letters to Editor 1 12/22/2011 4/5/2012 0 
Total individual texts: 
Combined print and online texts: 
779 
23     756 
Note. List of published articles with the number of online reader comments. 
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  The publication of a three-part investigative series sparked the exchange from 
which this data was derived. The authors of the series were investigative journalists, 
Mike Behrens and Ken Armstrong, working for the Seattle Times. Published over a 
three-day period in December of 2011, the trio of articles examined related but distinctive 
facets of health and policy debates regarding the use of opioid medications in the 
treatment of chronic pain.  
  The information presented in the articles was augmented by the inclusion of 
additional material readers could access via the Times’ website. These included links to 
source documents, a timeline of policy actions, an interactive map of state methadone-
related deaths, an explanation of the journalists’ methodology, and a video presentation 
of the stories’ primary claims. These items were reviewed and treated as contextualizing 
documents, “necessary for a situated understanding of some of the things that are in the 
texts” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 146). 
  Four follow-up articles appeared in December of 2011, January, March, and April 
of 2012. The first (12/21/11) and second (1/27/12) of these follow-up articles were 
substantive reports about governmental actions that were taken subsequent to the initial 
publications. The third (3/3/12) and fourth (4/16/12) follow-up articles were short 
pronouncements of recognition and prestige garnered by the original investigation. 
  Both the original series and each of the follow-up articles elicited editorial 
responses from readers across the state and elsewhere. Much of the data is derived of text 
responding to the original series (578). For all articles, the bulk of public responses (756) 
were posted online using the comment feature available to registered users of the Times’ 
website. Seven of these were appended to the supplementary explanation of methodology 
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used to establish a correlation between methadone, accidental overdose, and government 
policies. A few (15) of the reader responses were officially published by the paper for 
print and online consumption as editorials and letters-to-the-editor. 
  Of the responses published by the Times, two were editorials credited to “Guest 
Columnists” writing in their professional capacities. The medical directors of two State 
agencies, the Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) and the Health Care Authority 
(HCA), wrote in support of existing policies and priorities (Franklin & Thompson, 2011). 
Although the series focused on local state issues, a patient advocacy position was penned 
by an out-of-state author, who was a member of the Pain Study Committee of the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) and former president of the Center for Practical Bioethics 
(Christopher, 2011). Thirteen responses were printed as letters-to-the-editor. Some of 
these letters were also commented upon by readers posting in the online forum.  
  Contextualizing factors of the online environment. At the time the material was 
published, news content on the Times’ website was accessible to the public without 
subscription. As has become an increasingly common practice among media companies 
(Santana, 2011), the Times’ website included an interactive comment section appended to 
many of their stories and opinion sections. These forums provided an opportunity for 
users to respond to the stories’ content, Times’ staff, or other site users. Comment 
features remained interactive and open to new posts for 72 hours from the date of 
publication. Any site visitor could peruse the reader comments, but the Times required 
user registration to access the interactive features, including the ability to make a 
comment.  
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  Registered users were allowed to leave comments; rate the comments of others; or 
report an abusive comment to the moderators. Registration consisted of creating an online 
profile, with a personal moniker and place identifier, which would appear along with the 
user’s posted comments. Users had the option of employing a pseudonym for public 
display. The creation of a profile provided the Times with the technological capacity to 
monitor users’ interactions and to block accounts associated with habitually problematic 
posts. Posted comments were subjected to the Times’ moderation process—they could be 
removed if deemed inappropriate, threatening, potentially harmful, offensive or illegal 
(See Terms of Service, http://www.seattletimescompany.com/notices/notice1-old.html).   
  Research has explored the impact of user registration and moderating comments 
on the quality of user posts. It is believed to improve adherence to behavioral norms such 
as civility and topic maintenance, as well as intelligent sharing, reliability, relevancy, and 
clarity of posts (Diakopoulos & Naaman, 2011). Moderation has become an integral part 
of many computer-mediated communication sites and thus plays a role in the evolution of 
the practices and conventions guiding site users’ interactions (Wise, Hamman, & 
Thorson, 2006).  
  Moderated posts may demonstrate dominant discourses in action because 
expressions deemed to be in violation of acceptable norms are deleted from public 
perception (Hughey & Daniels, 2003). News media outlets contend that the norms being 
policed through their moderation practices are those governing civility (Diakopoulos & 
Naaman, 2011). Ostensibly, posts are not deleted for unpopular conceptual content so 
much as for hurtful words or suggestions of illegal activity.  
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  Of course, in practice it is not as tidy as all that. Norms of enforced civility can 
serve to silence criticism (particularly expressions of anger) by disenfranchised members 
of society (West & Olson, 1999). Readers (e.g., moderators) may take offense to posts 
that were not intended or perceived to be offensive by their authors, or, moreover, that 
another reader may not find offensive (McKee, 2002). This may be especially salient in 
discussions of divisive topics and expressions of resistance by those speaking from a 
stigmatized identity (Hughey & Daniels, 2003) These observations open the way to 
questions about the impact of moderation on the interpretations made by discourse 
analysts. 
  How issues of civility are defined, how moderation practices are enacted, and to 
what extent ideas and impassioned debates are censored in the drive to ensure civility, are 
important questions relevant to the topic of this study but outside its scope. Whether 
inclusion of deleted posts would substantially affect the analysis of stigmatizing 
discourses intersecting chronic pain may be an important question. It is not, however, one 
we must necessarily answer in order to observe stigmatizing discourses at work. In this 
present research, the units of text were treated as a sample of wider social discourses in 
which it was expected to find that which is ubiquitous in the culture (Parker, 1992).  
  Analytic practices. In order to preserve the text format as encountered by the 
public readership, the materials were downloaded from the SeattleTimes.com as a web 
archive. To secure lexical content from potential alteration during analysis, the materials 
were also pasted into word documents and saved in pdf format. The text was analyzed 
using the qualitative research software, Atlas.ti version 7.  
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  Atlas.ti is commercially available software used to examine digitally formatted 
text files. It provides a tool for creating and organizing codes at different levels of 
analysis. A memo feature allows researchers to capture reactions, associations, and 
reminders within the program files. Atlas.ti 7 also includes tools for visual mapping of 
conceptual relationships between identified codes, and/or source quotes. 
  The coding process was guided by the following research questions: How are the 
people, problems and solutions formulated by participants in the exchange? What 
identities, roles and behavioral expectations are exhibited and/or suggested by 
participants? How is participant authority and social status established and/or limited 
within the discourse? What are the ideological value hierarchies offered by participants in 
determining the relative desirability of identities, roles, and problem solutions? What 
assumptions appear to be taken-for-granted and what subversive or resistant formulations 
are presented? Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the aims of this research, the 
moral understandings and political implications of these discursive formulations were 
elucidated through analysis and discussion. 
  With the aim of illuminating contended social meanings (Parker, 1992), the 
sociolinguistic elements within the text were identified and interpreted (Blommaert, 
2005). Indicators of social status, identity, ideology, and language repertoires embedded 
in reader posts provided indexical markers of authority and influence (Blommaert, 2005). 
Interpretation of the semantic relationships and pragmatic conditions of, within, and 
between statements informed my understanding of the taken-for-granted assumptions, 
common sense understandings, and normative judgments operating within the discourse 
(Parker, 1992).  
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  Comments were analyzed as they appeared in the online format at the time of 
download. Grammar and syntax were edited for readability in the final draft; semantic 
and lexical content were not altered. Analysis proceeded in a step-wise fashion. A first 
reading identified themes in the topical content of posted comments, with attention to the 
associations made to the content of the articles (when points were missed, for example). 
Terms used to identify, define, or describe the people and issues related to pain and pain 
care were catalogued for ease of categorical analyses. 
  Additional readings were focused more specifically on semantic and semiotic 
elements within the text. These included context-dependent conventions guiding 
communication practices in computer-mediated and moderated forums (Herring, 2007). 
An example of semiotic devices used in computer-mediated communication is the tactical 
deployment of type-font as an attempt to influence interpretative uptake in the absence of 
behavioral cues such as vocal tone and facial expression. The quantity and quality of 
interaction between participants, as well as use of the site’s dichotomous rating feature 
(Like/Dislike) informed interpretations of the data (per Otterbacher & Hemphill, 2012) 
but were not the focus of analysis. These and other elements of sociolinguistic analysis 
were excluded to limit the scope of this study.  
  In some circumstances, consideration of mechanical construction of written 
language can provide a window into intentions, meanings, or aspects of a participant’s 
social identity (Blommaert, 2005). Due to emerging conventions governing 
communication practices within computer-mediated forums (Darics, 2013; Herring, 
2007; Przywara, 2012), however, some mechanical forms may be inappropriate signifiers 
of either intent or language facility. There is no way to know, for example, whether 
64 
 
 
 
punctuation use reflects the user’s degree of knowledge (of the rules of punctuation, 
typing skills, or computer interface technology). It may simply reflect a disregard of 
technical conventions in favor of other considerations, such as style, convenience or 
haste. Therefore, no conclusions were drawn regarding the significance of the non/use of 
such mechanical devices.          
  The introduction of tangentially related content (e.g., references to health care 
reform legislation as “Obamacare”), as well as the use of quotes pulled from the articles 
and other posts—intertexuality and entextualisation, respectively—informed 
identification of general themes (Blommaert, 2005). The use of arguments and rhetorical 
devices, metaphors and analogies received close attention based on the presumption that 
their presence signified connections between the identified subjects, cultural values, and 
ideological assumptions (Parker, 1992).  
  Interpretations of meaning and social significance relied upon the elaboration of 
semantic associations between signifiers, and the relationships between the concepts and 
objects being signified. Logical propositions (e.g., “if this then that”) within the analyzed 
texts were highlighted as a window into normalizing and moralizing discourses—those 
communicating and influencing moral understandings of the normal and the good. At the 
same time, it must be acknowledged that meanings as apprehended may or may not align 
with meanings as intended (Blommaert, 2005). Moreover, it is accepted truth that the 
meanings which are present may have little to do with either the conscious intentions or 
understandings of discourse participants (Kogler, 1992/1996). 
  Communicating and understanding are always imperfect processes in which 
variations amongst participants, their experiences, ideologies, expectations, and uses of 
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linguistic repertoires comingle in unpredictable ways, producing unanticipated effects on 
production and uptake (Blommaert, 2005). Comments are understood or misunderstood 
by the interpreter who always stands within a particular horizon of available 
interpretations (Gadamer, 1960/1975, p. 301). As a researcher engaging in interpretative 
analysis, I must acknowledge that my understandings of the text are drawn from my own 
pre-understandings, conscious or otherwise, which may not always be useful or accurate.   
  The subjective researcher. Research is an inherently subjective endeavor, in that 
it is always undertaken by a person with subjectively experienced motivations for, and 
perceptions of, the process (Kogler, 1992/1996). It is naïve to presume that we can know 
an object by ignoring the fact of our presence in the outcome of our activities (Gadamer 
discussing Husserl, 1960/1975, p. 241). The researcher has a personal history, is situated 
in a particular time and place, and possess their own peculiar perspective on every known 
and speculative aspect of existence (Parker, 1992). In critical research programs, it is not 
considered possible or desirable to eradicate the subject from research (Kogler, 
1992/1996). It is, however, necessary to reflect upon and account for the researcher’s 
subjectivity in making sense of the research process and findings (Wodak & Meyer, 
2009). 
  Competing philosophies of science suggest different tactics in dealing with 
researcher subjectivity (Gorski, 2013). This research was predicated on the understanding 
that researchers hold (indeed, cannot avoid holding) cultural assumptions and values, 
consciously and otherwise, which exert tacit influence on methodological decisions and 
interpretations of findings (Kogler, 1992/1996). In the present research, no attempt was 
made to inhabit the untenable positions of objectivity or of bracketing assumptions. 
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Neither the mechanistic mind engaged in the recording of raw data, unmediated by 
observation and interpretation, nor the dissociative mind, attempting to by-pass existing 
assumptions in making unfiltered interpretations, were seen as viable alternatives (cf. 
Cushman, 2013; Gadamer, 1960/1975; Gorski, 2013).  
  As the researcher, I acknowledged and challenged my subjective understanding of 
the text throughout the research process. My own reactions to the material in the data was 
flagged through the use of memos and a journal for personal review and reflection. 
Anecdotal experiences or memories of previously encountered texts were recorded in this 
fashion. All the same, no claim can be made to suggest explicit awareness or accounting 
of all potential sources of researcher subjectivity.  
  Unless something contradicts my presumptions, “. . . the fore-meanings that 
determine my own understanding can go entirely unnoticed” (Gadamer discussing 
Heidegger, 1960/1975, pp. 270–271). The prejudices of a researcher must be activated by 
the recognition of difference before they can become conscious. “…our own prejudice is 
properly brought into play by being put at risk (Gadamer, 1960/1975, p. 299). To 
facilitate an awareness of existing prejudices, I discussed my research, interpretations, 
and reactions with colleagues. These strategies of self-reflection and dialogue were 
intended to facilitate a critical distance between myself as the researcher and the social 
discourses that were the focus of my research. The purpose of such distanciation is to 
“make conscious the prejudices governing our understanding, so that the text, as 
another’s meaning can be isolated and valued on its own” (Gadamer, 1960/1975, p. 298) 
and that I do not find only what I have expected to find (Parker, 1992).  
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  Assumptions of this researcher. I began this study with a conceptualization of 
pain that I maintained throughout. I hold a view of pain as an experience with both 
material/physiological, and social discursive/psychological aspects—a complex of 
interactive biopsychosocial components. It was not the purpose of this analysis to either 
establish or appraise the facticity of claims regarding the specific properties and inter-
relationships of these correlates and components. Therefore, no conclusions are offered 
regarding the objective truth of explanatory models of things like pain, addiction, or 
prescribing practices. Questions of adherence to epistemological assumptions are raised 
in discussing the analysis due to the moral and political implications of authoritative 
knowledge claims.  
  I assume pain to be the effect of a wide variety of causative factors, rather than a 
construct of uniform conditions. The veracity of patient reports of discrimination, of 
enacted and felt stigma, that has been documented in the myriad qualitative research 
programs reviewed above is accepted as a reflection of their experience of patient-hood. 
Conceptualizations of pain and patients found in the data were understood in the context 
of those found in professional and academic literature. This included exploration of the 
empirical and phenomenological support, or lack thereof, for assertions and contentions 
identified in the text.  
  In service of transparent identification of researcher subjectivity, I am compelled 
to acknowledge myself as a person who lives with chronic pain. I was given a 
controversial diagnosis in adolescence that I rarely speak aloud in order to avoid 
confronting the reactions of my listeners. I am not currently involved with medical 
systems of pain care, nor have I been a “pain patient” for at least two decades. In my 
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young adult years, I sought medical explanations and interventions for the experience of 
chronic pain but found it to be an invariably useless and upsetting endeavor. I count 
myself among the lucky that pain has had less impact on my life and functioning than is 
true for many people with painful conditions.  
  I have family, friends, and acquaintances who are identified as chronic pain 
patients and who seek palliative care from medical providers. Some of these people use 
opioid medications for palliation and some do not. Some experienced relief through 
surgeries, acupuncture, or other treatments. I have also known people, some I have called 
friends and some who were passing acquaintances, who misused prescription opioids. 
Some of these people would have met criteria for an opioid use disorder as defined in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (2013). 
Others used opioids recreationally, reportedly without craving or withdrawal. All of this 
is to say that this project was personal, political, and academic.    
  Notes on language use. The following section contains an explanation of how 
words with a variety of meanings are intended in the body of this project. It is offered to 
clear up potential sources of confusion or conflation. It is not a necessary component to 
the analysis per se. It was developed following dialogue with colleagues who expressed 
confusion regarding the different uses of these common terms. 
  The distinctions I offer here are pragmatic, rather than technical or conceptual: I 
wish to simplify communication about complex constructs; and I wish to avoid long 
discussions of the debates in the broader field of language studies that, while important, 
are not of central relevance to the aim of this project. 
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  My use of the terms <discourse> and <discursive practices> are as summative 
devices signifying all forms of meaningful symbolic behavior, or “general mode of 
semiosis” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 2). Singular and/or plural word forms <discourses> will 
also be used to reference the particular, historically situated socio-cultural systems of 
meaning (e.g., Nationalistic Discourses) through which people construe the world 
(Fairclough, 2009).  
  I use <ideology> in its most general sense to signify the “coherent and relatively 
stable set of beliefs or values” that serves to guide evaluations of, and actions within, the 
social terrain (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 8). I do this in spite of the negative connotations 
and widespread use of the word to denote those positions which are viewed to be 
(disagreeably) false to the one employing the term (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). I do so 
under the assumption that it is necessary to employee a descriptor of the world-framing 
properties of discourse without regard to affinity for, or affiliation with, the frames being 
invoked.  
  In referencing specific examples of discourse, I will use the term <text> to refer to 
communication that appears in written/typed form and/or as a static image/picture. For 
ease of communication, I use <talk> as a super-ordinate device to refer to all manner of 
communication practices, written and spoken. When referring to those who are engaging 
in talk, I will use the signifiers <reader/author>, <speaker/hearer> and <discursant>. I do 
not use the more common term <conversant> primarily due to the accepted implication of 
interactivity signified by its use. Discursants are participating in discursive actions, but 
they may or may not be engaging in or expecting communicative interchanges in the 
immediate situation.  
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  In discussions of discourse in the abstract, I will use these terms interchangeably 
as an aggregate designation in order to maintain grammatical clarity. This should not be 
understood as an attempt to conflate understandings of communication practices where 
distinctions remain relevant in other contexts.   
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Deservingness in Discourses of Chronic Pain  
  This study utilized the text of a public exchange carried out via an internet news 
site operated by a large metropolitan newspaper. The exchange was sparked by the 
publication of a three-part investigative series conducted by Seattle Times’ journalists, 
Mike Behrens and Ken Armstrong. The articles in the series were published on December 
10th, 11th, and 12th of 2011. This series of articles, along with follow-up and auxiliary 
articles, examined related but distinctive facets of health and policy debates related to the 
use of opioid medications in the treatment of chronic pain.  
  The final analysis focused on the text of readers’ online commentaries and letters 
to the editor, comprised of 769 individually authored texts of variable length (See Table 2 
for list of texts used as data for this study). The text published by the news corporation 
was treated as stimulus material for the commentaries. The articles offered as a product 
of the newspaper, are summarized below.  
The Politics of Pain Series 
  Article one: Methadone policy critique. The first article (Berens & Armstrong, 
2011a) included a case study in accidental overdose; results of the journalists’ analysis of 
methadone-related death certificates; and selected points of policy discussion that 
intersect both public health and economic discourses. Starting with the uncontested facts 
1) that opioid overdose deaths were on the rise; and 2) that methadone, being less 
expensive than other long-acting opioids, was the preferred drug in the State’s formulary, 
the investigators advanced several, contested, conclusions. 
  First, methadone’s unique pharmacokinetic properties were responsible for a 
greater incidence of overdose with this medication than other long-lasting opioids: 
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Methadone accounted “for less than 10 percent of drugs prescribed and more than half of 
the deaths” (Berens & Armstrong, 2011a). Second, this information is not readily 
disseminated amongst prescribers or patient users, resulting in unintentional misuse of the 
substance. Third, the cost-saving measures enacted by state agencies to privilege 
reimbursement for the less-expensive methadone over other, ostensibly more predictable 
opioid medications, resulted in greater incidence of overdose amongst low-income, state-
dependent patients. And finally, the authors assert that policy makers and agency leaders 
chose to ignore the unique dangers of methadone in order to reduce their budgetary 
expenditures, thereby knowingly putting vulnerable populations at risk for a chance to 
save money. 
  The case study presented the face of overdose deaths in the story of a sympathetic 
character—a young woman who had a respectable job, left disabled and impoverished by 
the painful sequelae of a blameless injury before her iatrogenic demise. The analysis 
involved examination of 2,173 death certificates for the casualties of fatal methadone 
overdoses between the years of 2003–2011. The article reported that “up to 20 percent of 
the methadone-related deaths involved illicit substances suggesting the overdoses were a 
byproduct of abuse.” The implication of this statement is that 80 percent of the overdose 
deaths were the unintended consequences of medically sanctioned use by (presumptively) 
compliant patients. 
  The article headline and subheading provide a clearly identifiable moral 
evaluation of the subjects discussed in the article.   
State pushes prescription painkiller methadone, saving millions but costing 
lives. To cut costs, State steers Medicaid patients to a narcotic painkiller that 
costs less than a dollar a dose. The state insists methadone is safe. But hundreds 
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die each year and more than anyone else, the poor pay the price.  (Berens & 
Armstrong, 2011a; headline; subheading) 
  The deaths were undeserved and tragic; blame for these tragic deaths is lain upon 
the governmental agents responsible for administering public resources. In the body of 
the article, patients were positioned as the unwitting victim of policies, ignorance, or 
biochemical interaction effects. Prescribers were either uninformed or impotent to alter 
course, while policy-makers were cast as willfully shortsighted or negligent. Addicts and 
addiction were mentioned in relation to heroin, opioid maintenance treatment, and 
scamming. Addiction was not defined.     
  Article two: Opioid prescribing law critique. The second article relayed the 
story of a newly enacted opioid prescribing law focused on the prompting events and 
potentially deleterious consequences of the State’s recently enacted opioid prescribing 
law (Berens & Armstrong, 2011b). The impetus for the law, according to the policy-
makers cited in the article, was the rising tide of accidental overdoses and increasing 
black market demand for prescription opioids. Policy mandates were expected to guide 
prescriber’s clinical decisions and provide them with an authority to reference in 
communicating dosage restrictions to their patients.  
  The article referenced the concerns of patient advocates that the pain management 
law would encourage caregivers to discontinue, or refuse to initiate, opioid therapy in 
cases where patients may benefit from it. The law was criticized for creating onerous 
requirements for providers, and for codifying stigmatizing attitudes toward people with 
chronic pain. At issue were several points of concern to policy critics.  
  First, policy-mandated dosing ceilings that were to be based upon a controversial 
metric purported to calculate morphine equivalent doses for all classes of opioids; a 
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potential problem in the context of the existing variance amongst online calculators (see 
Shaw & Fudin, 2013). The policy-specified documentation requirements for justifying 
COT dosage and maintenance with reference to increased functionality and less emphasis 
on distress reduction alone. Finally, the policy delimited a category of “high risk” patient 
(people with diagnostic histories positive for psychiatric conditions, including but not 
limited to substance abuse/dependence and/or mood disorders). The law directed 
prescribers to flag patients presenting with these historical risk factors for additional 
documentation and monitoring. 
  In its coverage, the article was clearly sympathetic to the subject of chronic pain 
patients whose access to opioid medications was being curtailed by policies and practices 
predicated on negative evaluations of continuous opioid therapy (COT).  
New state law leaves patients in pain 
It was meant to curb rising overdose deaths. But Washington's new pain-
management law makes it so difficult for doctors to treat pain that many have 
stopped trying, leaving legions of patients without life-enabling medication. 
(Berens & Armstrong, 2011b; headline; subheading) 
  Policy-makers are framed as well-intentioned yet naïve to the plight of patients. In 
the body of the article, providers were positioned as gatekeepers with a deceptively 
narrow range of autonomy “to treat pain.” Patients were victims of policies, gatekeepers, 
and stigma that leave them bereft of “life-enabling” pharmaceutical treatments. The 
article discusses concerns related to addiction and drug diversion and offers supportive 
claims for the proposition that people with diverse health complaints were being abruptly 
and arbitrarily withdrawn from opioid therapy for (presumably) non-clinical reasons.   
  Article three: Negligent prescribing and ineffective oversight. The third article 
offered a critique of negligent and/or malfeasant opioid-prescribing practices and 
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ineffective governmental responses, purportedly contributing to the health problems of 
addiction and overdose, and the issue of illegal commerce in prescription opioids (Berens 
& Armstrong, 2011d).  This article focused on a clinic that had operated in a metropolitan 
area, serving a large population of identified pain patients, many of whom received 
public benefits. The report claimed that several people had expressed concerns to 
officials about the unusually high doses of opioids being prescribed at the clinic. The 
clinic had been associated with multiple overdose deaths, black market distribution, and 
patients who went on to commit drug-related robberies.  
  In this third article, people seeking pain relief from the providers at the clinic 
were sorted into two categories: The unsuspecting, legitimate pain patients and the 
illegitimate, drug abusers and dealers. The prescribers in this article were framed as 
criminally negligent, if not nefarious, in their opioid prescribing practice.  
Vancouver pain clinic leaves behind doubts, chaos and deaths 
 The clinic’s high doses—“Take 10 every 6 hours,” one painkiller prescription 
said—reveal murky regulations and Washington state’s anemic response. (Berens 
& Armstrong, 2011d; headline; subheading) 
  Policy-makers and enforcers were described as “anemic” in their response to this 
misuse of opioids because they did not investigate or censor the clinicians soon enough. 
The assumption that this physiological metaphor of systemic dysfunction will be 
understood in the context of policy discourses is a demonstration of the power and 
authority of bio-medical discourses. The article suggests that empowered social entities 
should increase their surveillance and influence over the behavior of other social actors. 
There is no hint of irony or acknowledgement that previous articles had largely criticized 
policy-makers’ purported attempts to do just that.   
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  Follow-up articles. Two follow-up editorials, penned by “guest columnists,” 
offered two apparently opposing views on extended opioid use and chronic pain 
treatment. The first editorial articulated the politically dominant position within the 
contemporaneous discourses of pain care policy (Franklin & Thompson, 2011). The 
authors were the medical directors of two State agencies that have social and financial 
stakes pain care practices. As agencies of public benefit, they are also invested in 
resolving social problems related to addiction.  
  In their professional capacity, these officials defend prior committee decisions to 
support methadone as a preferred medication in their agency formularies, as a safe and 
cost-effective medication. They emphasize the need to expand the overdose discussion 
from a narrow focus on methadone to the general class of opioid medications, which they 
argue are being overused for chronic pain complaints. Use of opioids for chronic pain 
conditions is thereby positioned to be the principal problem in need of policy 
intervention.   
  The second response was published under the name of a prominent advocate for 
patient voice. This editorial (Christopher, 2011) attempted to focus the discussion away 
from opioid (mis)use and on to the ethical, sympathetic treatment of people with chronic 
pain. Here, the pain patient is in a position to deserve empathy and respect; to be 
accorded a voice (i.e., power of influence). Maintenance of opioids as a viable treatment 
option for people with pain complaints is inherent in this position of advocacy. Patient 
voice, by definition, must include those claiming benefit from chronic opioid therapy 
(COT) as well as those who do not use opioids. 
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  Additional follow-up articles penned by journalists at the Times’ reported on the 
impact these publications had on the subsequent action of healthcare policy-makers. 
Ostensibly from the analysis of methadone’s disproportionate representation in 
prescription opioid-related deaths, State policy-makers first issued a warning about 
methadone’s specific risks for all prescribers (Berens & Amrstrong, 2011e). A few weeks 
later, new policy directives were issued that methadone, rather than being a preferred 
treatment, should be offered as a last resort (Berens & Armstrong, 2012). There was no 
discussion in these articles of the impact such a ruling may have on patients who were 
stable on methadone treatment, but it was celebrated as a victory for people whose 
medical needs would be more safely met through the use of other long acting opioids.  
  Two briefs related to this series announced that the Politics of Pain series had 
garnered coveted awards in journalism. The work was honored for its impact on public 
policy with receipt of the Selden Ring (Seattle Times Staff, 2012a), and for the quality of 
investigative journalism—the coveted Pulitzer Prize (Seattle Times Staff, 2012b). The 
reader comments appended to these announcements were included in the analysis.        
  The quotes presented below were chosen for their exemplification of particular 
concepts and language use. In an effort to increase readability, quotes were edited for 
grammar and syntax. Although some socio-linguistic elements of the text are 
homogenized with this strategy, the topical, literal, and semantic content was not affected 
by these edits. Use of emphatic font, capitalization, line spacing, and punctuation was left 
unchanged. To limit the scope of the study, misspellings, idiosyncrasies of 
expression—all of which affect reader interpretations and responses—were excluded 
from the final analysis. 
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  In the following section, I first show some of the general, semantic and syntactical 
language-based, ploys used to influence moral discourse in this cultural moment. I use 
examples drawn from their application to discourses of chronic pain. In the second 
section, I analyze these strategies in their application to and implications for the subjects 
of chronic pain discourses. The quoted text included below is not provided with links to 
either the source article or personal moniker of the posting author. This was done in an 
effort to focus on semantic associations within the general discourse.  
Reader Commentaries: Positing Deservingness in Categories of Us and Them 
  Two overarching themes were found emerging throughout reader commentaries: 
Us v. Them; and Deservingness. These themes wind throughout the data, in comments 
pertaining to the explicit topics of pain care policies and patient treatment. They are also 
found in commentaries with apparently tangential content, referencing topics ranging 
from abortion, climate change, socio economic status, and politico-economic corruption. 
The common thread connecting them all is the expectation (and assumed necessity) that 
Us-the-more-deserving should be distinguished from Them-the-less-deserving.  
  Assignments of deservingness frequently, though not exclusively, hinged on 
perceptions of blame. The more blameworthy the subject, the less it may be deemed 
deserving of desirable ends, and the more punishing responses are met with acceptance or 
encouragement. Aversive consequences are expectations for blameworthy 
identities—those which are thereby held solely responsible for their undesired and 
undesirable lot in life (See Figure 1).  
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Locating Problems and
Positing Consequences
US THEM
Versus
Aligning with Positive 
Social Regard
Deserves Positive 
Consequences
Legitimate 
Pain Patients
Charity
Good 
Choices
Sympathy
Doctors
Rich/Poor
Citizens or 
Government
Medical 
Marijauna
Associating 
Negative Regard
Deserves Negative 
Consequences
Addicts/Pain 
Patients
Irrationality Poor 
Choices
Dependency
Doctors
Poor/Rich
Government 
or Citizens
Opioids
Figure 1. The locus of the problem: Who deserves what. Subjects in discourse are aligned with indexical markers of social regard 
and positioned in adversarial roles in competition for public opinion, policy benefits, medical resources, respect and credibility. 
80 
 
 
 
  Commentators position subjects in these adversarial positions, alongside identity 
qualifiers that may put them in alignment with esteemed positions or push them beyond 
the pale of social good will (Leerssen, 1995). When the interest of those in one category 
are in conflict with the interests of those in another, prioritization arguments are 
predicated upon concepts of deservingness. There are real consequences posited for the 
people in each category, their just deserts as it were. The actual consequences for any 
given social actor, however, depends greatly upon the discursive power of their position 
to influence the flow of resources (Blommaert, 2005).  
  Qualifying deservingness. Deservingness, as a heuristic, need not convey an 
inherent endorsement of desirability. It can be a generic reference to a quality possessed 
of all subjects: They are deserving of something, the question is what, whether blessing 
or misfortune (Callan, Kay, & Dawtry, 2014). In practical usage, deservingness is 
explicitly referenced in support of positive consequences—privileges to be earned, or 
rights to be conferred (see www.oxforddictionaries.com). The word is thereby acceptably 
positioned to serve as both the value-neutral definition and the positive exemplar of the 
very concept it has come to designate. It will be used interchangeably in this manner 
throughout this paper, for reasons of syntax.  
 Shame and enmity. References to deservingness are sometimes oblique: 
Let me get this straight…. Your local pharmacist will provide methadone without 
any moral “compass” (which we now know without doubt is a DEATH 
SENTENCE)… but refuse to offer “Plan B” birth control?   Honestly… you can’t 
make this stuff up. 
  This is not the only reference to abortion politics in the comments; it was chosen 
to demonstrate invocation of deservingness through tangential connections in the 
discourse. In this comment, birth control is an expectation that is unfairly obstructed by 
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people who have the power to enforce their will over the choices allowed to others. The 
author emphasizes the responsibility of the pharmacists in the death of opioid consumers, 
yet it is ultimately an attempt to shame those who refuse to disseminate the “morning 
after pill”—a form of emergency contraception known by the brand name of Plan B. 
  This argument only makes sense in the first place if it is an accepted truth that 
women deserve access to this product more than HCPs deserve to live out the 
fundamental tenets of their moral lives. Otherwise there is no shame in withholding it.  
  As a logical proposition, the statement has no inherent merit outside of its 
ideological argument that women deserve to control the biological reproductive aspect of 
their lives. Many pharmaceutical products aside from methadone possess potentially 
dangerous side effects (including Plan B). Moreover, Plan B is considered to be the death 
sentence in the ideology of the professionals who withhold it. They adhere to an 
alternative moral ideology where the subject of the potential life of the fertilized 
ovum—which Plan B effectively flushes from the system prior to implantation in the 
uterine wall—inhabits a higher moral plane (Rettner, Rachael; Dec 2011; 
www.livescience.com/1783-morning-pill-plan-controversy-explained.html).  
  This post is ostensibly a tangent about birth control but it is a defense of patient 
voice (the woman in search of emergency contraception). As such it is not without 
implication for the subjects of pain care. If methadone is a “death sentence,” then there is 
no credible defense of medical use. Dismissing any voice claiming benefit becomes 
ethically defensible, if only for their own good. To advance the interests of patients 
seeking contraception, they are juxtaposed with patients whose voice need not be heard. 
82 
 
 
 
It is not the only time an argument in favor of patient voice in one arena undermines the 
credibility ascribed to patients in another.  
  The diminishment of the voice of pain patients occurs even in explicit reference to 
the deservingness of all patients. 
This is not a pain-specific issue; this is a health-care access for the poor issue. 
One that no one has been doing front page articles about until a vocal minority of 
"relatable" Medicaid patients complained that they couldn't get their Oxy. Do I 
agree these patients should have access to an educated, informed, responsible 
pain provider who has every medical option open to him/her? Yes. But I believe 
every, ANY, kind of patient deserves that, and in WA, poor people have never had 
that. 
  This quote is taken from a longer post expressing sympathy for the needs of the 
“poor people.” The author claims to have been a hospital social worker. Here, all patients 
are said to deserve access to educated, informed, responsible medical care. And while 
pain patients are described as “relatable,” their complaints of lost treatments are 
secondary to the problems of the impoverished patients. The claims being made by 
people with pain, that they are experiencing discrimination and lack of care because of 
attitudes toward pain patients specifically, are herein subsumed rather than compounded 
by issues of economic class. As a result, the voices of pain patients decrying the stigma of 
their condition are dismissed as inaccurate reflections of the real problem: class disparity.    
  There is no authority offered in support of the asserted moral aphorism—that 
financially impoverished patients deserve to access to medical care—yet the post offers a 
glimpse of the moral argument playing out in the discourse.  The comment provides a 
clear indictment of the prevailing utilitarian ethic as it is being enacted in a society 
prizing financial independence: The greatest good for the greatest number, and more for 
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those who can afford it. An ethic of chivalry is the proffered alternative: When interests 
come into conflict, protect the rights of the vulnerable who have a moral claim to charity. 
  Dependence and charity. Deservingness was not conceived as a purely 
dichotomous construct in the text. It was not a simple matter of identifying who deserves 
rewards and who punishment but rather locating subjects along a continuum of influence, 
social regard, and legitimacy. As an example, people who relied on charity (e.g., 
recipients of public benefits) were not quite as deserving of choice treatment as were 
those with the resources to purchase them, but they were not completely excluded from 
the circle of positive regard. Their financial dependence led to a concurrent dependence 
on the charitable will of others and dependency facilitated a limited sphere of influence.  
I think the real lesson here is that if someone else is footing the bill, then that 
someone else gets to make the rules. 
  This quote is also from a longer comment critical of the journalists focus on the 
needs of the economic underclass. Previous sentences in the post position medical 
marijuana as an equivalent alternative to opioids in pain management. The main thesis of 
the comment, however, is this: People with resources deserve to set standards at the 
expense of their dependents. When the financial interests of the conferring class conflict 
with the needs of those in the dependent role, the former has the socially accepted right to 
benefit at the expense of the latter. It is in fact the quintessential ethic of consumer 
capitalism. Those with more capital deserve their position of influence over those with 
less. 
For all those that believe healthcare is a 'right' and should be "free"; healthcare 
is a thing, and if you don't pay for it, someone else has to. And like all things, you 
get what you pay for . . . (ellipses in original)  
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  In this statement, health care is an object of trade and like other objects of trade 
must be purchased to be deserved. If one cannot pay for health care they don’t get it, 
except by philanthropic whim. This system of healthcare delivery is ethically defensible 
only if it is taken for granted that some people deserve financial profit more than other 
people deserve to obtain health care. In effect, people who are not paying for services 
with money received through more valued avenues like inheritance or employment, (i.e., 
people who are receiving charity) have deservedly less say over the course of their lives 
than people who have greater economic resources. This accepted truth remains true even 
when the former group is being harmed.  
  From this position, suffering is less important in moral decisions of care than is 
self-sufficiency. It is  
So let me get this straight, are these patients receiving this care for free? Then 
complaining it’s not good enough? 
  In this post, the patient whose care is subsidized by taxation (e.g., the Medicaid 
recipient) is not asserted to be wholly undeserving of healthcare. They are, however, 
expected to appreciate what boon they are granted. Even in cases where the medication 
offered is dangerously contra-indicated, the dependent patient is expected to accept what 
is offered without complaint. Any articulation of self-interest by a dependent-patient can 
be dismissed as self-serving propaganda if it contradicts this maxim.  
  The dependent-patient is positioned as less deserving—of discursive influence, 
clinical choices, empathy and respect—than are those who possess the resources to 
acquire these things through their own efforts. The financially resourced individuals are 
assumed to deserve more desirable ends than the people receiving charity because they 
possess value in trade. As an object of sympathy, blamelessness, or duty, the charitable 
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cases are still positioned to deserve a degree of public support. Their excusable 
deficiencies may yet afford them the power of influence sometimes granted to the weak 
by the strong (Kunz, 1998).  
  This does not mean resources will necessarily be made available to individuals, it 
simply means that the subject may elicit a positive response with potential benefits for 
individuals. The issue is thereby made one of taxonomy, a question of identifying which, 
and in what circumstances, people (or other beings) deserve to benefit at the expense of 
another. Different identities deserve different responses and those responses depend in 
part on the context in which it appears.  
  Positioning social identity in discourses of deservingness. Social identities 
invoke perceptions of deservingness through semantic networks. The identities most 
deserving of coveted rewards appeared to be the productive, working, taxpaying, law-
abiding, rational, intelligent, self-sufficient, independent, free citizen with family 
connections and a sense of practiced agency. These qualifiers describe qualities that 
increase positive ascriptions of deserved consequences—whether for material resources, 
positive regard, or credible influence. 
  When these ideal qualifiers were invoked, it was to enhance claims of legitimate 
deserts. The closer one’s position is to one (or more) of these identifiers, the greater the 
expectation of social reward. Citizens, for example, are expected to reap rewards solely 
because they are citizens.   
It is my (perhaps incorrect) understanding that our federal government negotiates 
prices at which other countries can purchase prescription drugs from the United 
States, but WE . . . the citizens of the country . . . pay WAY MORE than people in 
other countries for EXACTLY the same medications. 
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  The comment from which this quote is taken begins by setting up an economic 
argument critiquing current class arrangements in which the government is to blame for 
the suffering of citizens. Through the use of emphatic capitalization, the post references a 
fundamental assumption that citizens of the United States deserve valued outcomes solely 
by virtue of belonging to the category of citizen.  
  The commentator does not hedge in designating citizens as deserving of positive 
ends. Whether written with irony or sincerity, the reference to potential factual error 
results in an assertion that remains true even if the specific facts of the situation are not. 
In this line of thinking, the citizen deserves affordable medicine even if it is untrue that 
the federal government negotiates lower prices for citizens of other countries while 
allowing corporations to charge higher prices in domestic markets. Citizens are 
distinguished from the population of non-citizens who do not deserve to benefit at cost to 
them. Citizen is an idealized attribute. 
  Being accused of lacking in idealized qualities, or alignment with problematized 
qualities, are clearly intended to diminish the standing of the referenced subject. Markers 
of diminished standing were readily deployed to support position statements and 
denigrate those with opposing views.  
You're all dumb if you don't use marijuana for your pain and use those deadly 
pain killers instead!!  
  It is presented as an established truth that marijuana is safer than opioids. This 
proposition reflects the assumption that opioids are inherently deadly. In such a 
worldview, the use of opioids is irrational something only the “dumb” would do. This 
casting of aspersions on the rationality and intelligence of those who question 
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passionately held beliefs-of-fact reflects the problematic position of the dumb and 
irrational in the social world.  
  What is relevant about this post is not the facticity (truth) of the commentator’s 
claims, but the strategy of positioning the assertion relative to the idealized/problematized 
subject. It is a case of the rational (marijuana user) versus the irrational (opioid user). 
People claiming medical benefit from opioid pain management strategies are “dumb.” 
Subjects associated with irrational (e.g., crazy, nonsensical, imaginary, etc.) can be 
defensibly dismissed because, in the dominant positivist framework, only a fool would 
doubt the truth of reality. Fools are not deemed deserving of influence in social discourse 
because their claims carry no ontological authority: They know naught of what they 
speak. Opioids and fools are, in this way, discursively entwined with the idea that the 
irrational are impaired. They do not deserve a voice.  
  Deservingness enters the discourse in other ways as well. Valued qualifiers are 
juxtaposed with more powerful entities to highlight the illegitimacy ascribed to those who 
block them from what is deserved. That which is deserved is a fundamental expectation 
attending a subject’s moral status. To block what is deserved is, by definition, unfair and 
unjust. In this way, power relationships are opposed or supported through aligning the 
sympathetic subject with the qualities of the idealized subject. This tactic is easily 
identified in statements where the sympathetic subject is the one with less social power or 
fewer material resources.  
Wealthy individuals, and their acolytes, wish impoverished citizens to be dead. 
What do you wish for the wealthy individuals? 
  What makes this post meaningful in this context is not the potential to realize 
class warfare with a call to doom the wealthy at the hands of the impoverished. Rather it 
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is the use of idealized identities in suggesting that the wealthy deserve this fate and the 
impoverished deserve to deliver it. That the citizen represents the identity most deserving 
of positive regard remains unquestioned.  
  The quote is taken from a longer post accusing members of the government of 
being “happy” that financially dependent patients are dying of methadone overdoses. 
According to this line of thinking, the idea that the powerful and the wealthy benefit from 
the death of poor people is contrary to the charitable moral imperatives of chivalry. The 
powerful are able to benefit from blocking the poor from benefit, but they are not seen to 
deserve to use this ability. The sympathetic subject is the less powerful player who 
deserves social benefit. The sympathetic position is marked with the idealized subject of 
citizen.  
  Within nationalistic discourses of collective allegiance, the subject of the citizen 
inhabits a defacto position of positive regard. Members of the economic underclass are 
here ascribed the citizen’s due while the wealthy are semantically isolated and stripped of 
their association with the more deserving class of person (e.g., citizen). Since, objectively 
speaking, the wealthy and the impoverished individuals being referenced are likely 
citizens of the same body politic, the labels serve a completely ideological function to 
convince others to align with their position.  
  Ideological placeholders as links to deserving identities. The idealized identity 
traits (e.g., citizen, taxpayer, rationality etc.) are a kind of placeholder; they represent the 
preferred identity role in the dominant discourse though they are not the direct topic of 
discussion. These ideological placeholders invoke associations that influence evaluation 
of significance and meaning, of worth and value. What is taken for granted is that these 
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subjects are worthy of sympathetic identification. They deserve attention and 
consideration. It does not mean that people aligned with these positions (e.g., individual 
taxpayers) necessarily get the deserts to which it is suggested they are entitled. It is 
debatable whether that really matters since they are not the actual subject of the 
discussion. Rather, these subjects inhabit a more metaphorical position in the social 
discourse.   
  These placeholders are the qualifiers employed to emphasize what is good or bad 
in relation to the actual subject of comment. 
This is the first step in weeding out the chaff. The D's actually had been exposed 
on this issue on Obamacare. Choosing what and when Grandma and Grandpa get 
treatment. They want paying members of society not costly ones. 
  This quote uses socially venerated identity labels of grandparents to mark the 
sympathetic position—standing against Obamacare. It is taken from a longer post 
suggesting that a conspiracy of big government and unions was responsible for increased 
methadone overdoses amongst the poor. It is not the only example of the idea that policy 
preferences for methadone were intentional attempts to harm the poor. The imagery 
employed in this quote is similar to media images created in the partisan campaign 
against President Obama’s Affordable Health Care Act.  
  In this thread of discourse, reported concerns about pain care and opioid deaths 
are tied to conspiratorial narratives of totalitarian agendas associated with health care 
reform (Obamacare). Family members serve an ideological function in this statement, 
which is really about the demonization of the Democratic Party (D’s). To accomplish 
this, the comment pits the utilitarian ethic of public health initiatives, with its calculated 
pragmatism that would prioritize resource distribution according to social contribution, 
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against an ethic of family-centered chivalry demanding protection of the venerable and 
the vulnerable amongst us. Yet beyond this, the intended meaning of the commentator 
remains ambiguous.  
  The above post could be a diatribe against existing power relationships, a class 
conscious frame seeking a face to blame, a face they just happen to name Democrat. It 
could be a critique of the social practice of restricting health care choices for those in the 
dependent position, a critique that does not consider the long-standing nature of the 
problem. Or it could simply reflect an ideological argument about partisan politics in 
which reference to an exploited and expendable underclass bears no literal meaning at all. 
All that is clear in the commentator’s position is that “the D’s” agenda is undeserving of 
respect or allegiance. This is accomplished with the suggestion that the D’s kill 
grandparents for their own gains.  
  Influencing evaluations of veracity and righteousness. Semantic associations 
between the actual subjects and idealized subjects are influential in evaluations of both 
the veracity and righteousness of the actual topic under discussion. The subjects of 
citizens, wealthy individuals, acolytes, taxpayers, even family titles can serve as an 
identity placeholder through which ideological norms are communicated. It is this 
indexical function of marking positions with idealized and problematized identities that 
provides a window into the pervasive stigma associated with chronic pain and opioid use.    
  The government, political parties, policy-makers, health care professionals, pain 
patients, opioids, and drug addicts/abusers are subjects intersecting with discourses of 
pain care practice and policy with material consequences for all. Each of these identified 
subjects has been positioned relative to the idealized subject, the ideological placeholder, 
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in arguments supporting mutually exclusive assertions regarding the social worth of 
subjects in pain care discourses.  
  The taxpayer, for example, is an idealized identity role in politico-economic 
discourses. In the American narrative of meritocracy, in which productivity and financial 
solvency are idealized qualifiers, the taxpayer inhabits a position of earned rewards. They 
have purchased a right to be heard by those with the power to spend tax revenue. 
References to taxpayers were used to support divergent interpretations of whose benefit 
the ethical imperatives underlying these social systems are meant to serve.  
So taxpayers should worry greatly as in far too many cases we are not treating 
people with pain appropriately. Far too many of them go untreated. And the 
under-treatment of pain, which may affect 116 million people is costly in the 
truest sense of the word.  
  This quote is from a longer post voicing a position of patient advocacy. The 
alignment of the subject “pain patient” with that of the “taxpayer” is a rhetorical strategy 
employed to support the call to assign priority to the needs of pain patients over-and-
above short term cost saving measures. Yet, it is the taxpayers whose (financial 
utilitarian) interests most deserve to be honored; not (chivalry for suffering) pain patients 
per se.  
  While proponents of this argument may believe that patient interests should be the 
priority, the argument with which they justify their stance leaves the person with chronic 
pain to benefit from a trickledown effect: When taxpayer needs are met through treatment 
of pain patients (through a decrease in long-term expenditure), then should patient needs 
be served. This means equally well that the taxpayer’s interests should take precedence 
when patient needs are deemed too costly, which of course they routinely are. 
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  Arguments in opposition to patient advocacy claims invoke the same idealized 
subject, the taxpayer, using the same logic meeting the interests of tax payers. The 
difference lies in the identified beneficiaries. 
Myra J. Christopher is a liar trying to scam money out of the taxpayer. … 
"Chronic pain affects an estimated 116 million American adults". Nonsense. The 
total population of the United States is 313 million.  
  This quote is taken from a comment dubious of the claims of patient advocacy 
discourses. The author claimed to have visited the website of the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) cited in the Politics of Pain series. The statement in quotes is interpolated from the 
body of the editorial by Christopher and is otherwise an oft cited statistic in the pain care 
world (see IOM, 2011). The taxpayer here is still the most deserving position, but the 
validity of the statistical claim is challenged directly on the basis of its apparent 
nonsensicalness. An otherwise legitimating bid for empirical authority (statistical 
citations) is dismissed as inaccurate propaganda for an improper agenda.    
  In the first quote above, the cited statistics are accepted proof of urgent need of 
attention to the plight of people with chronic pain. In the second quote, the suggestion 
that this experience touches such a large percentage of the population is seen to be so 
absurd (outside of all expectations) that the author goes so far as to question the integrity 
of its proponent. In either post affinity with the position of taxpayers is invoked to 
advance the interests of other subjects. In so doing, the pain patient is positioned not as a 
member, but as a dependent of the taxpayers. Dependency is a repeated theme attending 
the problematized subjects of chronic pain and opioid use. 
  Positioning patients and opioid users—Layers of Dependency. By virtue of the 
discursive relationship between opioids and pain management, all pain patients fall under 
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the subject of potential opioid user. Opioid use and pain care are discursively entwined to 
such an extent that seeking the latter regularly invokes reference to the former. This 
connection was apparent in arguments about prevalence statistics that were initially 
offered to legitimize the prioritization of patient needs. 
"Washington has at least 1.5 million people who struggle with chronic or acute 
pain, the American Academy of Pain Management estimates."  
What!!! 23% of the population is in need of pain meds??? 23% REALLY???  
Nothing against this particular guy but when 23% of a random ordinary 
population needs pain meds (implied) something is VERY wrong with this whole 
picture.  
  In this quote, the validity of statistical evidence is questioned largely on the basis 
of the subject’s association with opioid use. While empiricist discourses are commonly 
referenced to support the authority of a speaker’s fact assertions, they are not necessarily 
accepted if they contradict existing beliefs. These statistics were not viewed as a 
reflection of the prevalence of pain complaints, or the number of people who may have a 
stake in the debate to preserve medical access to long-term opioid treatments. Neither 
was the number understood to include people who may avail themselves of a wide array 
of non-opioid pain care options, people that clearly claim to exist:  
I also have a painful medical condition but I work on treating the problem, not the 
symptoms, because I don't want to live on drugs or in pain. 
  When there is not room in the narrative for people claiming a different 
experience, the voice of pain patients is dismissed if not erased.  
  The IOM’s claims about the prevalence of chronic pain complaints are perceived 
to (falsely) represent the number of people claiming want/need of opioids. This adjoining 
of the subjects, seeking pain care with seeking opioids, was displayed in more direct 
ways as well.   
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Some people just have low pain tolerance and cry to a doctor about every little 
ache and pain—and want a prescript for it . . . (ellipses in original) 
  This quote is from a comment posted in response to those who wrote from a 
position of patient advocacy, advocating positive regard for patients and medical access 
to opioid options for pain management. The pain patient in this statement is positioned as 
weak and drug seeking; they are engaged in irrational behavior for undeserved gain. 
Seeking pain care for a low pain tolerance suggests that these patients are seen as inviting 
dependency rather than embracing self-sufficiency in response to potential adversity. In 
this post and those like it, the irrational, potentially dependent, patient is not someone 
who deserves to be heard.  
  Pairing opioid use with weakness rather than necessity is an ascription of 
illegitimacy that is left for the pain patient to disprove. There is no clear path to proving 
anyone’s credibility, however, when they are speaking from a position of illegitimacy.  
I was told I was not getting an x-ray; that I am seeking drugs, and I was told it 
was a simple sprain. I left there angry and I then walked on a broken foot for a 
month because I was told I'm a drug addict. I'M a drug addict? OOook. I had to 
go to Covington to be treated like a human and get an x-ray—when I got over my 
SHOCK of being called a drug seeker by somebody who gets paid to treat illness 
and injuries. 
  This quote is taken from a much longer narrative detailing a humiliating 
experience at a local Emergency Room. The commentator does not specifically identify 
as a chronic pain patient but rather someone seeking care for an acute injury whose health 
benefits were provided through a state welfare program. The author noted that they had 
been assumed illegitimate because of their welfare status, rather than diagnostic status. 
The result being that their presenting complaints of pain associated with injury were 
dismissed as being without merit. Whatever the providers’ decision-making process was 
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in this particular situation, an assessment of illegitimacy is a clinically and financially 
defensible reason to withhold both diagnostic and therapeutic services. 
  Identified patients rejecting associations with opioid use. It is noteworthy that 
the commentator above equates the experience of being called a drug seeker with being 
treated as something other than human. The subject of “abuser” is discursively separated 
from that of “human.” The foundational subject of moral discourse is the being which 
deserves respect simply because it is a human being (C. Taylor, 1989, p. 14). The addict 
is plainly not a coveted position, a point that is highlighted elsewhere in the same post 
when the author preemptively denies that they were using or seeking opioids.  
My life does not include any drug addiction, never has, and I have never sought a 
narcotic anywhere. 
  This anticipatory rejection of the ascription of opioid [mis]use reflects the 
importance of opioid use for the issue of Voice. The commentator seeks to retain 
credibility by inhabiting the identity of a non-opioid using medical patient. That people 
would reject association with opioid [mis]use signals the diminishing social status of the 
opioid user. The repetition of this message throughout patient-identified posts is 
indicative of the patients’ close association with opioid use.  
  Even patients claiming to have utilized opioid treatments may make the case 
against being categorized as an illegitimate user. 
  I’ve been on vicodin when needed; I’m not an addict.  
  This diminishment of opioid users is demonstrated by the explicit disavowal of 
association with the subject of opioids and addiction. If the association did not put people 
with pain in a precarious social position, there would be no particular place in the 
discourse for statements like these.   
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  I am a pain patient and you would never catch me taking that ride 
  The above quote is taken from a post that is highly critical of opioids as a 
treatment modality due to their addictive potential. Addiction, for them, is more 
concerning than pain suppression. Who can know if this is a reaction to the feared loss of 
independence, or some similarly idealized quality, that addiction threatens; or if it is a 
reaction to the feared loss of positive regard that attends identification with opioid use. In 
the suspiciousness surrounding opioid use and pain patient identities, perhaps foreclosing 
opioid options can mitigate the suspicions with which care seeking behaviors for chronic 
pain are met. In any case, addiction is made to seem a more fearsome outcome than 
unmitigated chronic pain.  
  These posts speak to the endemic pairing of the subjects, of chronic pain and drug 
abuse, due in large part to their relationship with the subject of opioid use. The existence 
of two discrete, objectively identifiable, categories of (even potential) opioid users, the 
legitimate and the illegitimate, is taken for granted. Legitimate uses for opioids are 
relegated to the medicinal arena for complaints of a purely physical basis. All other 
motivations for opioid use have been deemed illegitimate in medical and legal discourses.  
  Us (pain patients) vs. them (drug abusers). It is not possible to engage in 
discourses of pain care without encountering a fundamental competition for social 
benefits between the subjects of pain patient and drug abuse. The identity roles of pain 
patient and of drug abuser are at fundamental odds in medical and legal discourses and in 
direct competition for influential social regard.  
Legitimate patients are medicinal users whose physical body bears the proof of their 
suffering. Drug abusers, on the other hand, are those who seek the fruit of the poppy in 
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pursuit of euphoria or escape from mental suffering. The drug abuser inhabits a legally 
precarious position because, by definition, they must obtain their drugs under suspicious 
circumstances—through drug diversion or false presentation—for these unsanctioned 
ends.  
  Socially, the drug abuser is a blameworthy subject ultimately expendable when 
their interests conflict with those enjoying a greater claim on the public conscience.   
  The State and the DEA are treating all of us like junkies and dealers. 
  For this statement to make sense, one has to assume that Illegitimate users and 
legitimate users are not expected to receive the same treatment by public agencies, health 
care providers, or the public-at-large. It is taken for granted, that the two groupings of 
opioid users deserve differential treatment because they represent distinct and 
distinguishable classes of people whose lives have earned them different rewards in the 
existing social system.  
  The rewards include, but extend far beyond, privileged access to opioid 
substances through the legally sanctioned medical marketplace. These subjects are also 
accorded differential expectations of medical care, reception, and social influence 
(voice), among other intangible attitudinal values, e.g., compassion and respect. All of 
which are associated with material consequences. 
  Drug abusers and the illegitimate use of opioids. Within the dominant discourse, 
there are invalid justifications for opioid use. The illegitimate user consumes opioids 
without legal or moral sanction, for selfish or psychological reasons. The drug abusers 
are the idle and the weak who seek euphoria or escape, whose demise is not a surprise.  
  They overdose because they're trying to deal with the mental strain.   
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  In the context of this post, “they” is a reference to illegitimate users who, though 
they may be suffering, do not qualify for socially sanctioned access to opioids. This is 
because suffering of a psychological nature is not a qualifying subject of sanctioned 
opioid use. Contextually, there is an element of charitable sympathy for the addict 
position. There is not suggestion that they deserve to die, simply that their death is related 
to psychological factors not drug properties, as was asserted in the news articles to which 
they are responding. Overdose is thereby attributed to a blameworthy misuse of opioids; 
it is an expectable if unfortunate outcome of improper motivation. Such a position 
renders interventions to offer alternative medications (e.g., OxyContin) unnecessary. 
  In the grand narratives, abusers are frequently written as villains identified with 
their actions: They are a “bane”, “crushing idealism” and limiting opportunities for the 
physician to enact the chivalrous ethic of palliative care. 
Drug seekers were the bane of our practice—sad in their own right—but also 
helping to crush physician idealism and any sense of professional satisfaction in 
what we saw as a calling . . .  clogging our waiting rooms while making their 
rounds for not tens or even twenties of meds—but accumulating hundreds of 
meds. Many taking our time from legitimately ill patients. They weren't interested 
in other pain management therapies—they just wanted their narcs. 
  It is assumed that drug seekers take what they do not deserve: Physician attention 
and medical resources are better spent elsewhere. The legitimate patient is clearly 
positioned more deserving of these things than the drug seekers. What is more, the 
physician is positioned to deserve job satisfaction more than the maligned deserve 
medical attention. The position of “drug seekers” in this sentence precludes them from 
the category of the ill; indeed, they are not even “patients.” Their self-centered choices 
are causing harm to the interests of more deserving subjects, legitimate patients.  
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  Legitimate patients and the sanctioned use of opioids. People whose access to 
opioid substances are medically sanctioned are positioned as legitimate users. This would 
apply, albeit tenuously and not without controversy, to methadone maintenance therapy 
for opioid addicts. Most centrally, however, the legitimate position reflects medicinal use 
for the alleviation of intense physical pain.  
As someone with experience working with pain patients, I can tell you, yes, there 
are people who abuse pain medicine –probably lots of them. But why is it that 
they, those who chose to abuse this medicine, get to make the world more difficult 
for those who depend on the medicine to live their life? And why does the 
government get to make that decision rather than physicians? I myself am 
fortunate not to need these types of medications except for when you would expect 
(i.e., surgery, injury, etc), but far be it from me to tell others they should live their 
life in pain because some INDIVIDUALS chose to abuse medication. There is no 
good reason why people should have to suffer in pain when there are inexpensive 
medications that can help temporarily ease that pain. 
  Personal experience is the authority by which this commentator sought to 
authenticate their knowledge of the subject: They have seen both legitimate need and 
illegitimate use. They identify as supporters of the patient’s position of need, though they 
report no chronic pain or opioid use. This positions their statement as unbiased, without 
personal investment, and informed by experience; it is therefore a bid for influence. The 
position being advanced is the prioritization of (the blameless suffering) patient needs 
over those of (the blameworthy) addicts who “chose to abuse medication.” The patient, as 
someone who did not choose their lot, should take priority at the gatekeepers’ door. The 
choice to abuse opioid medications renders one abject of their own accord—the abuser 
has earned their degraded status.  
  This hierarchical division between the legitimate and illegitimate was frequently 
articulated in posts aligned with the positions of patient advocacy.     
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Addicts are more important than law abiding chronic pain sufferers. Do you have 
any idea how warped that is? . . . Preventing addicts from developing a tolerance 
to their drug of choice seems like a pretty minor issue compared to easing the 
severe chronic pain of law-abiding citizens. 
  Here, restricting access to opioids for the addicted/abusing subject is criticized, 
not on the basis of presumed efficacy but, on the basis of moral deserts. Restricting 
opioid access may reduce escalating use by addicts, but that is framed as a secondary 
concern to the suffering restrictions will cause the blameless. Pain patients are positioned 
as law-abiding—a subject possessed of earned rewards. Addicts are excluded from the 
category of deserving law abiders, thereby seen to merit whatever aversive consequences 
may follow. As such, the drug abuser is less deserving of positive regard than the 
medicinal user, and is most certainly devoid of legitimacy as the targeted beneficiary of 
public policy. It is morally nonsensical to think that anyone would consider policy actions 
aiming to curb drug abuse when these actions could negatively impact more deserving 
subjects.  
  For the pain patient-allied position, mitigating pain is considered more important 
than preventing addiction.  
Don't make legitimate patients suffer, please reexamine the law and deal with the 
real issue. 
  The “real issue” referenced by this commentator is that of addiction, and by 
logical extension the people identified with the position of the addict. Their position is 
that the legitimate patient does not deserve to suffer: If opioids reduce their suffering, 
then they deserve that option. By implication, the suffering of illegitimate patients is 
acceptable or, at the very least, irrelevant. Suffering of the legitimate subject is, however, 
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the guiding principle of ethical decision-making invoked by the narrative of patient 
advocacy.  
  Suffering, responsibility and blame as markers of interest prioritization. 
When considered in conjunction with the absence of reference to the suffering of 
creatures used in medical research, it appears that suffering in and of itself cannot be the 
dominant legitimizing factor in authorizing positive, compassionate, or charitable regard. 
In the moral discourse of suffering and chronic pain, the animals used in pain research are 
non-entities but for human subjects, responsibility and blame appears to be of primary 
significance in determining whether suffering is deemed deserving of palliation. The 
existence of agency and choice are integral assumptions in ascriptions of blame. 
Negative attitudes toward those bearing the addict label are justified through references to 
their having made a choice in full awareness of their error.  
What in the world is WRONG with the people in Olympia? Why are they willing 
to sacrifice the safety, health, and relative comfort of people who are suffering 
legitimately with horrible pain to "protect" people who have CHOSEN to misuse 
drugs that weren't even intended for them? Either our legislators are short on 
brains, or even shorter on compassion. 
  This statement emphasizes wrong choice in asserting that pain patients deserve 
greater consideration than do drug abusers. Rather than being cast as the cause, the 
patient is afflicted by horrible pain. The abuser is the sole source of their own ill-fortune. 
Because of the social illegitimacy of their choice—to ingest opioids for recreation or 
addiction—the abuser has lost their claim to deservingness. They do not deserve access to 
the drugs they use; the attention of policy-makers; or the sympathy of the public. To think 
otherwise is seen as a sign of irrationality or stupidity (i.e., “short on brains”). As agents 
of free-will exercising moral choice, addicts are made blameworthy and shameful.  
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What I will NEVER understand is the state's "mission" to save losers FROM 
THEMSELVES . . . from their own lifestyle choices . . . while throwing people 
with legitimate diseases and medical conditions under the bus. 
  Again, with choice, the addict is positioned as the cause of their problem, not a 
victim of unearned calamity, like the pain patient. The social hierarchy is made clear: 
Though they both may suffer, people associated with painful physical conditions are 
deserving of opioid access as a compassionate attempt to mitigate their suffering, even at 
the expense of the “losers” who may be harmed through drug diversion. It is taken for 
granted that alleviation of withdrawal symptoms or mental strain provides no warrant for 
opioid use.  
  Sole responsibility for addiction is clearly located in the identity of the addict, as 
something inherent to the addicted individuals themselves. Because of this inherency 
factor, it is not expected that policies and social practices will have any appreciable effect 
on the population of drug addicts. Pain patients, however, are sufferers deserving of 
access to pain relieving treatments precisely because they did not choose, and are 
therefore not responsible for, their need of opioids.  
When one politician in Olympia can tell me why “saving” a junkie is more 
important than treating those who didn’t choose these drugs, I might change my 
stance. 
  “Junkies” do not deserve to be saved if it harms the interests of more deserving 
subjects, even if it should mean their death. 
As usual, probably the best idea is somewhere in the middle. Lose the nanny-state 
law, but don't have doctors handing out Oxy like M&Ms. Honestly, if a 
junkie/addict OD's—natural selection at work. 
  This post identifies an idealized middle position reducing public involvement in 
prescribing policies that encourages individual HCPs to make the choice to withhold 
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opioids of their own accord. The reference to “nanny-state” is a rhetorical strategy of 
partisan politics to mark the problematized subject—dependency. The reference to 
“natural selection” invokes scientific discourses of ontological inherency. The imperative 
function in these Darwinian discourses is for the strong to reproduce and the weak to 
perish, thereby ensuring a thriving future for the species. To benefit the collective, not the 
individual. In the context of Social Darwinism, assignments of deservingness are 
predicated upon the belief that exclusion of inferior beings is a just response to a 
condition of existence (Mackelprang & Salsgiver, 1996). 
  The ill-fated weak link. The implication that the death of a junkie is “natural 
selection at work” is that society benefits from the death of the opioid addict. The drug 
addict is the subject of weakness; they are a being whose life activities threaten the very 
fabric of society. They are the weak link in a narrative of meritocracy—they cannot earn 
the right to respect and life if they are not fit to survive.  
  As the weak link, the death of the illegitimate user should neither be lamented nor 
prevented. From the moral perspective of personal responsibility and productivity-
oriented value systems, death is framed as an earned consequence of their willful choice 
to engage in wrong action. From the perspective of Social Darwinism, their death 
represents the protection of society’s future. The drug abuser is in dereliction of their 
duty to collective survival and in so doing are perceived to forfeit their claims on the 
collective conscience.     
They took up beds, they took up resources, and they took up medicine, just to get 
their fix.…and we, the taxpayers, got stuck with the bill, increased wait times for 
legit ER visits, and higher premiums all because some pathetic junkies needed to 
have their fix. [ellipses in original] 
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  Abusers are thus portrayed as parasites, whether by choice or ill-fortune. They 
drain resources and divert attention from those who are deemed more deserving of these 
things. With these choices, abusers come to reap what they sow. When they die from the 
fatal effects of opioid use it is not so sorrowful a thing, because they are to blame for 
their death.  
It's like this. People die taking prescription painkillers, because they abuse them, 
often after buying them on the street. 
  This and similar comments were sometimes posted by patient-identified authors 
or other positions allied with medical opioid use. It is yet another example of support for 
the voice of one type of patient being asserted at the expense of another: The dead patient 
is not a patient at all, they are criminals. There is no position in this assertion for people 
with pain who may overdose while taking medications as prescribed. Suggestions that 
overdose deaths may result from legitimate use are dismissed outright, because 
overdosing is itself evidence of abuse (i.e., illegitimacy).  
It is neither mercurial nor whimsical in its behavior. It only kills those who take it 
not in accordance with how it is prescribed. 
  The thesis that methadone may possess dynamic properties that increase risk of 
fatal side effects is rejected outright by commentators such as this one. Once again, the 
dead are drug abusers, the proof rests with the fact that their death was ruled an overdose. 
Death is in the position of earned reward making it something deserved through the 
willful actions by individuals who knowingly choose to misuse the drug. It is not clear 
whether this post is arguing in favor of maintaining access or of restricting opioids, but 
either way it offers an opportunity to dismiss the voice of any patient who describes a 
different experience.    
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  Arguments opposing this totalizing view of overdose deaths as the wages of sin 
do little to counter the underlying assumption that drug abusers are responsible for their 
own drug-related death.    
You have no basis for your claim that most overdoses are due to the abuse of 
illegally obtained methadone. As a result, you are stereotyping victims as 
irresponsible addicts. That's pretty low. 
  This post is a direct response to another commentator, and while it portends to 
defend the reputation of the dead methadone user, it does little to challenge the 
assumption that irresponsible addicts inhabit an indefensible position. The author accepts 
the assertion made in the articles that methadone poses special risks for patients, and that 
deaths are not necessarily evidence of misuse. The problem, as put forward by this post, 
is not so much the implicit blame laid on the addicted subject for any overdose related 
complications they may experience. Rather, the problem lies with linking patients to 
abuse of drugs. 
  Patients over addicts. Patients are positioned in adversarial relationships with 
addicted users when it comes to courting public support for respect, compassion, and 
blameless access to opioids and other resources. From the competitive dynamic of 
legitimate patients versus drug abusers, the problem with policies restricting opioid 
access lies in its impact on the people in the (deserving) patient position.  
“Druggies will be druggies, no matter what, so it is very dumb to put the “war on 
drugs” above the suffering of real people with real pain that need effective 
medication.” 
  The drug addict, here, is not even accorded the status of a real person: Real people 
deserve respect and medical care, including access to treatment with opioids. The 
statement positions Druggies as people who deserves to be ignored, in part because they 
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are inherently unchangeable. The well-being of humans aligned with the drug addict 
identity is not even allowed (semantically speaking) to operate as a motivational factor in 
moral action: Policy-makers are seen to be waging a war on drugs (an object of trade) not 
trying to reduce the addiction-related suffering of human beings. The subject of the addict 
is thereby denied moral value as a predicate for beneficent action.   
Just how twisted and evil are these Washington State lawmakers? Now they will 
deny or take pain medication away the hard from working, productive and law 
abiding citizens of this state, and then turn around and use the tax revenue taken 
from those very people and use it to fund a program that hands out free "clean 
needles" and free Methadone to heroin addicts down in the "U" district, Tacoma 
and many other areas. 
  Invoking idealized qualifiers in reference to protagonists highlights their desert of 
a better fate than has befallen them. Pain patients may not get pain care but they deserve 
it, along with access to financial, material, and social goodwill. Addicts do not deserve 
care, resources, or goodwill but are seen to receive all at great cost to the more deserving 
population. Addicts do not even deserve publicly funded clean needle programs to stop 
the spread of disease. Those who choose to focus on the needs of addicts when it impacts 
more deserving groups are “twisted and evil”: It is an inexcusable outcome. From this 
position, whether the addicted subject is suffering from their relationship with opioids is 
beside the point. Yet, as demonstrated above, the suffering of pain patients is used to 
legitimize their claim to access to opioids (i.e., the determination that they deserve to 
have this option).  
Everyone is worried about money and drug addiction, and then last about your 
life, as a law-abiding sick person. 
  From the stand point of patient advocacy, the idealized qualifiers are invoked to 
influence perceptions of deservingness in favor of the patient’s position. The law-abiding 
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has earned the privilege of access, the sick deserves compassion as an object of charitable 
regard. The addicted subject is semantically oppositional to both the law and illness and, 
hence an inappropriate target for either privilege or compassion.  
  In arguments about policy, invoking the subject of “law-abiding” to defend a 
legally debated position is a slippery slope. Policy sets the tone for normative behaviors 
amongst those who are bound within its parameters (Fischer, 2003). Laws are governing 
policies. As these change so too will the defining criteria of “law-abiding.” What was 
considered medically legitimate use of opioids may soon be defined as a problem under 
the law. At that point, and regardless of their actual condition, a pain patient using 
opioids will have been re-positioned from legitimate to illegitimate. Now, when they 
speak to their healthcare workers, they do so as someone who is perceived to have a 
problem with opioids, someone who needs restrictions.    
  Power and voice: Legitimacy, choice and the good patient script. Different 
subjects in the discourse inhabit different strata of deserved influence. People who are 
deemed in need of restriction have substantially less influence than those deciding upon 
the appropriateness of restrictive actions. They deserve different consequences and enjoy 
different capacities to exhort their will over their circumstances.  
I suspect that it is easier and safer for many doctors to simply quit treating 
chronic pain than it is for them to risk any of the following: 1) Being fooled by a 
supposed "pain sufferer" who is lying in order to obtain prescription pain meds to 
feed an addiction, 2) Overlooking some obscure measure in the new regulations 
that may subject them to fines, censure, lawsuits, and/or all of the above. 3) 
Having to hire additional staff to make sure that the additional paperwork and 
reporting required by the new regulations are completed in compliance with the 
state's dictates . . . I don't blame the doctors . . . I blame the idiots who run this 
state. 
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  This post is authored by someone who elsewhere described themselves as 
sympathetic to the position of pain patients, but as someone without a chronic pain 
condition themselves. The existence of an ally identity in itself belies the diminishing, but 
not absent, influence of the patient’s voice. Obviously, enough people assume the patient 
position is both worthy and in need of support that there is an identity role for supporters 
in the discourse. This patient-allied author accepts the accuracy of the patient experiences 
described in the article and elsewhere in the comments. The point of the post is to offer 
an explanation for the negative experience of patient. The one they offer exonerates the 
immediate gatekeepers of treatment—the providers. The comment also casts aspersions 
on rationality and cognitive functioning as a means of marking problematized subjects.  
  The relevance of this post is not so much the portrayal of the health care 
professional (HCP) as a sympathetic character, but the unstated moral assumptions 
underlying ascriptions of deservingness, and the implications for the voice of the other 
subjects. The HCP is a valued position whose pragmatic self-preservation is justified by 
the utilitarian ethics underlying healthcare delivery. For the HCP, caring for one’s own 
interests preserves one’s availability to a larger number of patients. The guidance of a 
utilitarian ethic is given precedence over the chivalrous regard toward the suffering and 
vulnerability of any given individual.  
  If the HCP is under threat of lost social standing for their association with chronic 
pain and opioid use, then they are imbued with the power to safeguard their position. 
They can simply refuse to affiliate with patients whose situation may threaten the 
providers’ privileged position. Being fooled, censured, or financially inconvenienced are 
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not consequences that the HCP should have to face (i.e., deserve to deal with). It was, 
however, accepted as the reality facing providers.   
It's a tough call sometimes. If more responsibility could be put on the patient, as 
far as the risks are concerned, and not on the doctor, then maybe the patients who 
need it can get relief, and the drug seekers can do what they do without 
jeopardizing the doctor. 
  This post is one of the few that acknowledges a difficulty in distinguishing 
between “patients” and “drug seekers.” The proposed solution is the removal of the social 
mandate to distinguish between them: Let people live and die by their personal choices: 
This is the quintessence of American Individualism.  
  The post seems to be suggesting that if prescribers were assigned less 
responsibility for the consequences of their decision to prescribe opioids, they may feel 
less apprehensive about prescribing them and people deemed deserving would have 
access as needed. In considering right action, therefore, accurate distinction between 
deserving patients or blameworthy drug abusers would become less important. Why? 
Because the potential good to come of relieving the undeserved suffering of the person 
with medically explainable chronic pain is greater than the good that would come of 
restricting users who may be addicted or in danger of overdosing.   
  Illegitimacy and the loss of voice. People who report medical benefit from opioid 
pain management strategies fear loss of their choice to access these substances through 
sanctioned medical channels. In an effort to refute calls for increased prescribing 
restrictions, the narrative of patient advocacy emphasizes the contribution of opioids to 
increased quality of life, functionality, productivity, and relief of suffering for 
“legitimate” patients. All of these are subjective measures; all requiring positive regard 
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for the credibility of the reporting patient to exercise influence. In other words, the 
provider must believe the patient is truthful and accurate in reporting drug effects.  
He is alert, can function very well, doesn't feel drugged, and actually doesn't 
notice anything except some relief from taking the edge off his pain… I hope he 
can still be prescribed Methadone through his pain clinic like he is now, because 
I dread that we might have to go through what we used to when he was given 
other medications before the Methadone. He was like a zombie, and couldn't 
function at all until the Methadone. Hopefully it will still be available to those 
who have used it "successfully" for a number of years. 
  The author of this quote identifies themselves to be a family member of a depicted 
beneficiary of opioid therapy. The statements above are taken from a much longer 
narrative outlining the journey of false starts and setbacks that the patient experienced on 
their journey toward finding their preferred treatment. What this respondent fears most is 
the loss of a treatment they credit with increased quality of life for their loved one. This 
patient-allied commentator agrees with anti-opioid sentiments that losing a sense of 
rational agency (e.g., being “a zombie”) is an undesirable fate. They argue from 
experience that not all opioid use results in these negative side effects. Whether their 
report is taken seriously—whether they are accepted as rational and legitimate or 
mistaken, manipulative and illegitimate—will depend on the presumptions of the reader. 
  The consequences of being deemed illegitimate include a loss of voice and 
restrictions on choice. This diminishing influence is justified on the grounds that people 
who are illegitimate are poor historians of dubious authority or moral standing. The more 
denigrated a person’s ascribed identity, the less likely they will be able to successfully 
convince others they belong in a social category of greater standing. The denigrated 
patients and opioid users deserves to be ignored more than they deserve to be given heed. 
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But perhaps the most striking consequence is the ascription of negative consequences to 
the illegitimate user.  
  Blame and the assumption of choice. Hateful sentiments and shaming 
condemnation often attend the subject of illegitimate use, sometimes in stark vitriolic 
attack.  
Letting the human garbage that choose to ruin their lives with abuse get in the 
way of easing the pain of someone whose life has been altered by constant pain is 
a travesty. 
  Since humans are not garbage and drug abuse can be associated with chronic pain, 
this statement cannot be understood at face value. There are several assumptions 
necessary to make sense of the statement. The choice to abuse a drug (to use it for 
illegitimate reasons) renders the subject blameworthy for their circumstances. If they are 
dying, it is their fault. If they are treated with disdain, it is a natural consequence of poor 
choice. The individual is wholly responsible for their position in society. It is a travesty to 
consider the needs of those addicts who are to blame at the expense of the blameless, the 
stricken patient who is befallen by their circumstances.  
  Ultimately, patient identified subjects are deemed more deserving of 
consideration than drug abusing subjects. When the interests of both come into conflict, 
the needs of the patient-identified subject are expected to trump those of the drug abuser. 
Taking this as truth renders nonsensical any decisions by gatekeepers, providers and 
policy-makers that do not act in accord with these foundational assumptions. Any 
contrary action can be decried as a miscarriage of justice because as a decisional 
outcome, they contravene the expectations of deservingness that attends each subject 
position. 
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  It was socially acceptable to give voice to assertions that [people labeled] drug 
addicts should be left to die of their own vices. 
I'd rather that the loser addicts out there die from their addictions as long as 
people who are trying to lead productive lives while suffering from chronic pain 
can have the medicine that helps them do it. 
  This statement supports a view that addicts are expendable because they are 
unproductive “losers” as opposed to people who want to be productive and deserve to 
have their suffering alleviated. Controlling opioids is therefore an illegitimate goal, not 
because it lacks necessity, but because drug abusers are both undeserving and immovable 
targets of intervention: 
The sad truth is some people abuse drugs, and some people die, which will 
happen regardless of what people want so let’s stop judging people with pain as 
somehow deserving of extreme distrust. I can say from personal experience I have 
never gotten high or had any euphoric feelings from pain medication because I 
take it for pain, and when you take medication as prescribed you don't get high. 
Lastly no legitimate pain patient likes taking medication for pain, the side effects 
aren't fun and nothing would make me happier than not to need anything for the 
pain. 
  This post contains examples of several strategies employed to influence 
perceptions of deservingness. Personal experience is the identified epistemological 
authority by which it is expected that veracity will be measured. Legitimate patients are 
linked to qualities of the good subject, deserving of positive rewards (e.g., being trusted, 
sympathized with, and granted sanction for their use of opioids). Illegitimate users are 
devalued; their deaths are sad, maybe, but inevitable in any event. In the end, legitimate 
patients deserve resources and positive regard more than do abusers. Legitimate equals 
good and here legitimacy is communicated here through lack of desire for opioids and 
their side-effects.  
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  Creating the good patient script. The proffered means of distinguishing between 
abusers and patients involves both motive for and effect of opioid use. There are 
legitimate and illegitimate examples of both. Patients may be recognized by their need for 
opioids to increase quality of life accompanied by the desire to cease opioid intake. 
Legitimacy is also signified by the absence of the opioids’ euphoric effects (the one 
effect—not coincidentally—believed to motivate the addict’s quest). Legitimate users 
supposedly do not experience the symptoms of illegitimacy. As seen above, getting 
“high” is not associated with a side effect of the drug itself, but rather the consequences 
of the user’s motivation.   
Patients that have chronic pain don't take their meds to get high. We take meds 
because it is the only way we can get out of bed in the morning. If I had my 
choice, I'd never need to take another pill. 
  In the good patient script, opioids are necessary evils; they are sought as a last 
resort and are not desired outright.  
I hate the pills. They reduce the pain while also reducing my thinking ability, slow 
the gut (constipation), interfere with good sleep, taste bad, and cause severe dry-
mouth and bad breath. And yet, they can make the difference between my 
choosing to live—or not. 
  Even with these unpleasant side effects, opioids are seen as preferable to the 
alternative of living with unbearable physical pain. While loss of cognitive clarity is not a 
desirable end, it is for some an unfortunate but worthwhile price to pay for a life worth 
living. This is in contrast to those commentators prizing rationality and intellectual 
functioning over pain suppression. 
  Some comments gave voice to a sense of helplessness ascribed to systemic issues 
in pain care funding allocations. Removing the option of opioid for chronic pain could 
leave people with no other fundable options for relief. 
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IF I HAD MORE MONEY OR INSURANCE THAT WOULD COVER OTHER 
FORMS OF TREATMENT, I WOULD ACTUALLY BE ABLE TO TAKE LESS 
MEDICATION IN ORDER TO FUNCTION ON A DAILY BASIS. The medical 
world seems hell-bent on trying to characterize us as drug addicts—when we are 
not—but won't look at helping us manage pain using many other kinds of tools, as 
well. 
  Again, opioid use and the patient position is legitimated through reference to 
functionality—the ability to maintain idealized quality of productivity is the defense of its 
use. A claim that is given no heed by those voices (professional and otherwise) advancing 
the idea of inevitable opioid-induced impairments of function. Another point being made 
here, that received little attention in the articles or the literature, is the issue of funding for 
treatment. If people are dependent upon third-party payers (whether welfare or corporate 
insurance) to access health services, their selection of treatments are limited to those that 
are reimbursable under policy.  
  In this narrative, opioids are not chosen for their preferential effects, but out of 
economic necessity. This is a very different motivation for use than is attributed to the 
drug abuser, who is said to be seeking “a high.” In this, and many other posts with an 
explicit allegiance to patient advocacy, the subject of pain patient is distanced from the 
subject of drug abuse on the basis of motivational variables.  
  Ease of distinction and the object-status of group identity. The identity roles 
of pain patient and of drug abuser are at fundamental odds in medical and legal 
discourses and in direct competition for influential social regard. The former is provided 
sanctioned access to opioid substances while the latter is targeted for restrictions. The 
pain patient is an object of some sympathy, while the drug abuser is an object of derision. 
The question being debated is not whether these categories exist, but rather upon what 
grounds they can be distinguished. 
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  There is record of a clear assumption, particularly from the standpoint of patient 
advocates, that the patient identity is demonstrably separate from that of the addict.  
  You'd think I acted and looked like a junkie. 
  That these subject identities represent discrete objects with distinctive features 
that ought to be recognizable to outside observers is taken for granted.  
My doctor tells me there are 2 kinds of abusers she watches for: those who always 
want medications for this week’s complaint and those who want to sell the 
medications for profit. Each of those is easy to spot and avoid. 
  It makes no sense to this patient-identified commentator that they should be 
mistaken for a drug abuser, because it is so clear to them that they are not abusing the 
drug. They assume it should be equally obvious to others. The necessary presumption 
being, observable characteristics can reliably distinguish between the deserving 
(legitimate medicinal user) and the blameworthy (illegitimate drug abuser).  
A simple urine analysis told the attending physician if the patient needed pain 
treatment or drug treatment. 
  This commentator self-identified as a chronic pain patient and made repeated 
posts in defense of easy access to opioids for legitimate patients seeking treatment for 
chronic pain. This sentence occurred within a larger critique of new prescribing policies 
for chronic opioid therapy. The irony of this, and similar posts, should not be lost. The 
law they criticize specified the need for monitoring drug use through urine analysis. In 
other words, to treat patients as potential abusers which the patient advocate otherwise 
decries. Even as these patient-identified commentators argue against the law, they 
articulate the same position: Drug abusers are observably, measurably, and discretely 
separable from medicinal users and it is the task of health care providers to accurately 
distinguish the two.  
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  Drug abusers and medicinal users may both require medical care, but they have 
distinct needs that cannot be met by the same treatment programs.  
90% of our problems can be solved with a pre-screening prior to opioid therapy 
to separate and place the addicts into programs they desperately need, but differ 
from the needs of the "clean" patient. 
  Addicts (aka abusers) are linked with desperate need (an indictment of 
dependency) and are juxtaposed to cleanliness. “Clean” being a word used extensively in 
discourses of addiction to denote the absence of psychoactive substances in the body of 
[former] drug users. The semantic consequence of categorizing subjects with reference to 
a quality (clean/legitimate) is the automatic positioning of excluded subjects into a 
category identified by its opposite (unclean/illegitimate). Employment of the word clean 
to describe non-drug use automatically positions users as unclean, by definition. This, by 
virtue of the fact that categorical qualifiers are just that—categorical. Either one is or is 
not a member of the clean (or legitimate) category.   
  Being clean (of disease, dirt or drugs) is the socially preferenced position—there 
is an expectation that most people will think it better to be clean than not. People in the 
clean category benefit from the positive social regard in which cleanliness is held. If 
systemic absence of opioids is the only qualifier for inclusion in the category of clean 
subjects, then it is an impossible goal for the patient-user who is dependent upon opioids 
to manage pain. Hence, the enclosure of “clean” in quotation marks: If drug users are not 
clean (i.e., dirty) by definition, then patient-users can be “clean” only in the sense that 
their dependence is not viewed as addiction. Cleanliness is thereby clarified as a 
reference to legitimized opioid use allowing for the inclusion of patient users within the 
preferred subject group.  
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  As noted above, the importance of distinguishing between them arises from the 
assumption that members of each category deserve different consequences and responses 
from other social actors. The subject of the pain patient is deemed deserving of some 
degree of positive response to care seeking, but as pain patients they must argue the case 
against being (re)classified as abusers. If unsuccessful, they stand to lose access to all that 
is accorded to the pain patient. Not only do they stand to lose access to opioid treatments 
but moreover, the expectation of being treated with compassion, trust, and respect. 
  The patient users are distinguished from the addict/abuser on the basis of their 
motivation for use; locus of responsibility for their circumstances; and their relationship 
with identified qualities of the idealized subject.  
Drug seekers can be so manipulative and convincing it is difficult for even a 
professional to distinguish their true needs. But government needs to stop trying 
to protect people from themselves—people who need the drugs should never 
suffer, and people who are addicts and don't want help, well that's their problem I 
guess. 
  In this quote, the drug seeker is someone who should not be believed but who 
tricks others into believing them, and while this is understandably difficult for 
prescribers, it should carry less significance in policy decisions. The drug seeker remains 
associated with the subject of “people” and are therefore granted what consideration is 
held for the human being. Their life is of less value than that of the legitimate patient, 
however, and their descent into disregarded social positions is inevitable. What they don’t 
deserve is to benefit at the expense of legitimate users, nor do they deserve the respect to 
be offered to the honest (implied) patients in pain.  
Those that suffer have more vested in making sure that abusers are culled out of 
the system than the abusers [do]. All abusers are looking for is a 'high' or a 
"quick buck"; we are looking for pain control sufficient to allow us to have lives. 
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  Abusers are not included in “those that suffer”; they are to be “culled,” a word 
pulled from discourses of production/farming that provides a conceptual link to unwanted 
objects with little or no value. Here the object of culling is an unwanted person with little 
or no value in the social world; a subject whose motivations are unworthy of respect.  
“We” patients, however, deserve “to have lives” and are not looking for more than what 
is sufficient to fulfill the pursuit of life.    
  The patient is positioned to have greater social value (as reflected in the 
expectation of a more positive reception) than the abuser. This hierarchical distinction, 
made on the basis of motivational purity, is necessitated by the stark realization that the 
needs of patients (access) and the needs of addicts (restriction) are diametrically opposed 
in the discourse of opioid policy.    
Instead of the easy fix of denying care to all, they need to work harder on weeding 
out the addicts and treating them. 
  This author asserts that denial of care for all is not the answer; rather denial of 
care should target those few who should be treated instead. Patients are the “all” 
deserving of “care” (a word imbued with positive sentimentality). Addicts are the few 
who should be weeded out, and “treated” (a word communicating clinical detachment).  
  This post does not advocate abandoning the drug abuser to their fate, as some 
other posts have. Treatment, as an undefined signifier clearly associated with medical 
discourses, is being advocated for the subject of drug abuse. Yet the subject is 
simultaneously denigrated through semantic linkage to weeds. Weeds are unwanted 
plants. Plants are organisms which are generally treated like senseless objects, not as 
experiencing subjects, weeds all the more so. The verb, to weed, refers to the act of 
ending the lives of unwanted plants, usually to make room for other developments. 
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Addicted subjects are like weeds, to be removed for the sake of more desirable crop. 
Their lives are expendable; no one really wants a weed. 
  The illegitimate (ab)users may be culled or weeded from the legitimate patient 
group only upon identification. To this end, commentators posit distinctive features of 
each subject position that can be assessed and measured through physical means, or 
behavioral observations.  
  Ontological attributions of group identity. In a worldview privileging material 
ontological explanations, it is logical to conclude that an object of verified existence 
mandates responsiveness. The privilege granted material ontology is seen in its frequent 
invocation as authorizing arguments. Yet, it is oft times employed in support of a priori 
assumptions in logically contradictory ways.      
I for one am glad they are cracking down on handing those pills out. If your 
medical record proves you have chronic pain then you should have no problem 
getting your pain management pills but if there is a question in a dr.'s mind. Sorry 
I’m siding with the doc. 
  This commentator invokes reference to the authority of physical science 
(observable, documented medical proof) to enhance the claim to represent objective 
reality in their words. The patient is an abuser until proven legitimate. Yet in the same 
moment, this post undermines all faith in the practitioners’ capacity to objectively 
identify proof of legitimacy. The author is not denying the existence of people who 
require opioids as medicinal treatments. They are, however, dubious of the pain 
experience of those claiming it.  They are equally dubious of the prescribers’ ability to 
use appropriate caution when prescribing opioids for pain complaints. If not, they would 
not need be so welcoming of new of policies increasing restrictions and oversight of 
prescribing practices.  
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  The “crack down” by government is ethically supportable because it slows the 
entry of opioids into the consumer market. The crackdown is necessitated by the fact that 
HCPs have not been sufficiently conservative when “handing out” medicinal opioids. Yet 
the author will side with these same untrustworthy doctors if they deny the validity of a 
pain complaint. The professional role is ceded influence only when their understanding of 
the physical evidence supports their a priori conclusion that opioids are undesirable, 
ineffective, and, unnecessary.  
  The ideological role of materialism is also manifest in its use by patient advocates 
with an opposing agenda: References to physical reality are used to legitimize 
subjectively reported experiences of pain, rather than undermine them.   
Baseline information of before injury, after injury blood pressure, etc. systemic 
measurements can accurately provide information on the status of pain and 
thresholds. Let us fund studies. Let us encourage that highest level of care. Pain is 
NOT mental illness. Enduring pain can cause complications. We have the ability 
to improve our health care. Ignoring pain is abandoning the injured. Pain drugs 
can complicate the healing, but use with alternate (acupuncture and physical 
therapy) can be used as tools to allow the injured to heal. 
  Legitimate users are identified as those that experience injury, and do not cause, 
through the willful misuse of opioids, the circumstances of their pain-filled physical 
suffering. Pain patients may be distinguished from drug abusers on the basis of 
physiological signs. These signs are understood to reflect material disturbance that can be 
enumerated through technological means. These observable signs are presented as the 
preferred barometer of truth in support the validity of the reported pain because it is 
assumed that they exist as expected. Ironically, a potentially detrimental assumption for 
the voices of people with different experiences.   
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  Physical malformation of some nature is nevertheless the suggested distinction 
between a legitimate and illegitimate applicant for pain care. The more closely the 
observed phenomenon approximates accepted understandings of these cause and effect 
relationships, the more validity is ascribed to the subjective complaints, the more likely 
their request for medicinal intervention will be granted.  
  When pain is attributed to material reality, belief in the rightness of patients’ 
access to caring attitudes and therapeutic options has sufficient currency to be given 
voice as an expectation. The fact that patient identified subjects may not receive these 
things is seen as a problem to be remedied through appeal to public sympathies.  
RESPECT and COMPASSION for those in unrelenting chronic pain is what is 
lacking in our health care system today. Negative Attitudes around addiction, 
abuse and chronic pain (addiction, abuse, and chronic pain are NOT 
synonymous) stand in the way of truly caring for these unfortunate individuals. 
We need a paradigm shift . . . we need more respect, more compassion and we 
need more EDUCATION for those whose job it is to care for person with chronic 
pain. Vulnerable persons with chronic pain are the most discriminated against 
group in the state of WA at the moment . . . this needs to change. 
  Respect and compassion are what is lacking, and education is the solution. 
Education to inculcate positively valued attitudes about the identified subject (i.e., pain 
patients). Withholding respect, compassion, and any options for pain care represents an 
act of discrimination against the patient subject. Discrimination, as it is used here, 
provides a social reference infused with moral authority: In emphasizing the resistance to 
unfounded, negative prejudicial attitudes toward the subject of pain patients, the word 
“discrimination” links this population with discourses of civil rights, social 
marginalization and stigma.  
  In this context, the patients are the truly unfortunate ones. They are suffering; they 
are deserving of respect and compassion, which, contrary to idealistic expectations of 
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fairness, they do not readily receive. In associating them with “vulnerable persons” 
patients become the deserving and needy subject of the chivalrous imperative: Protect the 
weak and the blameless. Yet what of the addict position in this comment?  
  While there is no explicit reference to what the addict may deserve, the patient 
subject is purposely and emphatically distanced from the addicted subject. They inhabit 
different spheres of social regard. The addicted subject bears ironic mention in reference 
to harmful negative attitudes, but their exclusion from consideration in the main is so 
complete that it does not register as a form of discrimination. The absence of the voice of 
the addict in this debate is taken for granted. 
  Disability status and conditional sympathy. Health conditions with material status 
that are associated with disability are expected to elicit sympathetic responses. Thus 
references to disability are a potential means of influencing perceptions of deservingness. 
Disability, when people are not held responsible for the conditions leading to need for 
opioids, is expected to generate sympathetic identification. The disabled deserve care. 
Finally, a reasoned thought on pain meds. Thank goodness I do not need them, 
but my disabled son needs them and is faced with "we do not treat pain patients" 
policies. So what is a father to do? Become a criminal and traffic in illegal 
substances or stand by and watch my son suffer? 
  This commentator draws upon the moral arguments of chivalry to support the 
legitimate user’s claim to opioids. The idealized subject is the law-abiding, family-
oriented, reasoned individual for whom familial obligations to ease the suffering of kin 
would prevail in case these ends should conflict with unjust legal mandates. The 
perceived irrationality of more powerful actors (policy-makers who deny pain care to 
disabled patients) leaves the devalued subject (criminal drug dealer) more attractive than 
123 
 
 
 
it should, or otherwise would, be. To traffic in illegal substances preserves at least some, 
albeit diminished, power to choose for one’s self.  
  When the course of one’s life is the undeniable result of choices made by distant 
others, an acute awareness of dependence emphasizes one’s distance from the idealized 
subject of independence.   
We penalize hundreds of doctors and thousands of patients who WILL enter the 
disability rolls when they could have been living productive lives. 
  The loss of access to pain relief for legitimate users is attributed to the position of 
opioid use, because prescription and consumption of opioids are punishable acts. Patient 
advocates argue that opioids can be effective in allowing patients to approximate the 
qualities of the ideal subject (e.g., productive worker). Penalizing regulations unfairly 
relegate patients to disabled lives they may otherwise avoid. The patient’s disability 
becomes the responsibility of policy-makers and gatekeepers who have refused them 
access to medical treatments, including long-term opioid use. 
  Arguments against use of opioids for treating chronic pain also reference 
disability in terms of sympathetic identification. It is not the notion that disability earns 
charitable deserts that is questioned, but rather the legitimacy of one’s claim to it.  
You guys are insane. No normal person takes these drugs but addicts do 
everything they can to preserve their drugs. 
  
They are extremely dangerous as taken and everyone gets that they do a terrible 
job of taking care of pain long term (that is why EVERYONE escalates their 
dose).  
 
Very, Very few people on these drugs are able to continue to work full time and 
most become "Disabled" and unemployed.  
 
I met a guy who was disabled with only wrist pain. Give me a break. [spacing in 
original] 
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  In this line of thinking, people who use opioids over the long-term are, for the 
most part, bereft of positive regard, but the notion that the subject of disability deserves a 
respectful and caring response is a shared assumption. The subject of disability retains its 
status as an object deserving of charity, even if individual claims of disability may be 
shown fraudulent. It is the source and legitimacy of the disability claim that is being 
criticized: Disabled pain patient is an illegitimate identity claim if it is made in service of 
addiction or laziness. This post is an assertion of fact in relaying the homogeneity of the 
population of pain patients. As a statement of fact, the patient is left with the 
responsibility to refute the accuracy of the claim to homogeneity. They must defend their 
claim to legitimacy against ascriptions of irrationality and sloth. 
  The fool as problematized subject in discourses of brain dysfunction. Several 
quotes used above reference loss of rationality, cognitive impairment, and similar 
designations in their denigration of contrary subject positions. This includes variants such 
as “zombie”, “numb”, or “mindless.” Words and phrases drawn from psychological 
discourses have become common-place references to negatively valued subjects. The 
insane, mentally aberrant are problematized subjects, although in colloquial, metaphorical 
use, the words are not understood literally to signify someone with an actual mental or 
brain disorder. Yet the association remains paramount in its ascription of irrationality. 
  The author of the post immediately above emphasizes that “EVERYONE” (or at 
least most people) in the category of opioid-using-chronic-pain-patients is “insane,” 
abnormal, and making false claims in a bid for charitable regard (“Disabled”). They are 
thus dismissed as unproductive, unemployed, irrational (“insane”), drug dependent 
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(“addicts”) malingerers (“everyone gets they do a terrible job of taking care of pain”). All 
of these qualities are antithetical to the idealized subject—good and deserving—subject.  
It's enlightening to read the comments from folks that obliviously have 
dysfunctional brain chemistry from years of high dose narcotics. As with any 
addiction procuring drugs and rationalizing its use becomes a central part of 
their personality. Having the government cut them off is the correct course of 
action because it's highly improbable that they would attempt that themselves. 
  To contextualize the significance of this comment, it is necessary to understand 
that only the patient-aligned-subjects gave voice to concerns about maintaining access to 
opioids. Therefore, this author’s response must logically be read as an indictment of 
patient authenticity. The so-called patient in this narrative is an addict with a 
dysfunctional brain. Not without significance, the ascension of a disease model of chronic 
pain is a model of brain dysfunction (see Tracey & Bushnell, 2009). Something also used 
to describe subjects within discourses of mental illness that has been found to correlate 
with increased stigmatization of that population (Mann & Himelein, 2008).   
  Dysfunctional brain chemistry, whether it is identified with pain, addiction, 
mental illness, or acute drug effects is invoked to undermine a subject’s believability and 
generally devalues their position in the discourse.  
Anyone who, because of chronic pain or mental illness, is required to take 
massive dosages of narcotics in order to survive is already dead. Laying on your 
couch doped up into a catatonic state is not living. 
  In this assertion, pain and mental illness share the distinction of being lives not 
worth living. Ergo, anyone advocating continued use of opioids is automatically suspect. 
There is no logical ground upon which opioid users can claim benefit if opioid users are 
already dead. Or if opioid-induced impairments inevitable. Or if opioids are ineffective 
for the task at hand—mitigating pain of a chronic nature. 
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  It is not insignificant that these modifiers of the irrational arise from psychiatric 
discourses of mental aberration. Loss of ascribed rationality inevitably results in a loss of 
voice, even if one holds sympathetic views of the subject. Affixing subjects with 
adjectives such as “crazy,” “nuts,” “mindless,” or the like results in an inherently 
dismissible position. One may pity the “crazy” person, even wish to help them, but that 
does not mean the so-called crazy person knows what they need regardless of what they 
say.  
  When a person is positioned as a chronic pain patient, the assumption is that the 
pain has no predicted end and, at best, a tenuous relationship with proximal causation. 
These are subjects of debated ontological and social status: Whether they deserve positive 
social regard is as much a question as their right to access opioids through medical 
channels. The chronic pain patient thus resides at the edge of deservingness, fighting to 
maintain the status of medical patient while frequently being positioned as drug abusers 
and/or mental patients quite against their will.  
  Patients as drug abusers. Whether an opioid user will be conversing from the 
position of patient or abuser is wholly dependent upon the assumptions of their 
interlocutor and little to do with their own powers of persuasion.  
You guys are addicts. ALL of these medicines are extremely dangerous. 
  This comment addresses the many patient-identified commentators who were 
defending the efficacy of continuous opioid therapy on the basis of their personal 
experience. Anyone defending opioid use is derided as a drug addict because the danger 
is seen to inhere in the medicines, not the way they are used. Once the drugs are 
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positioned as uniformly dangerous (read addictive) than any argument in support of 
continued access is automatically suspect.  
  The medicine loses it pain relieving effects after using it for a few weeks. 
  The medicinal user of chronic opioid therapy is rendered illegitimate because the 
drugs are “known” to be ineffective. Only an addict would continue to take an addictive 
substance with no medicinal value and inevitably disabling side effects. 
Those opiates are making it worse on you due to the fact that they decrease 
muscle mass and take your inhibition and throw it out the window. Making for a 
lazy drug addict who would rather drug themselves up and numb their minds than 
actually figuring out what is really going on. 
  This quote is taken from a longer post that posits conditional sympathy for opioid 
use in cases of cancer and injury all while using totalizing language to suggest that by 
taking opioids one is made an addict. The quote exemplifies how opioid use weakens 
association with idealized qualities of productivity, self-sufficient independence, and 
rationality. The patient user is made illegitimate as a function of the inherent properties of 
opioid substances. It is inevitable. Pain patients (most especially those who use opioids) 
must argue the case against being (re)classified as abusers.  
  Absolute propositions such as the one below leave little room for justifiable 
dissent without first successfully challenging the claims of asserted facts.   
Across the country, tens of thousands of people are dying and millions are 
becoming addicted because pharm industry marketing and pharma-funded pain 
groups convinced docs to prescribe aggressively for conditions where opioids 
harm more than they help, like chronic pain. And these same groups are fighting 
public health efforts to bring the epidemic under control. 
  This HCP-identified author is a critic of opioid use in treating chronic pain, and of 
people who defend their use. The post is appended to a profile name of a publicly 
identifiable proponent of restrictive opioid prescribing practices. The use of a personal 
128 
 
 
 
moniker aligned with an HCP identity establishes a personal connection with the 
professional knowledge base of medical discourses of pain care and opioid therapy.  It 
confers a degree of authority on fact assertions that demonstrates the existing influence of 
this position.  
  So what is the message of this authoritative voice? On the face of it, this post 
advocates for the drug addict who is in a position to benefit from public health 
interventions aimed at restricting opioid access to reduce addiction-related suffering. On 
another level, the writer has made de facto addicts of chronic pain patients who utilize 
continuous opioid therapy. They may have been led into addiction by well-meaning 
professionals who bowed to the pressure of a greedy pharmaceutical industry, but they 
are still misusing opioid substances.  
  In their exploitation by more powerful interests, the patient-become-addict in this 
scenario is rendered less blameworthy—they do not bear sole responsibility for their 
predicament. This may be the means by which the subject retains their position of 
legitimacy as a target of compassionate intervention: It would be ethically righteous to 
prevent otherwise deserving people to fall into such despair and disrepute. “Pain groups” 
are credited with exploiting chronic pain to create an acceptable subject (the chronic pain 
patient) for targeted opioid sales. These same greedy actors are then accused of 
blockading the patient-addict’s salvation by blocking well-meaning policy-makers from 
restricting access to the addict-victim’s drug of choice. Well-meaning as it may be, this 
statement exemplifies the complete erasure of the legitimate patient position by banishing 
the supportive ally to the role of cynical villain.  
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  When opioids are perceived inherently ineffective and addictive, then negative 
results are a foregone conclusion. It becomes a matter of moral imperative for providers 
to restrict their use if they are to live up to the code of their professional oath. If opioids 
invariably lead to addiction and misuse, then advocating continued access is morally 
indefensible from the ethical stance of utilitarianism and of chivalry. The implication, 
only the cynical profiteer would do such a thing, which is the position left for patient 
advocates and treatment production companies. If true, their message would deserves no 
attention and they no converts to their cause.  
  But if opioids are assumed to always harm chronic pain patients more then they 
help, how does one make sense of the claims of those who have reportedly used opioids 
to effectively manage pain, sometimes for years?  
I was injured in 2000 and I take oxycontin, I have for ten years plus and I’m alive, 
and just fine, how are you going to say that narcotics hurt in situations of chronic 
pain more than they help ?? seriously with that, you clearly have no idea what 
debilitating pain is, and I’m sure glad you’re not my doctor, you wouldn’t be for 
long, you clearly have no compassion!!! 
  This patient-identified post was made in response to the physician-identified 
comment that had proclaimed the inevitable harm of continuous opioid therapy. The 
author passionately refutes the claims of the professed medical authority on the basis of 
their lived experience. Yet any sway the assertion may exert must first be granted by 
more powerful others who may or may not ascribe merit to the patient’s narrative. When 
the health care professional espouses attitudes dismissing the credibility of patient 
reports, or eliminate any position of legitimacy for the use of opioids in chronic pain 
management, is there really anything an opioid user can say to convince them otherwise?    
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Summary of Interpretive Findings 
  The data used for this critical discourse study included over 779 individually 
authored texts. The authors ranged from paid investigative journalists, to policy-makers 
and advocates, to unidentified members of the news reading public. Commentators 
claimed origins from around the country, though the majority identified as residents of 
the geographic readership of the Seattle Times newspaper. There were comments by 
those claiming to be medical professionals, pain patients, and opinionated by-standers.  
  The sixty-four quotes included above were drawn from comments that were 
credited to fifty-three different profile names. This was interpreted as a probable 
indication that the comments had been authored by different individuals. The decision to 
draw quotes from so many differently authored comments was intentional, and based on 
an assumption that prevalence communicates something of significance. It was a 
pragmatic effort to illustrate the dominance of deservingness and the us-vs-them 
competitiveness that seems to characterize much of the social discourse of our current 
historical moment. 
  Throughout the texts used for this project, social problems were discussed in 
hyperbolic terms of the good/deserving versus the bad/undeserving. This was not true for 
every individual comment, and alternative conceptualizations of role relationships did 
exist in the data. These positions were, however, commonly encountered in comments 
about a wide variety of topics and oppositional assertions. This commonality of 
deservingness across a spectrum of social positions is indicative of its dominance in 
discourses of resource allocation and attitudinal regard. 
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  Such hyperbolic and exclusionary discourses posed a challenge to continuing 
attempts at constructive dialogue about problems, solutions, and compromises. Complex 
social problems, like chronic pain treatment and opioid addiction, among others, were 
reduced to simplistic aspersions of character and ascriptions of blame. The negative 
consequences ascribed to those in unpopular positions was sometimes extreme, including 
social ostracization and even death.  
  Reinforcing this dichotomous positioning did little to alleviate the problems 
associated with problematized identities. Neither could it address the problems facing 
those people who are (mis)identified with them. Vilifying drug addicted people did not 
improve the position of pain patients, nor did it result in proposed solutions for 
preventing addiction in the first place. If anything it reinforced the arguments in favor of 
increasingly regulated access to opioid medications, contrary to the interests of people 
with CPC’s who have or may benefit from them.   
  Pain patients inhabit a tenuous position in this discourse of deservingness. They 
are potentially objects of chivalrous attitudes toward blameless suffering, but they also 
inhabit a position of dependence. Dependency lead to a reduction in the influence of the 
dependent person’s voice in the social discourse. The claims of those deemed dependent 
were dismissed, rejected or ignored by numerous respondents to the Times’ articles, 
including some who self-identified as medical professionals who may hold positions of 
power over the lives of prospective patients. 
  The assumption of physical and financial dependence, especially of disabled, 
state-dependent patients, was compounded by an association with opioid dependence. 
Opioid users are split into categories of descending legitimacy. The pain patient, the 
132 
 
 
 
patient of addiction treatment, the manipulating pseudo-patient, and the criminal user. 
Those who abuse opioids are maligned across the board; it was not an identity that was 
ever willfully adopted in the text.  
  The hyperbolic, adversarial context of the wider social discourse facilitated 
extreme conclusions about pain patients and opioid users, perhaps the most troubling 
being that opioid users deserved to die for their presumed “choice” to (mis)use the drugs. 
It is not that all commentators made such a claim that makes this part of the dominant 
discourse. It’s that the assertion was common to arguments in support of maintaining 
patient access to opioids and those in support of blanket restrictions on opioid prescribing 
alike.     
  Opioid substances were argued for and against in relation to their assumed impact 
on idealized qualities such as agency, self-sufficiency, and productivity, among others. 
The highly undesirable side effects of opioids, namely addiction and overdose potential, 
were tied to the subjects of dependency, irrationality, and sloth. Commentators with 
diverse identity claims articulated the idea that these effects are inherent and inevitable or 
arose from improper motivation and use. These idealized and problematized subjects 
were common to statements favoring oppositional positions, e.g., those advocating more 
or less restrictions for opioid prescribing practices.  
  The position of opioid side-effects had profound effects on patient voice. People 
who dismissed opioid efficacy also dismissed patients claiming benefit. People who 
dismissed the risks of opioid use as side effects of misuse dismissed people with pain 
who suffered from these negative side-effects. People who dismissed concern for opioid 
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users who developed addictions inevitably dismissed concern for people who may be 
(mis)labeled as drug addicted.      
  For patient-identified participants to maintain their right to access the 
consideration and influence accorded to the human subjects of medical discourses, they 
must convince others that they are deserving of the right to choose their course, to use or 
not to use opioids. Contributing to the reification of an illegitimate patient identity 
undermines this attempted advocacy of the patient’s position.  
  For one, it contributes to stigmatization of another group of suffering people 
(addicts) with potentially fatal consequences. For another, pain patients have little say 
over whether they are ultimately labeled as addicts/drug abusers by their HCP, family 
members, or other members of society. This is particularly true for those who have 
become dependent upon opioids to maintain functional quality of life, but it is also 
reportedly true for those who seek care for acute injuries as well as those with chronic 
conditions who do not seek opioids.   
   As seen in the analysis above, deservingness and out-grouping infuse discussions 
of social problems ranging from abortion, climate change, socio-economic conditions, 
partisan politics, and more. Discourses of pain care, opioid use, and addiction are 
entwined with these dominant discourses which underlie moral decision making. The 
idealized position of the law-abiding, independent, self-sufficient, rational citizen is 
implicated in stigmatizing attitudes toward pain patients, opioid users, and addicts alike. 
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Losing Voice with Pain, Addiction, and Opioid Use 
 This critical discourse analysis examined texts from the reactive commentary of 
news readers that were posted to a series of articles on the website of a large 
metropolitan newspaper. The frames of legitimacy and deservingness used in patient 
advocacy appeared to inadvertently reproduced the inequities they sought to redress. 
Pain Patients were discursively positioned as potential or actual opioid users. Opioid 
users were positioned as actually or potentially addicted. Addiction and drug abuse were 
maligned to the detriment of people with pain and people with opioid addictions alike. 
Perceived loss of independence and rationality underscored negative attitudes toward 
both groups.  
Why This Study? 
  The original stated purpose of this project was to explore moral discourses 
intersecting with the subject of chronic pain, specifically to expound the potential 
implications for the social, personal, and medical treatment of people with chronic pain. 
The data for this analysis was obtained in the context of a public debate about evolving 
state policies pertaining to opioid medications in the context of chronic pain 
management, but this project was not undertaken with a focus on opioid use. As the 
researcher, I initially undertook this study with the explicit intent of informing efforts by 
patient advocates to decrease stigma and facilitate access too respectful, client-centered, 
effective and affordable care for people who live with chronic pain irrespective of 
etiology.  
  The need for anti-stigma work in pain care has been well-supported by existing 
research into the experiences of people seeking medical care for pain of diverse 
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etiological and chronicity factors (e.g., Hakanson, et al., 2010; Holloway et al., 2007; 
Lillrank, 2003; Marbach, et al., 1990; Nettleton et al., 2004; Slade et al., 2009; Walker et 
al., 1999; Werner et al., 2004; Young et al., 2013).  
  In keeping with the findings of these earlier studies of patient experiences, the 
public commentaries analyzed for this project contained obvious examples of 
stigmatizing attitudes and beliefs related to chronic pain and people seeking pain care. As 
would be expected of stigmatized identities, whatever could be said on behalf of pain 
patients was repeatedly challenged, ignored, or readily dismissed as the ramblings of the 
naïve, overly-sensitive, or the drug addicted.       
  From a sociolinguistic standpoint, patterns of language use stand to complicate 
mutually comprehensible encounters between people of different language-use 
communities (Blommaert, 2005; Gee et al., 2001). In the instant case, differences in 
narrative style and content were observably associated with explicitly claimed indices of 
social identity. Patient-identified commentators, for example, were frequently associated 
with the use of detailed anecdotal narratives to establish their authority and demonstrate 
the legitimacy of their claims. Their authority was based on lived experience, rather than 
knowledge of aggregated data points. This is a sociolinguistic register that may not be 
well heeded by those steeped in the succinct precision of academic jargon, privileging an 
assumption of disembodied aggregation over individual reports, as medical practitioners 
and policy-makers are wont to become.  
  While any of these artifacts of linguistic expression would have made an apt 
object of articulation for the stated aims of the study, in the end what stood out was the 
overall adversarial tone of the discourse in positioning subjects in categories of us-the-
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more-deserving versus them-the-less-deserving. This is a tone that seems to permeate 
much of contemporary social discourse and has certainly erupted with vehemence in the 
2016 election cycle (Pew Research Center, 2016). Subjects in the analyzed text were 
positioned as contenders in a fatalistic competition for social and material rewards. 
Contended rewards included the influence of voice (Blommaert, 2005) and any sense of 
dignity available to one’s social identity (C. Taylor, 1989), as well as access to medical 
resources.  
  This adversarial positioning is a theme observed to wind throughout reader 
commentaries. It is apparent in tangents ranging from abortion arguments to global 
warming to politico-economic corruption and partisan political propaganda. It is a feature 
characteristic of many comments directly related to the topics of pain care, including the 
discourse of safe marijuana vs. deadly opioids. The interests and goals of those 
individuals who are identified with these subjects are presented as being in direct 
opposition.  
  It was suggested, in both the public comments and the medical source material, 
that legitimate pain patients and drug abusers would be best served by mutually exclusive 
policy decisions. The pain patients claimed benefit from policies facilitating access to a 
wide variety of medical treatment options, including opioids. The drug abusers were in a 
position to need policies restricting general access to opioid substances. Within the 
commentary, these two categories of opioid users are dichotomously positioned to be 
deserving or not deserving of respect, compassion, medical resources, palliative 
responses, and in some cases, life itself.   
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  This competitive dynamic was borne out in regard to the subjects of chronic pain 
and opioid use by pitting the interests of certain subjects against less deserving others. 
The humans against non-humans; the good blameless against the blameworthy; the 
government and/or the corporate powers against the citizen consumer. Perhaps most 
explicitly associated with the stigma of chronic pain and the voice of care seekers was the 
division setting the “legitimate patients” against the “drug abusers”.    
  There seemed to be an expectation (and assumed necessity even) that the-more-
deserving subjects should be distinguished from the-less-deserving. Entwined withal 
were understandings of the real and the good underlying the moral status of these subjects 
(Parker, 2002). On one level, this is a debate about opioid use between those advocating 
restriction to reduce addiction and overdose rates and those advocating for the 
maintenance of medical access to opioid treatments for people with chronic pain 
conditions. On a more fundamental level, it is about separating the kind of people who 
deserve to be heard from those who can be justifiably dismissed.     
  A discourse of deservingness must answer fundamental questions about identity 
roles, relationships and consequences. Who deserves to be held in esteem? Whose voice 
deserves influence over the interpretations and actions of their listeners? Who deserves 
access to or control of material resources? Who is worthy of being respected, empathized 
with, or beheld with compassion? And who deserves to shoulder the mantle of blame? 
For whom is exclusion, restriction, derision, or even death considered a justifiable desert? 
And, perhaps most urgently, how are these distinctions made justifiable? These questions 
are answered in conflicting, contradictory ways in discussions of chronic pain; patients; 
addiction; drug abusers; prescribers; policy-makers; and opioid use.  
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  Subjects in discourses of deservingness. It may first be necessary to clarify the 
use of the word <subject>, which carries such a variety of connotations across academic 
traditions that the meaning here could become easily lost to confusion. In language 
studies, the subject is that which is the topic of discussion. In grammar classes, we are 
taught that “the subject is the person, place, idea or thing that is doing or being 
something” (http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/subjects.htm). In social science 
research, <subject> has become a common means of signifying a <being>—a seat of 
perception and awareness—who is under study, or is a world observer. From this, 
<subject> can just as easily represent <person> in any number of sentence constructions. 
Hence, the potential for confusion. 
  In the realm of social discourse, all subjects (even those referencing material 
things and/or living beings) are simply ideas, topics of discussion. Here the word 
<subjects> may be understood as the shadows in Plato’s Cave: We necessarily assume 
that the subjects are reflections of an actual world where the objects/concepts under 
discussion have discernible taxonomical distinctions. It would not do, however, to 
mistake the sign for that which it signifies.  
  The subjects of interest in this study relate to specific social identities available 
for living beings, e.g., health care professional, pain patient, drug addict, or research 
animal. It is understood that people (beings) are discussing these subjects and inhabiting 
the roles being discussed; however, the paragraphs below offer an examination of the 
consequential potential of the relationship between Ideas, not the actual individual beings 
(human or animal). Thus, statements about the subject of pain patients (a social identity 
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role) should not be read as a stand-in for the person of the pain patient, whose individual 
experience is their own. 
  The idea of the <pain patient> and the person who is identified as a pain patient 
may coincide on a regular basis, but they cannot be equated. A person may have chronic 
pain but not identify as a patient, yet should they communicate about their experience of 
chronic pain they become semantically associated with the subject of the pain patient. 
Someone with an observable physical ailment complaining of chronic pain can be 
perceived an illegitimate claimant to opioid access. Thus a given person with pain may be 
identified with different (even exclusive) identity labels which can limit the responses 
available to them in subsequent communications.  
  Once labeled, the living subjects are discursively positioned relative to a set of 
expectations and assumptions that are linked to specific socio-moral standards. These are 
the standards by which they will be judged by other people, and themselves (Link & 
Phelan, 2006). Individuals are received and responded to according to the prejudices 
associated with the labels they are given and held by those they encounter (Major, 
Mendes, & Dovidio, 2013). These standards and prejudices are interpolated with 
Modern-era views of suffering, individuals, responsibilities, and obligations that become 
the moral predicates of deservingness and dignity (C. Taylor, 1989, pp. 14–15).  
  Subjects are allotted their right to culturally valued responses, such as respect, 
empathy, or privileges on the basis of their moral status within historically specific 
discourses (Parker, 2002). These allotments are based upon implicit ontological 
assumptions that are rarely subjected to logical analysis (C. Taylor, 1989, Chapter 1). The 
same qualities that may mark subjects as deserving objects of moral discourses are the 
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same qualities that can provide individuals with a sense of dignity, as a being worthy of 
respect (C. Taylor, 1989).   
Deservingness and the Moral Status of Objects: Who Deserves What and Why 
  Subjects are made into the objects of moral discourse whenever they are 
positioned as potential recipients of moral choices or consequences. The Hippocratic 
Oath, for instance, makes an object of the patient whose care is the action by which the 
physician shows themselves to be good, ethical beings. Accusations that one is not living 
up to this oath amount to aspersions on one’s ethical character. Of course the power and 
social influence of the accuser is paramount in determining the consequences of any 
accusation that one may be less than ethical. The opinion of a professional ethics board 
carries more weight than the complaints of a disgruntled pain patient.  
  Choices made in accordance with ethical imperatives or values are predicated on 
understandings of both the needs and deservingness of the action’s direct object. Yet it 
may be that, in the final analysis, the latter trumps all. Callan et al.’s (2014) reviewed 
articles “highlight the role that a concern for deservingness plays in people’s reactions to 
the fates of others” (p. 143). The perception of choice and control were central to the 
ascription of deservingness in the work of Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager, and Togeby 
(2010). In exploring opinions about social welfare policies, these authors found 
deservingness to be more predictive of endorsed actions than were the ethical values 
identified by their participants. The importance of deservingness attribution has also been 
seen in researching pain care decisions in clinical encounters (see Hinze, Webster, 
Chirayath, & Tamayo-Sarver, 2009).  
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  It has been argued that a deservingness heuristic guides an individual’s selection 
of actions on the basis of what is deemed right and wrong in a given circumstance 
(Petersen et al., 2010). Judgments of right and wrong always imply consequences that are 
both justified and expected within their ideological frames (C. Taylor, 1989, Chapter 1). 
Ends are justified when they are believed to be morally right; when they are deserved. 
Ends are expected when they are assumed inevitable within the chain of events; when 
they are an effect of causal reality. It is expected and accepted that the good, sympathetic, 
legitimate subject should be rewarded in social currency while the bad, expendable, 
illegitimate subject should reap their bitter harvest. 
  These are supposed real things—the legitimate and illegitimate—they are 
afforded ontological status in the discourse (Parker, 1992). The issue is ultimately made 
out to be one of demarcation: The desirable social identities can be, indeed must be, 
distinguished from the derided and accorded their moral deserts (C. Taylor, 1989, 
Chapter 1). These positions are taken-for-granted. The only thing that is contended is the 
means by which they are to be accurately identified and explained. The decision-making 
process (the who, what, when, and why) of assigning moral status to different subjects 
and identity roles is questioned only to the degree in which it is a personal choice, an 
artifact of socio-cultural conditions, or an inherent condition of being. This debate was 
something seen in the text analyzed above and in the literature authored by researchers of 
deservingness. (e.g., Petersen, Sznycer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2012).   
  When referring to social identities, different classes of people (other beings) are 
deemed deserving of different personal, social and material consequences, to include life 
and justice, depending on the position of their associated qualities within moral 
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arguments (Kittay, 2005). The goodness or desirability of any given identity is defined in 
ways that are wholly context dependent (Goffman, 1963). When it comes to accessing 
sanctioned markets, and the respect of those aligned with dominant cultural influences, 
certain identities (e.g., blameworthy illegitimate users) are clearly beyond the pale of 
social goodwill.  
  Beyond the pale: In-group vs. out-group. In medieval Ireland the English ruled 
over regions known as the “Pale,” where English laws, customs, and moral dictates held 
sway over the Anglicized denizens. Outside of these boundaries, the “wild Irish” carried 
on their fantastical and uncivilized lives under colonial occupation (Leerssen, 1995, 
p. 30). It was an accepted understanding that those who were beyond the borders of the 
Pale did not behave in proper fashion and could not expect the same moral or legal 
consideration as those who resided within the geographic boundary. They were literally, 
geographically, beyond the Pale of social goodwill extended by the ruling classes.  
  The continued idiomatic use of this antiquated point of English law reflects an 
enduring tendency to express the morality of social arrangements in starkly competitive 
terms: Us (within the pale) vs. Them (beyond the pale). Once people are placed outside 
the bounds of positive social regard, they become inapt objects of moral benefit (C. 
Taylor, 1989, Chapter 1). Subjects are positioned in these adversarial roles with the use 
of indexical qualifiers resulting in alignment with esteemed ideas or pushing them 
beyond the pale of social goodwill.  
  Discursively speaking, those who are grouped with “us” propose to speak from 
the righteous position, expecting the benefit accorded to the good. The “we” may be 
conceived to be the problem solvers who clearly recognize truth where others may not; or 
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“we” may be the deserving supplicant for charitable endowments. Those grouped as 
“them” are, of course, conceived to be unworthy, the misguided others, or the morally 
bankrupt agents of inflicted suffering. These outsiders are the presumed seat of social ills; 
they are the blameworthy others who have earned their positions of derision or exclusion 
(Yang et al., 2007).  
  Stigma as reductive othering. Not coincidentally, the process of stigma involves 
the demarcation, identification, and categorization of people and subjects into these 
groups—the valued and the devalued—in the context if unequal social power (Link & 
Phelan, 2001). According to these authors, “substantial oversimplification is required to 
create groups” that effectively ignores the “enormous variability within the resulting 
category.” (p. 367). These observations have profound implications not only for the 
subjects of addiction and pain care, but the social landscape as a whole.    
  In the analyzed commentaries, there are examples of this reductive othering that 
are drawn from political narratives on a macro scale: Pitting Democrats against 
Republicans as enemies and/or defenders of the common decency, and the rights of 
deserving subjects. There are class-conscious expressions of resistance to existing and 
suggested allocations of power and privilege from competing ideological positions. Then 
there is the so-called legitimate patient who is set against the illegitimate user in a contest 
for morally and legally mandated consequences. These deserved ends are beseeched of 
and bequeathed by those outside of, and with more social power than, either people in the 
legitimate or illegitimate group. Seekers of medical care are ascribed diagnoses, 
motivations, needs, and deserved consequences by those to whom they submit their 
request, however else they may identify these for themselves.  
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  Inhabitable and ascriptive identities in discourses of pain and opioid use. 
Blommaert (2005) distinguished between inhabitable and ascriptive identity positions in 
social discourse. Inhabitable identities are those that people would choose, or at least 
acquiesce to adopt. Among their reference groups, these will have at least some claim to 
positive regard, however tenuous. Through this, individuals in these groups maintain a 
degree of influence over their position within a discourse of privileges and allowances. 
Ascriptive identities, on the other hand, are those ascribed to an individual, either by 
virtue of their discursive role (e.g., seeking care from a medical provider results in an 
ascription of patient identity) or by those with the power to do so. It matters not whether 
people sought to be identified by the ascriptive label of addict, for example, or even if 
they freely choose to retain it. It is the person who named them that has decided what 
they are and will treat them as they believe they should be treated.  
  Inhabitable identities in medical discourses include the researcher, physician, 
policy-maker, and patient—these all have some claim to legitimacy. Individual 
discursants may willingly identify with, and support the interests of these subjects albeit 
in unequal measure. Within the text used for this study, authors readily adopted the 
positions of independently resourced, opioid-free members of the collective public. When 
circumstances warranted, they inhabited (adopted/claimed) the identities of health care 
providers, policy-makers, people with pain, chronic pain patients, medical opioid user, 
and on rare occasion, a past abuser of drugs.  
  It is noteworthy that no one acknowledged themselves to be a current drug addict, 
or recreational opioid user. The drug addict, the lazy, the free-loader, the criminal, the 
greedy and the negligent, these were ascriptive identifiers in the commentaries. They 
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were names one may be called, not identities to be claimed nor subjects any one 
respectable would want to align with. These identities represented the loss of one’s claim 
to dignity as a being worthy of respect by self or others.  
  The idealized and problematized subjects as markers of social value. Ideal 
subjects can be idealizations to strive for, or problems to avoid and resolve, depending on 
their position in moral discourse (Parker, 2002). Idealized and Problematized subjects 
inhabit a metaphorical position in the commentary in that any reference to them is a 
marker of social valence for the identified subjects under discussion. It is through this 
indexical function that ideals come to exert their discursive influence over behaviors and 
resource allocations (Blommaert, 2005). Ideal subjects invoke discourses of 
deservingness that become part and parcel of the decision-making of social actors (see 
Hinze et al., 2009).   
  As a point of reference, idealized subjects highlight valued traits and social 
positions.  In this sense, they exemplify the concept of Centering Institutions (Silverstein 
as discussed in Blommaert, 2005). They represent the ideals under which subjects are 
deemed deserving of consideration or exclusion. The idealized social identities are those 
viewed most deserving of coveted rewards, including life sustaining resources (Kittay, 
2005).  
  Indexical markers of deservingness in the dominant discourse. As articulated in 
the reader commentaries, markers of the idealized subject position were the productive, 
working, taxpaying, law-abiding, rational, intelligent, self-sufficient, independent, free 
citizen with family connections. These individuals are further imbued with a sense of 
agency, responsibility, and are expected to demonstrate concern for the deserving other. 
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There is no case where one of these qualifiers is used as a negative descriptor in an 
attempt to diminish the standing of the associated subject. There is also no case wherein 
they are applied to the subjects of drug abusers or addicts—these illegitimate users were 
invariably problematized. 
  Problematized subjects are identified as something in need of resolution. Subjects 
can be thus positioned through explicit declaration, as when referencing the public health 
problems posed by drug addiction. The notion of public health renders these socially 
undesirable behaviors into objects of medicalized discourses for the purpose of directing 
social resources toward behavioral change efforts. It appears to be a category reserved for 
those behaviors that are perceived to pose a burden on the functioning of the collective.   
  The markers indexing problematic subjects can provide a window into dominant 
discourses of power, privilege, and the moral good (Blommaert, 2005). This is 
particularly evident when subjects are problematized through oppositional juxtaposition 
with idealized subjects. For example, when opioid use is described as a threat to 
rationality and productivity the social value placed on these qualities is emphasized. 
Likewise, when patients and/or opioid users are described as dependent (whether on 
social welfare or chemical substance) the negative evaluation of dependency becomes 
definitive.  
  Chronic pain is a problematized subject, as is its treatment, but the possibility of 
aligning with idealized subjects remains open for the individuals identified with the 
subject of chronic pain. Not so for the addict. Once assigned such a label, one can be 
justifiably excluded from consideration as the beneficiary of social action—no one is 
expected to listen to the drug abuser rationalizing their drug use. To do so is a mark of 
147 
 
 
 
exceptionality (e.g., practitioners of “addiction medicine”) or of gullibility (e.g., 
“prescription happy” providers).       
  Subjects that are set in opposition to the idealized cannot simultaneously offer 
exemplification of that ideal. This is not a question of truth, but of the inherent logic of a 
given statement. Identifying drug addicts as “human garbage” means that the drug addict 
cannot simultaneously inhabit a respectable identity in that narrative. A subsequent 
statement could effectively argue that respectable people may also be drug addicts, or that 
drug addicts are people to pity rather than discard. But if one accepts the parameters of 
the original argument, then there is no reason to hear what an addict might say in their 
own defense. If the addict is garbage, then they are someone with no value, no dignity 
and no voice. Why would anyone heed the requests of garbage, human or otherwise?      
  Obviously, it is in the interest of any supplicant to find a means of aligning with 
idealized subjects to increase positive responses to their supplication. The closer one’s 
position is to one, or preferably more, of the idealized role identifiers the greater the 
expectation of social reward. These rewards can be attitudinal or material. In the context 
of medical discourses of pain care, these rewards include respect, compassion, 
understanding, credibility, and discursive influence. They may also include privileged 
access to resources, including medical treatments, alternative therapies, assistive devices, 
and of course prescription opioids. Those who do not or cannot demonstrate alignment 
with the idealized subjects (e.g., law-abiding) face sanctioned social exclusion, 
exploitation, and restrictions on allowed access to desired resources (see Hinze et al., 
2009; Petersen et al., 2010).  
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  Living subjects as moral objects in discourses of chronic pain. The identified 
subjects specific (though not exclusive) to conversations about pain care include pain, 
policy, opioids, medical marijuana, addiction, disability, corporate interests, state welfare, 
public health, medical patients, drug addicts, providers, veterinarians, and animals as pets 
or chattel. These subjects are directly related to the actual topic of the conversation (pain 
care) and are positioned relative to the qualities of idealized subjects (e.g., rational, 
blameless), legitimacy claims (e.g., materially real and morally good), and posited social 
consequences (e.g., respect and access).  
  In medical discourses of deservingness, the subjects of central concern are those 
objects of cultivated and lived experiences—beings (human, animal, and plant). These 
beings have an experiential stake, acknowledged or otherwise, in the consequences of 
social discourse and the position of the subjects therein. Their existence and function, as 
objects in the world, are directly impacted by discursive actions which influence 
behavioral choices of other social beings.   
  The beings identified with idealized or problematized subjects may be positioned 
as something that merits earned recompense; can claim charitable rewards; must face 
social exclusion; or merely serve a means to an end (Kittay, 2005). The position in which 
they will ultimately come to rest in this discourse is based upon the (de)merits ascribed to 
them; their assumed characteristics; the social standing of the subject with which they are 
identified; and the needs/interests of other (more deserving) beings (Hinze et al., 2009; 
McMahan, 1996; C. Taylor, 1989).  
  Moral relativism and the subject of plants and animals. Discussing the place of 
plants, and even animals for some, may seem like a tangential topic to some readers. 
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Perhaps this is because plants are so rarely referred to as living beings in common 
parlance. They are identified primarily with the ends to which they are but a means. 
Aside from questions of the experiential potential of plant-based lifeforms, the subject 
position of specific plants and plant-based derivatives (e.g., opioids) can carry profound 
implications for the lives of the humans associated with them. 
  Plants are the subject of pain care discourses in their status as objects of trade and 
consumption. As agents, they may be potential sources of treatment, recreation, or toxin 
in their effects. As commodities, they may be available for acquisition in politically 
sanctioned markets or the illicit black-market trade. As consumables, they may be 
positioned as medicinally (i.e., legitimately) useful, or as a potentially dangerous form of 
entertainment and/or pathological coping strategy (i.e., illegitimate). As products, 
thousands of humans owe their economic livelihood to producing, investigating, 
confiscating, or otherwise controlling these plants and their derivatives. Other animals, 
particularly laboratory subjects, are made to ingest these substances for perceived benefit 
for human beings. 
  Plants as objects. In the current data, the plants of reference were opium poppies 
and cannabis. Opium as a “natural” pain reliever, harvested directly from poppy plants, 
was sometimes invoked similarly to medical marijuana. The proponents of medical 
marijuana, few of whom identified as people with chronic pain, were vociferous in their 
support of its use and dissemination. Even here the discourse was adversarial in tone: 
These “safe and effective” and “natural” forms of treatment were pitted against the 
“dangerous and deadly” synthetic agents of “greedy” corporate manufacturers. Some 
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patient identified commentators rejected medical marijuana for being ineffective or for 
effecting greater cognitive impairment than their opioid prescriptions.   
  In the interest of increasing the social standing of their identified object, medical 
marijuana supporters were observed to dismiss pain patient narratives if the latter claimed 
cannabis was ineffective for pain management. The subject of pain patients served an 
indexical function in these cases, it was not the actual subject of worth. Rather the pain 
patient was valued only as a backdrop for the elevation of marijuana’s position in medical 
discourses as a therapeutic agent.     
  Opium was more frequently an indirect subject in posts related to its derivatives. 
The opioid substances named in the text were, by-and-large, the synthetic concoctions of 
laboratory science. The plant itself was mentioned infrequently in reference to pure 
opium or in association with the black-market product—heroin. Despite having a place as 
diamorphine in the medical formularies of the United Kingdom, heroin is a substance 
with no legally sanctioned use in the United States (www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov). It is 
perceived to serve no purpose beyond the hedonistic pursuit of an undeserved euphoria. It 
is assigned no acceptable instrumental value and is allowed no commercial outlet within 
the politically sanctioned marketplace. Heroine, and to an extent opium itself, served as 
an indexical marker of illegitimacy and expendability for its users.     
  Prescription opioids—misused or not—bear the stamp of legitimacy as the 
utilitarian objects of medical discourse. As products made available on the open 
consumer market, they are objects of socially sanctioned use. As consumable objects of 
medicinal use, their safety and effectiveness is hotly debated in the commentaries 
analyzed above and in the professional literature (see Kalso et al., 2004; Ross et al., 
151 
 
 
 
2011). Medical patients enjoy privileged access to opioid substances, whether as pain 
treatments or agents of supportive withdrawal from opioid dependency, but even the 
medical use of opioids is a contentious topic. 
  Opioids, and by extension would-be opioid users, inhabit a contended space in 
discourses of deservingness. When illegitimate use is perceived inherent to the plant or its 
synthetic derivatives, there are few language moves available to users of the substance to 
justify continued use. If it is inherent to personal variables within the body of the user, it 
becomes an expectation that these can and should become the basis of restricting access 
to opioids. When opioid use is perceived to be a free choice or the result of addiction 
rather than medically necessitated and a last resort, the deservingness of the user to 
access either opioids or public sympathies is called into question. And when humans 
forfeit their dignity and abdicate their free-will (e.g., in choosing addiction), they become 
“weeds” to be “culled” as a means to an end for more deserving subjects (legitimate 
patients). 
  Animals as objects. Pain care discourses include the concept of suffering. Subjects 
suffer, from untreated pain or addiction or stigma and discrimination. This suffering is 
frequently cited as a moral predicate for medical and policy decisions. Within the 
discourse, there is an invisible subject whose suffering seems to warrant no notice. Non-
human animals are not so visible in the data used for this study, at least not by explicit 
mention.  
  Animals feature in the text as unstated indirect objects in posts referencing 
medical research into painful conditions and their treatments. It is simply an 
unacknowledged fact of our existence that animal “models” of painful conditions are 
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created as a means of increasing humans’ knowledge base. Of course “animal models” is 
itself a euphemism for the intentional induction of pain, disease, and disorder in non-
human creatures for the sake of researching it (e.g., Schiller et al., 2015). The animal, as a 
being, is secondary to the interests of those who are deemed deserving to benefit from the 
products of their cultivated experiences, painful or otherwise.    
  The most direct reference to animal subjects is in the reference to the claimed 
superior pain management training received by veterinary physicians over those caring 
for human patients. This is a stance with some support in at least one study (see Watt-
Watson, et al., 2009). These assertions seem to be used to shame care providers who are 
accused of failing to relieve the suffering of human clients. This is ironic because it can 
only be shaming if it is taken for granted that humans deserve greater pain management 
than animals, and the suffering of animal research subjects is ignored. The animals in 
these kinds of statements are not the actual subject of interest or significance, but rather a 
means to prove a point. They are otherwise invisible.  
  The fact that the suffering of individual animals forms the backbone of the 
medical industry’s knowledge base and production practices is not even a topic of 
conversation in the text of this analysis or the literature on palliative care. The fact that 
animal research subjects must certainly be subjected to extremely stressful and painful 
experiences to create opportunities for the benefit of pain patients (both humans and their 
chosen animal companions) is never acknowledged. The “rightness” of their subjugation 
in service of more deserving subjects is taken for granted. If some participants held 
different views on the subject of animals in pain research, they did not give them voice in 
this forum.  
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  There may be little room in medical discourses of disease and suffering for the 
minority views of animal sympathizers. Discursively speaking, the suffering of humans 
retains a high degree of persuasive power in medical discourses of deservingness. Yet, 
from a logical standpoint, the exclusion of animal suffering from the discourse serves to 
undermine the moral arguments of palliative care for any pain patient.  
  Models of palliative care are predicated upon the assumption that suffering is to 
be avoided and/or mitigated to the greatest extent possible given the material 
circumstances of the medical encounter (Cassell, 1991). If only certain beings (e.g., 
“legitimate patients”) deserve a palliative response to suffering, then the moral axioms 
dictating these responses are inescapably relative. Suffering, by itself, is no longer a 
tenable predicate for compassionate choices. The being who is suffering must have 
specified qualities in order to activate assignments of deservingness (McMahan, 1996).    
  Human beings—objects of ethical privilege. The subject (indeed the whole idea) 
of beings as a locus of perception, interpretation, and volition reflects notions of self at 
the heart of moral consideration (C. Taylor, 1989, Chapter 2). The human being is 
deemed deserving of posited consequences on the basis of belonging to a category of 
foundational value, a sentient human creature (McMahan, 1996). While some 
controversial lines of thought extend this value to other sentient creatures their 
subordination to human interests remains the dominant discourse (C. Taylor, 1989). 
Humans (particularly those with idealized qualities) are the deserving recipient of ends to 
which these others (e.g., animals) are but a means.   
  This is not to suggest that all human beings inhabit an equivalent space in 
discourses of deservingness, or that categorical exclusion of the “other” from moral 
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consideration is a fate reserved only for animals or the non-sentient. Different humans are 
clearly differentiated by identity status, e.g., disabled, welfare recipients, tax-payers, and 
gatekeepers. These are associated with differential assignments of deservingness (see 
Petersen et al., 2010). They deserve different consequences in response to their 
circumstances based in no small part on ascriptions of belonging, blame and/or capacity 
(McMahan, 1996; Petersen et al., 2010; C. Taylor, 1989). It seems logical to question 
how this relates to the maligned identities of the drug abuser and the contested identity of 
the pain patient.   
  For people with pain and opioid users, the self-sufficient, productive, independent 
ideal is a questionable attainment. A problematic dependence—on taxpayers, family, or 
addictive substances—along with a concomitant loss of productivity and increased 
irrationality become their assumed characteristics. Loss of rationality, particularly when 
this is seen as a voluntary dependence upon opioids, can lead to questions of one’s 
deservingness as a sentient being. The centrality of sentience to the concept of 
deservingness is so entrenched that the proper place of severely cognitively impaired 
humans is a subject of philosophical debate (see Kittay, 2005; McMahan, 1996).  
  In the event of semantic distantiation from idealized subjects (e.g., inability to 
align with productive, rational, citizen), claims to the social and material rewards of 
positive regard must be based upon factors. Modern-era conceptions of the deserving self 
are associated with the position of suffering as something individuals should be allowed 
to avoid or alleviate (C. Taylor, 1989, p. 13). The beings in this situation must become 
the objects of charitable action, a boon granted by social superiors, if they are to be the 
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subjects of respect and dignity. In this they may exercise a paradoxical influence over the 
actions of more powerful others (Kunz, 1998).  
  Identity roles and power relationships. These discursive processes can 
ultimately be thought of as reflection, creation, and creator of the social and material 
circumstances in which individuals exist (Parker, 2002). People may be identified with 
any number of available subject positions in discourses of deservingness but that does not 
mean their lives are definitively impacted by negative ascriptions. Semantic indications 
of blame and deservingness pair negative consequences with identified problem actors, 
making certain behaviors more likely than others. The actual consequences for a given 
individual and/or identity role will depend upon pre-existing power dynamics and the 
ability to influence the flow of resources (Goffman, 1963; Yang et al., 2007).  
  Existing power relationships will bear heavily on the outcome of any attempted 
categorization of a subject: A Medicaid patient may harbor negative stereotypes about 
their physician, but it is the physician’s beliefs that carry the weight of authority. Because 
of existing power relationships and social authority, a patient’s negative attitude is 
unlikely to affect the physician’s social standing. The physician’s stereotypes about pain 
or pain patients can, however, stand as an impediment to accessing medical care. That 
this is actually occurring has some support in empirical research. Hinze et al. (2009) 
reported findings suggesting that physician opioid prescribing decisions were related 
more to patient’s characteristics (whether they were socially stigmatized or acceptable) 
than to presenting complaints (regardless of whether pain stemmed from injury, illness, 
or nonspecific source).   
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  Identity roles in pain care discourses are enacted within politico-economic power 
structures that operate through relationships between regulators, providers, and 
consumers. Individuals may serve in positions of policy-makers and enforcers, financiers, 
producers, retailers, practitioners, and consumers—both the legitimate and illegitimate. 
These categories include, among others, patients; drug abusers; prescribers; doctors; 
acupuncturists; researchers; purveyors of therapeutic merchandise (e.g., manufacturers 
and distributors of treatment products); agents of insurers; public or private policy-
makers; people with or without pain; family-members; or observers.  
  In the analyzed commentaries, the government, political parties, policy-makers, 
health care professionals, pain patients, opioid users, and addicts have all been positioned 
in opposition to the idealized, deserving subject. That is, they have all been the identified 
problem set in opposition to the interests of more deserving subjects. All of these 
subjects, save for that of the addict/drug abuser, have also been aligned with idealized 
subjects and present inhabitable identities in medicalized discourses. The subject of the 
addict was sympathetic only in their potential as victims of naive or malfeasant 
prescribing and marketing. The absence of any examples of idealized associations with 
the subject of addiction, or defense of the rights or dignity of addicts demonstrates the 
extreme marginalization of this identity and the subject of non-medical use of opioids.  
  In the hierarchical power structure of regulator, provider, and consumer, there are 
those with limited power to advance their interests or influence others to meet their 
requests. Some are empowered through their access to resources, e.g., people with 
money, or associates who will readily provide them their needs. Some have been allotted 
privileged influence over the behavioral choices of other social actors, e.g., rule makers 
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and enforcers, or lobbyists for corporate or practitioner interests. HCPs are obligated, 
through socially sanctioned traditions, to function as gatekeepers to other 
resources—including treatment modalities.  
  Medical consumers are in the position of supplicants to these higher authorities. If 
they ask, they do so knowing they may not receive. Some may lay claim to positive 
regard or resource allocation only through charitable appeals. This includes people with 
chronic pain conditions who may have few financial resources, or suffer significant loss 
of self-sufficiency. If these consumers are deemed illegitimate by those with more social 
power (e.g., HCPs, policy-makers), they are not likely to receive the treatments they 
seek—be it opioid prescriptions or anything else. In the legal, medical discourses of pain 
care, the position of illegitimate drug user and care seeker are not inhabitable 
identities—they are ascribed and undesirable. 
The Role of Medical Discourses in Stigmatizing Pain and Opioid Use 
  Pain is a common experience of living beings. It may be mild or severe enough to 
impair functioning or even threaten physiological existences. It may be relatively brief or 
become a never-ending saga. According to the IOM (2011) report, pain is a leading cause 
of care seeking behaviors. However, as seen in the text of this study, not all people who 
experience pain will seek medical intervention for that experience, or wish to inhabit 
medicalized identities. Hence it would be misleading to refer to everyone with chronic 
pain as “pain patients.”  
  People with pain—patient and non-patient. People with pain become “pain 
patients” when they adopt the label, or when it is ascribed by virtue of their relationship 
with a pain care provider in seeking to mitigate the impact of pain in their lives. 
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Regardless, pain is a subject of medical discourses and as such people with pain are 
always potential pain patients. People with pain must therefore contend, to some degree, 
with the ascriptions associated with the pain patient identity role. For a person to inform 
another of their experience with persistent or recurrent pain, regardless of medical status, 
is to encounter stereotypes about pain patients—these include ideas of materiality, 
psychological dysfunction, and pursuit of opioids all of which affect assignments of 
deservingness.  
  Pain patients are further subdivided according to assumptions of duration and 
etiology. People seeking care for physical pain are categorized as acute pain patients, 
cancer patients, chronic pain patients (aka chronic non-cancer pain patients; IASP, 1994), 
or addicts and people with malingered disability. Assigning a patient to any of these 
categories is predicated upon vague notions of temporality and materiality regarding the 
attributed source of, and ascribed motivation for, reporting pain. Both the ascribed source 
of pain as well as the assumed motivation for reporting it have implications for how 
people will perceive and respond to people who report pain.  
  Treatment of subjectivity in a material worldview. Pain, particularly chronic 
pain, presents a challenge to accepted understandings of both the real and the good that 
underlie medical discourses (Cassell, 1991). It is neither consistently tangible to 
measurement nor consistently responsive to treatment efforts. As a subjectively reported 
experience, pain is not readily verifiable by external measures. Yet pain, especially 
severe and disruptive pain, is oft considered an experience worthy of palliation. In this, it 
is an apt object of chivalrous moral action.  
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  Addiction in medical discourses is a costly and distressing “disease” thought best 
treated through supported withdrawal (Roux et al., 2013). When addiction is the targeted 
object of palliative care, opioid abstinence is seen as the means of managing, if not 
curing, the medicalized condition of addiction. And when overdose reduction is the direct 
object, restricting prescribing practices is the life-saving objective by which health care 
actors enact their moral code to decrease iatrogenic distress. Thus the subjects of pain and 
addiction are positioned to benefit from mutually exclusive actions predicated upon the 
same chivalrous and utilitarian ethics of relieving the suffering of individuals and 
protecting the interests of the collective.   
   The HCP is the gatekeeper tasked with the responsibility to distinguish the 
legitimate from the illegitimate positions amongst supplicants for products, services, and 
positive regard. Acceptance of some degree of personal culpability for the consequences 
of the professional decisions is also an expectation for those in these roles. This is the 
situation of health care providers who are tasked with the authority and responsibility to 
determine whether or what services to provide to those who may request them. And they 
do so while receiving mixed messages from the research community as to what 
constitutes scientifically and morally sound predication for their chosen actions. 
  Population oversimplification as reductive othering. The fact that so many 
studies of patient experiences of pain care include references to both felt and enacted 
stigma (as defined by Scambler, 2004) while provider-oriented articles on pain care do 
not is indicative of this power dynamic. The HCP has the privilege of discussing the 
“continuous or escalating doses of opioids at the expense of worsening function and 
quality of life” as do Ballantyne and Sullivan (2015, p. 2098).  
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 The claims of opioid-using pain patients, such as those articulated in the 
commentaries—that their functioning and quality of life are improved by COT, or that 
they do not require dosage escalation—are rendered invisible to the readers of such 
articles. And while there may be cases wherein COT is more harmful than helpful, 
definitive claims of the ineffectiveness of COT are being made without sufficient 
evidentiary support (Dowell, Haegerich, & Chou, 2016; Ross et al., 2011). There is no 
discussion of a how these discrepant reports are to be reconciled. It seems not to have 
been a question that has been asked. Perhaps these voices are not deemed credible in the 
first place. Or perhaps it is a discrepancy that has yet to be acknowledged.  
  This is only one of many examples to be found in professional discourses of 
chronic pain of the oversimplification of group similarities and ignorance of intragroup 
variation that lies at the heart of stigma perpetuation (as articulated by Link & Phelan, 
2001). The editorial by Ballantyne and Sullivan (2015) include two other examples of 
this process as it has been applied to people with chronic pain. In the first, the decision to 
use opioids is attributed solely to prescriber assessments of patient reports of pain 
severity. While this is no doubt true in some situations, there is no mention of the 
possible sociological factors influencing the treatment related decisions being made by 
both patients and prescribers.  
  One such factor, expressed with apparent frustration in the commentaries, is a 
lack of funding for different treatment options (e.g., physical therapy for musculoskeletal 
pain). Working conditions may induce and/or exacerbate musculoskeletal conditions over 
the lifespan (Cassou, Derriennic, Monfort, Norton, & Touranchet, 2002). Yet the 
economic necessities that sometimes dictate available options for lifestyle, activity, and 
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treatment choices are rarely examined at length in the professional literature (Holloway & 
Haw, 2013). It is likely that the palliative therapy of opioids may be an attractive option 
where removing noxious stimuli, or accessing alternative therapies is not.  
  The second oversimplification that is found in Ballantyne and Sullivan (2015), 
and elsewhere, is their interpretation of the data from neuro-imaging studies with chronic 
pain patients—a group with ill-defined inclusion criteria and immense (unmentioned) 
variability. Advancing claims made in other studies and venues, these authors report that 
“over time pain intensity becomes linked less with nociception and more with emotional 
and psychosocial factors” (p. 2098). Never mind that they do not mention social factors 
in the article, they still invoke the apparently popular but ill-used concept of the 
biopsychosocial model of human experience (Manchikanti, Boswell, et al., 2009).  
  These authors are not alone in contending that chronic pain is a condition of an 
emotional and/or neuronal feedback loop (e.g., Thernstrom, 2010; Tracey & Bushnell, 
2009). What is being advanced is a conceptualization of chronic pain as a singular 
construct, a disease or disorder of the central nervous system, regardless of causative 
onset. “The factors leading to the disorder of structure or function might vary, as is the 
case with cancer, but the end result must be a disordered system” (Tracey & Bushnell, 
2009, p. 1114). This reductive interpretation of correlational brain-imaging studies is 
contributing to the conflation of diagnostic etiologies, including cancer, without 
mentioning the fundamental diversity of physical conditions associated with persistent or 
recurring pain.  
  It is logical to ask whether this hypothesis, that diagnostic discrimination is 
unimportant because chronic pain reflects a particular disorder, is positively true or false. 
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Without including comparative studies of diagnostic subpopulations, and sociological 
analyses of life conditions and pain experiences, it cannot be said to have been truly put 
to the test (Holloway & Haw, 2013). There are clinically pressing questions to be 
answered in accepting this formulation of chronic pain. Is it possible that some chronic 
pain is the result of on-going, or recurrent nociceptive input which ought to be addressed 
or at least acknowledged? And what of the opioid using patients with neuropathic and/or 
myelopathic conditions that assert positive response to COT? Are these complainants to 
be discredited at the fore, and if so on what grounds?  
  Collapsing diagnostic distinctions in COT research. As reviewed in the second 
chapter, numerous diverse health and life conditions may lead to an experience of 
persisting or recurring pain, generally referred to as chronic pain. This etiological 
diversity is effectively erased in deploying catch-all labels, such as “pain patients” or 
“chronic non-cancer pain” (CNCP). This latter is particularly deceptive as its use appears 
almost exclusively in relation to opioid treatments. More to the point, it is a concept 
defined and measured by what it is not rather than what it is.   
  CNCP does not demarcate a population that can be studied as a whole because the 
people in this category have only one thing in common: Their pain complaints are not 
attributed to cancer. As a semantic marker, it combines every known cause of persistent 
and/or recurrent pain other than cancer. It is a category inclusive of pain arising from any 
number of sources, including congenital disorders, physical malformations, auto-immune 
disorders, herniated discs, cartilage loss, repetitive motion injuries, conditions affecting 
the central or peripheral nervous system, and somatization of psychological distress. 
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Surely the distinctions between these source conditions are important for developing 
targeted intervention strategies, whether that is opioid analgesics or some other.  
  Some authors in the professional literature are careful to acknowledge that 
chronic pain “may or may not be driven by tissue injury” (Rosenblum et al., 2008, p. 5). 
It is telling that the section from which this quote is extracted did not use the term 
“CNCP.” Rather, this label was reserved for an earlier section of the same paper 
reviewing opioid efficacy studies for patients with pain from non-cancer sources. In other 
words, CNCP seems to be code for assessing the legitimacy of opioid use, not pain care 
as a general practice. 
  Diverse health conditions may be associated with chronic pain requiring different 
treatment approaches, but this does not mean that some patients seeking pain care have a 
ready diagnosis that can be a treatment target. In some cases, pain is the only target of 
palliative care. Recognition of this fact has led some authors to suggest new categorical 
identifiers, e.g., “maldynia” for “a wild-type of chronic pain” that is “non-purposive” 
(Giordano, 2011, p 1). Manchikanti, Singh, et al. (2009) advanced the term “chronic pain 
syndrome” to include both medically explained and enigmatic illnesses. They suggest 
that this phrase would be useful in discussing the complex problems of managing quality 
of life for patients with chronic pain. Neither of these suggested taxonomical labels has 
achieved currency in the social discourse. 
  Conceptualizations of chronic pain, whether as CNCP or as a disease entity unto 
itself carry significant implications for treatment related decision making. When HCPs 
encounter patients with pain, accepting the existence of variability in the causes of 
chronic pain leaves open a variety of treatment options. Such options, depending upon 
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the presenting conditions, may or may not include opioids, exercise, physical therapy, 
steroidal treatments, surgeries, psychotherapy or any number of other modalities (see 
Rosenblum et al., 2008; Vowles & McCracken, 2008). If chronic pain is a disease of the 
brain, there is only one logical treatment choice to make—drugs that target brain 
function. There is certainly a segment of the medical community who advocate 
psychopharmacological interventions as preferable to opioid treatment (e.g., Julien, 
Advokat, & Comaty, 2011). Their blanket ascriptions yet again dismiss or erase the voice 
of patients who claim a different experience. 
  It is striking that the empirically obvious questions are not readily identifiable in 
the literature. Medical researchers, practitioners, and commentators operate in a world of 
empirical epistemologies and material ontologies. Categorical distinctions are assumed to 
reflect the objective existence of distinct categories; however, it is an epistemological 
necessity of empiricism that these taxonomical categories are clearly defined and tested 
before they are accepted as real (valid). Is this really happening?   
  The literature reviewed herein did not define the objective, material basis of a 
categorical distinction between cancer pain and CNCP—they accepted it as foundational. 
The neural change hypothesis of chronic pain is generated from interpretations of neuro-
imaging studies. Are these conclusions equating correlation and causation? Do they 
successfully address confounding variables within the study populations? The question in 
need of answering is, how meaningful are the findings from these studies really? Are they 
truly generalizable or are the explanatory possibilities so numerous as to make any 
proffered conclusions arbitrary?  
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  It may be that these empirical questions have been addressed elsewhere in the 
professional literature, but they warranted no mention in the articles reviewed for this 
project. They have been taken-for-granted as foundational reality upon which to build 
subsequent understandings. It is one of the many questions arising in the course of this 
project that would benefit from future research. From the perspective of stigma 
perpetuation, it is the conflation of numerous pain conditions into a single disease entity 
that poses the largest threat to patient care. Why? Because attitudes, behaviors, and 
treatment decisions made in regard to people living with chronic pain will be informed by 
a conceptualization that renders individual differences irrelevant, or worse—invisible.  
  Personal characteristics, social conditions, diagnostic presentation, and/or 
treatment responsiveness all but disappear when the primary focus of medical attention 
becomes the disordered neuronal feedback loop of people complaining of chronic pain. 
This point was aptly made by M. D. Sullivan, Cahana, Derbyshire, and Loeser (2013) 
who also expounded the potential benefits of this disease model of chronic, as a bid for 
legitimization of chronic pain as an apt object of medical action. Yet this frame can 
increase ascriptions of inherency that preclude assumptions of variability and change, as 
indicated in studies of mental illness stigma (e.g., Mann & Himelein, 2008). 
  The concerning issue is that, not only does categorical collapse narrow the 
treatment options that will make sense to providers, it also creates an oversimplified 
category of easily stereotyped and dismissed people (Link & Phelan, 2001). If this is the 
box for people with pain, then negative stereotypes and attitudes toward the 
problematized subjects are applicable to all. If this becomes the all-inclusive 
understanding of chronic pain, then there is no path for an individual patient to move 
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from a derided or negated category to less stigmatized category and still carry the identity 
of pain patient. 
  It would seem that highlighting the diversity and complexities of pain complaints 
is a position of patient advocacy. If this diversity is accepted ontology in discussions of 
pain care, subsequent actions could be predicated upon an accepted need for safeguarding 
access to diverse treatment options. The question of whether an individual supplicant is 
deemed deserving of treatment, or perceived as credible is another question altogether.    
Opioid Use and the Denigration of Users 
  Discussions of pain care and people with pain eventually connect with the subject 
of opioid use—be it actual or potential. In the analyzed texts, complaints of pain were 
associated with pursuit of opioids and the value of the human subjects was often 
associated with the nature of their relationship with opioids. This discursive entwinement 
of opioids, addiction, and pain care intersects moral discourses of competitive 
individualism, chivalry, utilitarian ethics, and pragmatic necessities.   
  The moral dilemmas posed by these intersecting discourses are of such social 
significance that political responses are being mobilized nationwide. Policy, whether 
voluntary or mandated, offers decision-makers a guided instantiation of consensus 
reality; it tells us what is normative and acceptable within its scope of influence (Fischer, 
2003). In a sense, opioid prescribing policies represent an attempt to mitigate 
responsibility for the potentially harmful outcomes associated with the decision to 
prescribe or withhold opioid medications from requesting parties. The policies inform 
providers what is acceptable risks and can be referenced when and if prescriber decisions 
are questioned (Dowell et al., 2016).   
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  Thus opioid users are the living embodiment of a moral dilemma: To provide 
palliative substances to ease physically generated suffering that is not amenable to 
tangible measurement; or to withhold an addictive substance associated with dependence, 
criminality, and death. The crux of the argument seems to lie with the answer to a single 
question: In regard to opioid selection or restriction for patient-identified supplicants, 
which—addiction or pain—is the greater price to pay? Unfortunately, the question is 
complicated by the risk of accidental overdose and the widespread practice of 
polypharmacy treatments for various pain-related health complaints (Dowell et al., 2016).   
  Legitimate and illegitimate identity roles in discourses of opioid use. The cast 
of players in the discourse of opioid use included several identity qualifiers, of varying 
ideological valence. In producing and marketing opioids, the [“greedy”] pharmaceutical 
industry is either pushing addiction for profit or providing palliative care for suffering 
patients. In directing opioid prescribing practices, policy makers are either offering 
ignorant interference or needed policy guidance to providers in need of decisional 
predication—to prescribe or not to prescribe opioids. HCPs are potential allies for 
patients, but they are also cast as potentially uninformed or uncaring figures willfully 
withholding palliative care; or as the frightened middle-man who must comply with legal 
mandates of their social superiors (e.g., DEA) regardless of clinical judgment. 
  Opioid use is conceptually entwined with the subjects of drug abuse, addiction, 
and the person of the “druggie.” Within the commentaries, this semantic affinity was not 
affected by deployment of alternative lexemes (e.g., substituting “pain medication” for 
“narcotic painkillers”). The same words were used interchangeably by people 
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propounding starkly different positions, the advocates of medical access to COT, as well 
as those ascribing addict status to the majority of opioid users.  
  The associations involved are topical (opioids, addiction, and pain) as much as 
they are semantic (e.g., narcotics and crime). For multiple millennia, opioid substances 
have been used for pain relief and euphoric effect, and were associated with overdose, 
and addiction (Thernstrom, 2010). Centuries of association must leave little hope for the 
immediate discursive separation of these topics in modern bioethical analyses of patient 
stigma, as much as some patient advocates would, understandably, like to see done (e.g., 
Goldberg, 2010). The pain care debate would seem to be as much a debate about the 
place of opioids in our society as it is about the place of pain in our lives.  
  Moral categorization of opioid users. Pain patients are caught at this 
intersection of discourses on pain, opioids, addiction, criminality, and medicine. To the 
extent that people who use opioids are able to maintain ties with the identity of medical 
patient they may still openly vie for social reward and access to material resources. 
Where the patient identity is revoked, so too is the subject’s status as a medical object. In 
the dominant discourse, opioids and opioid users are sanctioned only in their role as the 
direct objects in medical discourse.   
  Although opioids have enjoyed a variety of sanctioned uses throughout history, 
currently there is only one sanctioned outlet for opioid use: It is a palliative measure to 
alleviate suffering from physical malfunctions or the physical symptoms of addiction 
withdrawals (Thernstrom, 2010). People who consume opioids are either legitimate or 
illegitimate users. They are categorized as either people who are granted sanctioned 
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access to opioids as medicine or those who use them—without warrant—for any other 
purpose.  
  The existence of discrete, identifiable categories of opioid-using subjects was 
never questioned in the commentaries, or the literature. Rather, it was the properties and 
their ease of distinction that was the subject of contention. The legitimate users included 
patients, providers, and the pharmaceutical industry. The illegitimate users were 
“druggies” and “pushers,” potential pretenders to patient-hood, or the unethical 
professionals with limited motivation to enforce existing restrictions.  
  In medical discourses of care, only the real (i.e., legitimate) medical patient is 
positioned with a moral claim to sympathetic social responses, and with it the potential to 
access opioids through sanctioned markets. The pretender (i.e., illegitimate patient) is 
anathema to all; in one way or another, their outcast position is a justifiable consequence 
of blameworthy choices, motivations, and behaviors. The illegitimate patient receiving 
opioids is one who is misusing both the health care system and the drugs. In short, they 
are a drug abuser.   
  Drug abusers are those who use opioids without legal or moral sanction. 
According to the designations of dominant discourse, they seek opioid substances for 
invalid reasons. Their opioid use is viewed as evidence of their degenerate state: These 
are the idle and the weak who seek primarily euphoria and escape. They may be seeking 
hedonistic recreation, or their lives may be governed by the singular quest for the fruit of 
the poppy, to stave off the shock of withdrawal as much as to experience its euphoric 
properties. Regardless of how they got here, whether they were victims—of prescriber 
malpractice, industry conspirators, or of an inherently addictive substance—or the agents 
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of free-will. Once they are ascribed this identity and motivation, they are accorded little 
dignity or voice in the discourse.  
  None of these motivations are met with particularly positive regard and the most 
compassionate position one is expected to take toward such an unfortunate wretch is the 
desire to free them from the influence of drugs. This is obviously contrary to the 
identified interests of chronic pain patients seeking continued access to opioid substances. 
It may also be contrary to the wishes of the “addict” or recreational user who want the 
ability for safe, affordable, easy access to opioids, but their desires are hardly given 
serious consideration in the text.    
  In the commentaries, illegitimate users are portrayed as parasites, whether by 
choice or ill-fortune. These subjects may be positioned within a narrative of the troubled 
naiveté of tragic desperation; the fatalistic devolution of unsuspecting middle class opioid 
users; or the devious machinations of a self-centered depravity. People who were 
ascribed this identity were frequently positioned as simply reaping what they had 
sewn—they had earned their position in society and were held blameworthy for their sad 
ends. When they died of overdose it was not so sorrowful a thing. This is a dangerous 
position to be in because once someone is posited to deserve their own death, there is 
little reason to pity them or endorse steps to reduce future incidents.   
  The subject of addiction was frequently positioned with one or more of the 
following qualifiers: irrational, unproductive, criminal, pathetic, dependent, garbage. In 
any case, they were perceived unable to safeguard their own physical, psychological, and 
moral integrity by abstaining from drug use. They are accused of draining resources and 
diverting attention from those seen to be more deserving of these things, to wit legitimate 
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patients, and care providers. And overdose was too frequently seen as proof of 
illegitimacy by both patient-identified and patient critical commentators. This results in 
the discursive exclusion of whole classes of opioid users from discourses of 
deservingness. 
  Resisting the position of identified problem. The pain patient, as a subject of 
discourse, is both disparaged and defended in the commentary. It was also an identity that 
numerous commentators claimed outright, as a point of authority born of experience, and 
as an appeal to moral sensibilities. The addict was maligned, vilified, and devalued pretty 
much across the board. No one claims the voice of the truly excluded: There was no self-
identified addict amongst the commentators arguing for greater consideration, more 
resources, or privileged access to opioids. Neither attitudes of compassion, respect, or 
derision, nor arguments favoring access or restriction were given voice from the position 
of addict-hood.   
  By and large, the position of the addict was outside any consideration of positive 
regard or socially supportive responses. They were presented as expendable if not 
downright villainous individuals who present a problem to the public welfare, or threats 
to social evolution. Legitimate patients, on the other hand, were framed as blamelessly 
suffering in mind and body. They were deserving of compassionate and palliative 
responses. It is clearly the preferable position for opioid users, both in terms of their 
access to prescriptions but also in terms of their access to personal dignity. If they lose 
this identity, they become one of the maligned. Unfortunately, whether someone is 
positioned as an addict or a legitimate pain patient is not something over which the 
categorized person has the ultimate say.  
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  One can accept or resist classification as illegitimate user, but successfully 
convincing others to reclassify one as another kind of person is wholly dependent upon 
the extent to which one’s arguments are granted credence by the interlocutor. A person 
may claim, even believe themselves, to be a legitimate pain patient but convincing 
another person that they are not an addict is another matter entirely. For this, a 
supplicant’s position must be associated with some degree of positive social regard. The 
person identified as an [potential] opioid addict has none. At least not until such time as 
they encounter a person who does not believe they are one.  
  The predilection of patient advocacy commentators to reinforce the maligned 
traits of the illegitimate user serves to undermine their own claim to social currency. If 
addicts deserve their fate, if they chose their fate, if they refuse to change their fate, then 
they are discursively aligned with negative social regard.  
  The currency of positive regard in discourses of deservingness. The regard in 
which a subject is held has direct consequences for ascriptions of deservingness and 
public support for the subject’s social influence. Positive regard extends benefits such as 
ascriptions of credibility and deservingness. These ascriptions are necessary for people to 
influence their position in the communicative situation. Their ability to willfully 
influence interpretative uptake of, or evoke behavioral responses to, their communicative 
attempts requires some degree of positive regard. 
  The accordance of influence is a direct reflection of the subject’s position with the 
preconceived notions of trait desirability (Goffman, 1963). In relationships of differential 
power dynamics, loss of voice and choice are feared consequences of negative social 
regard. To diminish one is to diminish the other. Someone speaking on behalf of a 
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discredited subject, from the position of a devalued identity, has limited means by which 
to influence their reception or the behavior of their interlocutor.        
  If the subject of opioid use is generally associated with an absence of 
productivity, or rationality, then it is the individual opioid user who must show 
themselves an exception to the rule. But how is this to be accomplished if expression of 
need or desire for opioids is perceived indicative of illegitimacy by gatekeepers and 
policy makers? If addicts are assumed to be deceptive in pursuit of opioids, then why 
should anyone accept protestations of legitimacy from a presumptive addict?    
  Distancing from ascriptions of illegitimacy and negative regard. When people 
were positioned as addicts by other discursants it was not a position that was willingly 
accepted. Quite to the contrary, the result was generally a furious attempt to distance 
oneself from everything associated with the addict label. One semantic strategy for 
achieving this was through the intensified denigration of the unwanted position. In effect, 
the message became: Addicts are bad, they are the problem actors who deserve their 
unpleasant fate. Patients are not like addicts; they are better people with more value who 
deserve palliative care. 
  In adopting this frame, the maligned identity of the illegitimate user is reified by 
advocates of medically sanctioned opioid access and the existing semantic associations 
with negative regard are strengthened. Ultimately, it is a strategy that undermines the 
patient’s own position because whether they are perceived as legitimate or illegitimate is 
not within their power. This defense of the worthiness of pain patients to access positive 
social regard and medically sanctioned access to opioid substances does not reflect the 
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power of the patient position. Rather, the implication here is that chronic pain is 
associated with a loss of status.  
  People who are [perceived] unable to earn their own way in a society prizing [the 
appearance of] financial and physical independence are positioned as dependent. When a 
patient relies upon opioid substances to lessen the disruptive influence of pain, their claim 
to respectability is made increasingly tenuous by the perception of increasing layers of 
dependence and assumed incapacities. Dependency and incapacity are deemed charitable 
positions at best, and parasitic at its worst. They are assumed to lead to loss of 
productivity and/or rationality,  
  Apart from accusations of drug abuse, chronic pain carries ascriptions of 
illegitimacy in other ways. Personal experience enjoyed a privileged position in the truth 
assertions associated with the subject of pain patients and opioid use. The medical 
discourse of patient care is, however, predicated upon the assumptions of material 
positivism. This philosophy of science leads to certain assumptions and expectations on 
the part of physicians and the general public: That which exists to be treated by 
physicians should be consistently tangible. Material existence is a requirement for the 
subject to be considered a real object amenable to manipulation and deserving of 
intervention. In a results oriented value system, the cure is a material demonstration of 
utility (the good) of medical intervention.  Pain offers none of these things—it is 
personal, intangible; it is a perception of the experiencing being not an object perceptible 
to the observing being. 
  Loss of social currency for pain patients and opioid addicts. Patient identity is 
experienced under a pall of suspicion that questions the person’s motivation, capacity, 
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rationality, and credibility. Pain patients have limited voice in determining the course of 
their journey through the medical community, much less the position they will be made 
to inhabit in discursive interchanges—whether it be legitimate or otherwise. The 
repetitious assertion that people living with chronic pain can also be associated with 
idealized subjects, e.g., productive, independent, and credible, belies an assumption that 
they are not. If one must argue the right to be included in any social category, then the 
default position would be one of exclusion. That their arguments for inclusion are 
perceived believable to any but the most marginalized listener is evidence of at least 
some tenuous connection to positive social regard.  
  Whether and to what extent an actual subject may be negatively impacted by 
being ascribed a problematic identity will depend more upon the influence of the 
positions they and their accusers inhabit within discourses of power and control than it 
will on the problems with which they are being associated. Certain identity positions are 
imbued with moral, legal, and/or scientific authority (e.g., health care providers, policy-
makers, and agents of law enforcement). When the role of a given social actor is to 
arbitrate the real and/or the good, it is their reality ascription that matters most in a 
contest of competing truth claims. Policy-makers are tasked with dictating the practices 
of their subordinates. Health care professionals act as gatekeepers for medical practices; 
their decisions are influenced by policy guidelines, but are ultimately based upon their 
own understandings of the problems and values at play. 
  Sociolinguistics, social regard, and ontological authority. As demonstrated in 
the reader comments, patient-identified agents may harbor ontological assumptions about 
their ailment that differ from those of their physician caretakers. Patients may ascribe 
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symptoms to physical malformations while their providers ascribe them to emotional 
stressors. Patients can also communicate their symptoms and experiences in a linguistic 
register that may exert little, or even negative, influence over the behavior of health care 
providers.  
  People without medical training may engage in narrative styles of communication 
using metaphorical descriptions in hyper-detailed, tangential anecdotes privileging 
personal experience over aggregate data. The professional register of the physician 
privileges succinct expression in the language of empirical science and calculated 
probabilities. Even phrases, such as “I need pain medications” are potential sources of 
misunderstood meanings and misattributed intentions. 
  Regardless of the feelings and beliefs of the patient, in these interactions it is the 
physician’s judgment of what is real and good that bears most pressing on the treatment 
the patient will receive. The patient may harbor negative stereotypes about their 
physician’s competence, though they have little recourse but to accept whatever treatment 
they receive, regardless of whether they find it oppressive. It is the physician’s 
stereotypes about the patient that will determine the type of medical services the patient 
will be offered. If the provider believes the patient is reporting pain symptoms for 
secondary gain, they may see no medical necessity to engage in the diagnostic or 
therapeutic endeavors patients may be seeking.  
  The person who seeks opioids from a health care provider may view themselves 
as legitimate patients, with a legitimate, verifiable physical claim to need. The provider 
may share this interpretation, or they may perceive the seeker to be after secondary gains. 
What is more, the provider may perceive opioids to be unsafe or ineffective as a long-
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term treatment, or they may endorse COT as a viable, affordable option. In the end, the 
patient’s perception of their pain or the efficacy of opioid management strategies has 
little bearing on whether they retain the position of legitimacy or are reassigned the label 
of illegitimate user.  
  Speaking from a position of illegitimacy. A person who inhabits the identity of 
pain patient who is accused of misusing opioids is ascribed the identity of an illegitimate 
patient. Requests for opioid prescriptions are unlikely to be granted by a provider who is 
responding to a position of illegitimacy. Moreover, any arguments made by the patient in 
defense of their medical legitimacy can be summarily dismissed as vain pretense, or 
misguided exaggeration. This, regardless of whether or not they seek opioids, may impact 
how their symptom complaints are responded to, if they are to be accorded any serious 
attention by a care provider at all. To be positioned as illegitimate is to be diminished of 
both voice and choice; as well as removed from one’s source of dignity—the possibility 
of aligning with multiple idealized subjects.  
  Whatever the actuality of the patient, or the objective existence of a causative 
source, the associational networks of the physician is ultimately decisive. If, for example, 
the physician perceives that observable spinal stenosis is not sufficient to account for the 
reported pain severity, then alternative explanations for the pain (e.g., hyperactive “pain 
centers” in the brain) are adopted by the practitioner. Whether the patient accepts these is 
irrelevant in the physician’s final analysis. The actions taken by the provider are guided 
by their own ascription of the patient’s complaint. The veracity of the consumer is 
assigned by the provider—a socially sanctioned performance of power and obligation.  
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  Trapping the consumer with the language of illegitimacy. Pain patients who are 
unhappy with the care they receive, and who seek to change providers, may be derided 
for “doctor shopping,” a charge of illegitimacy rather than empowered agency. To the 
patient, changing providers may be perceived as the appropriate consumer response to 
dissatisfaction. In the world of consumerist discourses, giving or taking one’s resources 
to competitor businesses is the power allotted the consumer. Unfortunately for the person 
with pain, seeking another provider may be deemed proof of their illegitimate 
consumption rather than a legitimate exercise of their socially sanctioned power as 
consumers. 
  For the illegitimate user there is neither consideration given to their 
interpretations nor reverence allotted to their position. Their access to opioids may be 
curtailed through regulatory practices, or relegated to the most unsavory of underworld 
markets. More to the point, they are moving beyond the pale of positive social regard. 
Their options for aligning with idealized subjects to maintain respect and dignity, to say 
nothing of influence, are increasingly limited. Everyone who may be identified with this 
position is forced to endure a derisive barrage of contempt enough to undermine any 
sense of dignity that they may, in vain, try and defend. These messages can lead to the 
adoption of a negative self-evaluation in line with social messages of unworthiness, what 
stigma researchers have termed self-stigma (Corrigan et al., 2009).  
  Earning our fate through social regard. In a society prizing its assumption of 
meritocracy, one’s social identity is not viewed a casted lot, but rather something that can 
be gained or lost through the actions of individual agents (C. Taylor, 1989). In a 
hierarchical social system, desirable social identities are associated with greater 
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privileges, influences, and worth (Blommaert, 2005). Therefore, subjects are positioned 
and repositioned within discursive exchanges in an attempt to increase positive regard 
and influence over social responses. When the social interests of one identified group 
conflicts with those of another the result is a competitive dynamic in which public 
opinion, personal dignity, and resource allocations are the contested rewards (Fischer, 
2003). The ultimate aim of these policy debates is to shift the moral predication of 
socially sponsored actions (Fischer, 2003).  
  Enacting values of independence, self-sufficiency, and self-definition, people at 
the border of deservingness are understandably trying to show themselves to be the kind 
of person who deserve to be granted rights, protections, resources, and some modicum of 
influence in directing the course of their lives. If their words are going to be given any 
heed, their identities and their claims must be associated with positive social 
regard—they must be respectable in some way. Failing this means losing the influence of 
one’s voice to argue in support of their own repositioning. (Blommaert, 2005).  
  Without voice, there is little social pressure on those with more privileged social 
standing to acquiesce to any request for respect or valued ends. This can leave people 
without social support, without pain care; without credibility; without a claim on the 
moral conscience not even that reserved for the tragic blend of blameless suffering and 
bearing endurance. Truly, what efforts can you be expected to take in alleviating the 
suffering experienced by people who deserve their ill-fate? 
  Those arguing from (or on behalf of) these less desirable (i.e., deserving) 
positions attempt to increase perceptions of deservingness through legitimating 
strategies—aligning with more deserving qualifiers and/or appealing to sympathetic 
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ideals. Commentators may have voiced support for opioids or denigrated those who use 
them, but if they aligned with the subject of chronic pain experiences (whether as medical 
patients or no), they did so as productive and independent, or at least as blamelessly 
dependent and unproductive as their circumstances allowed.  
  Degrees of denigration and shared qualifiers. People allied with the pain 
patient identity role engaged in discursive attempts to increase their authoritative 
influence in the discussion because their position requires this response: The pain patient, 
and all the more so the opioid user, are distanced from the idealized subject positions and 
from credibility’s authorizing source. As a result, people complaining of pain are not 
automatically granted credibility by their interlocutor. Rather, their motivations, their 
intentions, even their capacities are rendered suspect by virtue of their proximal 
associations with increasingly problematized subjects: dependency, irrationality, laziness, 
and criminality. 
  By definition, pain patients and opioid users both have lost an element of their 
claim to independence. They inhabit a position of undeniable dependence, relying on 
medical systems, family support, and/or social welfare. For opioid users, this negative 
evaluation is compounded by their dependence upon a drug associated with highly 
undesirable subjects (e.g., overdose, erosion of free-will, loss of moral reasoning, crime, 
and poverty). Yet, in both cases, to the extent their dependency can be named blameless, 
and so long as its costs remain acceptable to the giver, the subject of chronic pain 
maintains some appeal to positive regard as an object of sympathy and charitable reward.  
  Patients are positioned as someone who must prove their capacity, or at least their 
attempt, to fulfill the social expectations of the idealized subjects. Illegitimate users, on 
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the other hand, have no real means of aligning with these idealized subjects because, by 
definition, they are the embodiment of the problematized subject—the irrationally 
dependent, willful agent of their own destruction whose behavior harms more deserving 
others. The greater the denigration of the addict position, the less influence is accorded to 
those who have been identified as addicts, and the less credence is given to their 
protestations. It becomes easy to dismiss the claims of those who are defined by their 
self-serving manipulations and criminogenic immorality.  
  When addiction or overdose are identified as inevitable, or as being of greater 
concern than unmitigated pain, any advocate of continued use becomes suspect. Who 
would willingly argue for continued use of a dangerous substance, except people who are 
addicted to it? If addiction is inevitable it becomes easier to dismiss the voice of people 
who claim their lives are better for the aid of opioids. Medical patients (legitimate users) 
become drug abusers (illegitimate users) in all cases. Illegitimate users are a problem in 
need of elimination. Thus opioid using patients must defend the legitimacy of their 
position. Such a defense is successful only to the extent that the listener assumes the truth 
of their assertions and for this they must be deemed credible.   
Suggestions for Future Studies 
  At the outset of this undertaking, I perceived the problems related to chronic pain 
management to be “multifactorial, and infinitely complex.” Yet for all, I was still 
narrowly focused on the position of pain patients in medicalized discourses. This was 
clear by the quote I selected to open the literature review: “Relations between pain 
patients and health care deliverers are considered the worst in medicine” (Jackson, 2005, 
p. 338). Indeed, this should be far from surprising. Pain patients and providers are caught 
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at the intersection of discourses on pain, opioids, addiction, criminality, and medicine. 
There can be nothing easy about obtaining harmony in a relationship characterized by the 
conflicting agendas these subjects must necessarily evoke.  
  Moral analyses. The identities of pain patient, opioid user, and drug abuser are 
thus entangled in a nexus of medico-moral discourses centrally concerned with 
distinguishing right perception and action from the wrong. Use of opioids is deemed to be 
either legitimate or illegitimate, making it necessary to sort people by their purpose and 
motivation in needing, seeking, using, and or rejecting opioids. The provider, on the other 
hand, has been tasked with the dual role obligations of offering medical care to the 
legitimate patient and repudiating the illegitimate seeker.                     
  For the patient-identified subject, aligning with the legitimate position is the only 
means of retaining some degree of dignity, respect, and influence. As a medical patient, a 
person becomes a moral object of palliative care discourses. They may become the 
recipient of palliative measures but only at the behest of the HCP who is ethically 
charged with selecting the appropriate treatment in every circumstance. Yet medical 
treatment for opioid seekers is mutually exclusive dependent upon whether one is 
identified as a person in need of opioid access or withdrawal—i.e., whether one is a 
patient of pain care or addiction care.    
  Whether they are a pain patient, brain disordered patient, or a patient of addiction 
medicine, as long as they are identified as a patient, they have some claim to influence 
over those who may regard them with some, albeit varying degree of, sympathy. Of 
course these different categories of patient do not enjoy the same rewards of status, 
choice, or even preservations of dignity. Yet where the legitimacy of their patient-hood is 
183 
 
 
 
revoked, so too is the subject’s status as a medical object and any residual credibility for 
medical palliation, including the use of opioid substances.    
  In a world of finite resources, and/or restrictive allocation, it is a clear fact of life 
that conflicts of interest must be settled. Within medical discourses of patient care and 
opioid use, not everyone or everything can serve the position of suffering object for the 
palliative provider. Like it or not, utilitarian decisions must be made for the simple fact 
that some claims are in direct opposition one to another. We are sometimes forced by 
exigencies to choose one at the expense of the other. Ultimately this is the existential 
situation underlying the scientific use of animals: For some to live others must die. To be 
compassionate may be viewed as good but some subjects (ailing humans; legitimate 
patients) are seen to deserve a greater share than others (research animals; the humans 
addicted to drugs; or malingering; or criminally motivated).  
  The same person can be named addict or pain patient. The considered medical 
treatment for the former is opioid restriction while for the latter—regimented opioid 
consumption. Yet, the restriction of opioids can be a utilitarian decision as well as a 
medical one. Addiction is costly, in terms of health care costs, family and individual 
distress, and criminal justice involvement. Criminal involvement is costly not only in 
terms of incarceration expenditures but also in terms of the ripple effect of victimizing 
assaults, robberies, and neglect that are associated with opioid addiction.  
  Life with chronic pain is also costly, in terms of health care costs, family and 
individual distress. There are people living with chronic pain who report finding an 
increased capacity to participate in life activities with the use of opioid medications, with 
mitigating effects on subjective distress. But if they are described as human garbage, or 
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even pitiable victims of drug addiction, they will not receive the care of the pain patient 
but rather the treatment reserved for the identified addict. If people develop an addiction 
to the medication used to palliate their pain, they will be subjected to the derision 
reserved for the drug addicted. Rejecting this categorization may be as much about 
maintaining access to respect and dignity as it is to retaining access to prescribed opioid 
substances. Depending upon how they are categorized, people may be left without pain 
care, compassion, respect or dignity.     
  It is for this very reason, for the sheer gravity of potential consequences, that I 
argue the necessity of applying a moral lens to the analysis of conditional subject 
positions and predicating arguments within our discourses. Decisions of such magnitude 
should not be based on tacit assumptions (about patient legitimacy) or the vague 
impressions left by widely used but poorly defined jargonese (e.g., chronic non-cancer 
pain). Rather, examination of the underlying assumptions and potential consequences of 
our discursive formulations must be incorporated into educational programs and anti-
stigma advocacy efforts if we are to avoid reification of existing strategies of 
marginalization facing pain patients and addicted persons alike. 
  Continuous opioid therapy: Studies of effects and outcomes. Concepts like 
Chronic non-cancer pain as much as the idea of the legitimate patient should be the 
subject of both scientific and discursive analysis. Their assumed truth value needs to be 
questioned both from an epistemological standpoint and from the pragmatic analysis of 
how they effect and are affected by social behaviors. As a population, CNCP patients 
should be subdivided in research programs according to more explicit inclusion criteria to 
address potential confounds for explaining the meaning of findings of statistical analyses. 
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If it was a population of established empirical validity at some point in history, that point 
should be referenced in more recent publications to aid modern readers in interpreting the 
significance of COT research.    
  The use of opioids for chronic pain management deserves real assessment, with 
clearly delineated inclusion criteria. Policies are being set based upon an urgent need to 
reduce overdose deaths, but they are not built on ample evidentiary claims of problematic 
or ineffective use. In fact, it is an admitted dearth of empirical information regarding the 
efficacy of COT alongside a surfeit of overdose statistics that make wholesale restriction 
of opioid prescribing not only logical but an ethical imperative.  
  In explaining recent CDC guidelines preferencing non-opioid treatments for 
chronic pain, the limitations of evidentiary analysis were described thus, “Meta-analysis 
was not attempted due to the limited number of studies, variability in study designs and 
clinical heterogeneity, and methodological shortcomings of studies” (Dowell et al., 2016, 
abstract). This is an unacceptable—not to mention mysterious—state of affairs given both 
the stakes for patient lives and company profits.        
  Opioid using pain patients should receive greater attention in the pain care 
literature. Their claims of safe and efficacious use of opioids with and without dosage 
escalation should be taken seriously by medical researchers and practitioners. To validate 
or discredit these claims through empirical research can only benefit patients and 
providers in making informed treatment decisions related to long-term palliative pain 
management. There may yet be sound reasons that some patients have claimed COT 
facilitates continued productivity or improved quality of life through mitigation of pain 
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related suffering. Understanding what these reasons might be can inform decisions 
related to targeted interventions for individual care seekers. 
  The voices of people living with pain who do not seek medical intervention are 
strikingly absent from the discourse of chronic pain and patient care. Yet they existed in 
the commentary, albeit as a minority. This is a population that may be hard to research 
because they do not rise to the attention of providers, advocates, or researchers. It is an 
open question whether their choices to forego medical services are a result of their own 
attitudes toward pain or an outgrowth of social attitudes about people who seek pain care. 
Similarities and differences in the experiences of those who seek care and those who do 
not may be informative for anti-stigma work as well as identification of potentially useful 
interventions for care seeking patients. 
  Professional roles, attitudes, and needs. Healthcare professional’s (HCP) have 
been tasked with identifying appropriate interventions within the economic means of 
their patients. They have also been tasked with acting as gatekeepers, sorting the 
legitimate from the illegitimate care seekers. With a dearth of studies as identified above, 
this task must be accomplished with little by way of empirical guidance. Moreover, few 
contemporary studies have directly examined HCP attitudes about chronic pain patients 
and opioid prescribing. More frequently HCP attitudes are inferred from the studies of 
patient experiences of care seeking. This is an unhelpful situation for clinical educators, 
practitioners, and patients alike.  
  For these reasons, it would seem imperative to conduct research exploring HCP’s 
needs and attitudes. Such a research program may help to determine what the HCP would 
find helpful in carrying out their task of gatekeeping opioids, and identifying appropriate 
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interventions. These results can then be used in developing provider education materials 
and inform more targeted research into patients’ medical needs. Such research may also 
be used to inform patient advocacy work toward stigma reduction.     
  Stigma in chronic pain and addiction. Future studies of stigma in pain care, and 
addiction medicine, may find value in exploring the correlation between dominant 
ideological values and attitudes toward specified groups associated with pain, opioid use, 
and addiction. In conducting this analysis, I was led to the question of whether high 
valuation of independence/self-sufficiency would correlate with increasingly negative 
attitudes toward people identified with the pain patient and/or label. It also occurred to 
me to ask whether such values predicted the likelihood of ascribing devalued motivations 
for care-seeking behavior among people complaining of pain. 
  Development of attitudinal measures for patients, providers, and general 
population respondents may be another fruitful avenue of study. This could explore the 
question of whether high valuation of individual responsibility may correlate with 
increased negative evaluations of identified addicts. Is the assumption of victimhood a 
moderator of ascriptions of blame when determining whether pain patients and addicts 
are deemed deserving of different outcomes?  
  Are stigmatizing attitudes toward people with pain affected by assumptions of 
uniformity amongst pain sufferers? Is this potentially changed if diagnostic, etiological 
and prognostic distinctions are provided? What bearing does this have on attitudes toward 
those whose pain is deemed unexplained or ascribed to controversial syndromes? 
Questions such as these may be answered with the use of vignette studies, the results of 
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which may inform pain management education. They may also inform educational efforts 
targeting the provision of psychological services to people with history of chronic pain.  
  Psychotherapy with stigmatized patient populations. While stigma and anti-
stigma efforts receive a great deal of attention in psychological research, the role of 
therapists in working with people who live stigmatized identities does not. Therapists will 
undoubtedly encounter people touched by the stigma of chronic pain or opioid use. 
Regardless of whether this occurs in the context of providing pain management care, 
chemical dependency treatment, or merely serving clients in other contexts who have 
these histories. Studies have indicated that stigma has a negative impact on health and 
well-being (Allison, 1998; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009). Moreover, ascriptions of 
deservingness can result in negative evaluations of ones’ self (Callan et al., 2014). From 
the perspective of therapeutic work with stigmatized populations, there appears to be 
little information for therapists and advocates. 
  The questions not being asked are myriad. How can therapists benefit people 
whose interpersonal world is significantly impacted by stigma? How do they refrain from 
reinforcing instances of felt stigma in their interactions with stigmatized patients? What 
are the needs of patients whose psychological existences is punctuated not only by the 
experience of physical distress but also the denial of material explanations for their pain? 
How can therapist support the well-being of patients whose stigmatized identity carries 
with it ascriptions of extreme denigration, e.g., the opioid addict? 
  These are questions in dire need of examination because the reality of our social 
lives entails stigma. In every society, some forms of action, physicality, or accident of 
birth are celebrated while others are maligned (Goffman, 1963). This is inescapable, 
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whether or not activists want to acknowledge the futility of their valiant endeavor to de-
stigmatize their chosen target. If anti-stigma work is taken seriously, advocates must be 
careful not to transfer negative attitudes from one marginalized group to another, as 
seems to be the case with setting the legitimate pain patient against the drug abusing 
person. To contribute to the marginalization and denigration of one group for the 
perceived benefit of another is to perpetuate a culture of discrimination and oppression 
that benefits no one.   
Concluding Remarks 
 Negative stereotypes about people with chronic pain pose a barrier in the delivery 
of care; contribute to worsening symptoms of physical and psychological distress; and 
play a role in policy decisions that adversely affect patients and providers. People with 
pain experience this stigma through accusations of malingering, laziness, mental 
aberration, attention seeking, and drug seeking. These attitudes are propagated through 
discourse in obvious and non-obvious ways that can defy well-intentioned change 
efforts.   
 Assumptions of choice and agency were associated with ascriptions of blame and 
deservingness. Assignments of blameworthiness were used to distinguish the legitimate 
pain patient from the illegitimate care seeker. Motivation for seeking pain care as much 
as the effects experienced by the user provided crucial determinants in evaluating 
legitimacy claims and blame ascriptions.  
 Evaluations of deservingness were predicated on the valence of social regard. 
Compassion, empathy, respect and influence were the rewards of positive social regard. 
Proposals for resolving perceived conflicts of interests between groups were predicated 
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by one or more pragmatic, utilitarian, objectivist, or chivalrous moral arguments. In 
medicalized discourses, ontological materialism along with empiricist epistemologies 
were applied in support of untested truth claims.  
 The disease entity model of chronic pain and the population category of chronic 
non-cancer pain were both offered as taken-for-granted realities with little attention to 
confounding variables in research design. Particularly in light of the potential impact 
these medical and social frames on the lives of people and animals, these confounds 
cannot be left as they are—implicit and unquestioned. There is a critical need for moral, 
logical, and empirical analysis of predicating factors in care giving decisions for both 
people identified with pain and/or addiction.  
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COT     Continuous Opioid Therapy 
CPC     Chronic Pain Condition 
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